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University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
 
Recent studies have forecasted major growth in mobile broadband traffic. Due to the predicted 
high growth rate of mobile broadband traffic over the coming years (demand), there is a need for 
more wireless network capacity (supply). One of the major approaches to expand mobile wireless 
capacity is to add more spectrum to the market by enabling “spectrum sharing”. The FCC has 
issued many reports indicating that the US is dangerously close to running out of capacity for 
mobile data, which is why the FCC and the NTIA have been working continually to enable 
spectrum sharing.  
The spectrum usage rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users/licensees 
come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth 
of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio 
networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use 
and share spectrum more intensively.  
This dissertation is written on the premise that spectrum sharing will be a major factor in 
increasing the capacity supply in the near future. The focus of this dissertation is to examine and 
quantify the benefits of spectrum sharing through different enforcement scenarios.  
Enabling spectrum sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing 
agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable. This 
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dissertation will examine the spectrum sharing between government and commercial users and try 
to generalize some finding, which can be implemented, in different spectrum sharing cases.  
This analysis is valuable because it will help regulators/governments prepare for possible 
future scenarios in addressing the potential capacity crunch. In addition, it can give the incumbents 
more insight into expected future sharing as well as into how to optimize mitigation of possible 
harmful interference that may result. It is also of value to commercial users and operators in that 
they can use the results of this work to make more informed decisions about the economic benefits 
of different spectrum sharing market and opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 3 
1.1.1 Spectrum Management and Licensing .......................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Taxonomies of Spectrum Sharing .................................................................. 4 
1.1.3 Spectrum Crunch or Capacity Crunch ......................................................... 6 
1.1.4 Mobile Broadband Traffic .............................................................................. 6 
1.1.5 Dynamic Spectrum Access ............................................................................ 12 
1.2 MOTIVATION .................................................................................................. 13 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................... 14 
1.4 RELATED WORK ............................................................................................ 15 
2.0 FACTORS TO INCREASE NETWORK CAPACITY .......................................... 19 
2.1 MORE CELL SITES ......................................................................................... 20 
2.1.1 Number of cell sites........................................................................................ 21 
2.1.2 Offloading to Wi-Fi and Femtocells ............................................................. 24 
2.2 TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................ 26 
2.3 MORE SPECTRUM ......................................................................................... 27 
2.3.1 Exclusive Spectrum ....................................................................................... 27 
2.3.2 Shared Spectrum ........................................................................................... 29 
2.3.3 Unlicensed Spectrum ..................................................................................... 30 
2.4 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 31 
vii 
 
3.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN ............................................................. 32 
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................... 33 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................... 35 
3.2.1 Research settings............................................................................................ 35 
3.2.2 Hypotheses ...................................................................................................... 38 
3.3 RESEARCH OUTLINE .................................................................................... 40 
4.0 ENFORCEMENT IN SPECTRUM SHARING ...................................................... 43 
4.1 ENFORCEMENT CONCEPTUALIZATION ............................................... 43 
4.1.1 Spectrum Holes .............................................................................................. 44 
4.1.2 Centralized vs Decentralized Enforcement ................................................. 45 
4.1.3 In-Band and Out-Of-Band Interference...................................................... 46 
4.1.4 Ex Ante and Ex Post Enforcement ............................................................... 46 
4.1.5 Analogy ........................................................................................................... 47 
4.2 EX ANTE ............................................................................................................ 48 
4.2.1 Exclusion Zones ............................................................................................. 48 
4.2.2 Policy Language ............................................................................................. 51 
4.2.3 Device Standardizations ................................................................................ 52 
4.2.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 53 
4.3 EX POST ............................................................................................................ 53 
4.3.1 Sensing Network ............................................................................................ 54 
4.3.2 Litigation ........................................................................................................ 56 
4.3.3 Interference Threshold at PU Location ....................................................... 57 
4.3.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 57 
viii 
 
4.4 BENEFITS AND COST OF ENFORCEMENT ............................................. 58 
4.4.1 Precision of Enforcement .............................................................................. 58 
4.4.2 Enforcement Cost .......................................................................................... 59 
5.0 SPECTRUM SHARING MODEL ........................................................................... 61 
5.1 GENERAL MODELING .................................................................................. 61 
5.1.1 White Space (W) ............................................................................................ 64 
5.1.2 Gray Space (G)............................................................................................... 65 
5.1.3 Black Space (B) .............................................................................................. 65 
5.2 MAIN FUNCTION OF SIMULATION .......................................................... 67 
5.2.1 SU Transmitted Power .................................................................................. 68 
5.2.2 Antenna Gain ................................................................................................. 69 
5.2.3 Path Loss ........................................................................................................ 71 
5.2.4 Frequency Dependent Rejection .................................................................. 72 
5.2.5 Assumed Losses.............................................................................................. 74 
5.2.6 Aggregate Interference .................................................................................. 74 
5.3 MODEL DESIGN .............................................................................................. 74 
5.3.1 Settings ............................................................................................................ 75 
5.3.2 Research Assumptions .................................................................................. 75 
5.3.3 Area of simulation ......................................................................................... 77 
5.4 FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS ............................................................... 79 
5.4.1 PU Antenna Gain ........................................................................................... 81 
5.4.2 SUs Density ..................................................................................................... 83 
5.4.3 Frequency ....................................................................................................... 84 
ix 
 
5.4.4 Interference Threshold.................................................................................. 88 
5.4.5 MIMO Effects on Aggregated Interference Level ...................................... 91 
5.5 SPECTRUM PRICING..................................................................................... 92 
5.6 CASE STUDIES OF GOVERNMENT-COMMERCIAL SHARING ......... 93 
6.0 SPECTRUM SHARING IN THE 1.7 GHZ BAND................................................. 95 
6.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY USERS ........................................................ 95 
6.1.1 Primary User .................................................................................................. 96 
6.1.2 Secondary User .............................................................................................. 97 
6.2 SIMULATION SETTINGS .............................................................................. 99 
6.2.1 PU Characteristics ....................................................................................... 102 
6.2.2 SUs Characteristics...................................................................................... 108 
6.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .......................................................................... 110 
6.3.1 Inputs to Simulation Model ........................................................................ 110 
6.3.2 Benefits Evaluation of Spectrum Sharing ................................................. 114 
6.3.3 Sharing Benefits ........................................................................................... 120 
6.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 123 
6.4.1 Additional Losses ......................................................................................... 123 
6.4.2 SUs Active Factor and Density ................................................................... 125 
6.4.3 Black Space Boundary ................................................................................ 128 
6.4.4 Relocation Benefits ...................................................................................... 129 
6.4.5 NTIA Analysis VS Simulation Results....................................................... 131 
6.5 HYPOTHESES TEST ..................................................................................... 134 
7.0 SPECTRUM SHARING IN THE 3.5 GHZ BAND............................................... 138 
x 
 
7.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY USERS ...................................................... 139 
7.1.1 Primary User ................................................................................................ 139 
7.1.2 Secondary User ............................................................................................ 140 
7.2 SIMULATION SETTINGS ............................................................................ 141 
7.2.1 PU Characteristics ....................................................................................... 141 
7.2.2 SUs Characteristics...................................................................................... 142 
7.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .......................................................................... 144 
7.3.1 LTE-UE Scenario ........................................................................................ 145 
7.3.2 LTE Scenario ............................................................................................... 149 
7.3.3 Femtocells and WiFi Scenario .................................................................... 154 
7.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 158 
7.4.1 SUs Active Factor and Density ................................................................... 158 
7.4.2 Minimum Elevation Angle .......................................................................... 159 
7.4.3 Black Space Boundary ................................................................................ 160 
7.5 HYPOTHESES TEST ..................................................................................... 161 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ............................................................. 163 
8.1 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 164 
8.2 GENERALIZATIONS AND SPECULATIONS .......................................... 170 
8.3 FUTURE WORK ............................................................................................. 172 
APPENDIX (A)    SPECTRUM OPPORTUNITY COST .................................................... 174 
APPENDIX (B)    MIMO EFFECTS AND TRANSMIT POWER ...................................... 176 
APPENDIX (C)    POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS CHART ................................... 179 
APPENDIX (D)    ANALYSIS OF THE FCC AUCTION-DATABASE ............................. 188 
xi 
 
APPENDIX (E)    SHARING BENEFITS DETAILS............................................................ 190 
APPENDIX (F)    THE CUMULATIVE VALUE FOR EACH EARTH-STATIONS ....... 197 
APPENDIX (G)    TYPES OF THE PUS AT THE 3.5GHZ BAND .................................... 206 
APPENDIX (H)    SHIPBORNE RADARS SPECIFICATIONS ......................................... 211 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 212 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1-1 Illustration of different spectrum sharing cases .............................................................. 5 
Table 1-2 Examples of mobile broadband traffic growth ............................................................... 9 
Table 2-1 Main factors to increase the capacity over the past 50 years ....................................... 20 
Table 2-2 Number of cell sites in the US ...................................................................................... 22 
Table 2-3 The US mobile spectrum allocations ............................................................................ 28 
Table 3-1 Correspondence research settings and hypothesis with research questions ................. 41 
Table 5-1 Summary of proposed classifications ........................................................................... 66 
Table 5-2 Model equations descriptions ....................................................................................... 68 
Table 5-3 Major model inputs and variables ................................................................................ 80 
Table 6-1 Specifications of the MetSat 18 earth-stations ........................................................... 100 
Table 6-2 Detailed specifications for each MetSat 18 earth-station ........................................... 103 
Table 6-3 Population density analysis (1/2)................................................................................ 104 
Table 6-4 Population density analysis (2/2)................................................................................ 105 
Table 6-5 Relevant inputs to the simulation model based on MetSat case ................................. 112 
Table 6-6 Population data based on the latest U.S. Census Bureau (2010) ................................ 113 
Table 6-7 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block A (20 MHz) ..................................................... 116 
Table 6-8 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block B (20 MHz) ..................................................... 117 
Table 6-9 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block C (10 MHz) ..................................................... 118 
Table 6-10 Analysis summary, based on average spectrum auction prices ................................ 119 
Table 6-11 Benefits evaluation summary of B Space ................................................................. 121 
Table 6-12 Benefits evaluation summary of G Space ................................................................ 122 
xiii 
 
Table 6-13 Benefits evaluation summary of B, G, and W Space ............................................... 123 
Table 6-14 Sensitivity analysis in B, G, and W space: additional losses = 10 dB ..................... 124 
Table 6-15 Sensitivity analysis in B, G, and W space: additional losses = 20 dB ..................... 124 
Table 6-16 Active factor of SUs for G space .............................................................................. 127 
Table 6-17 Relocation benefits analysis of the 18 earth-stations ............................................... 130 
Table 6-18 Comparison between NTIA analysis VS simulation results .................................... 133 
Table 7-1 Specifications of shipborne radars.............................................................................. 141 
Table 7-2 B and G space radius for LTE-UE scenario ............................................................... 146 
Table 7-3 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in LTE-UE Scenario ................................ 147 
Table 7-4 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in LTE-UE Scenario ................................ 147 
Table 7-5 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 3 in LTE-UE Scenario ................................ 148 
Table 7-6 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 4 in LTE-UE Scenario ................................ 148 
Table 7-7 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 5 in LTE-UE Scenario ................................ 148 
Table 7-8 LTE network topology ............................................................................................... 150 
Table 7-9 B and G space radius for LTE scenario ...................................................................... 151 
Table 7-10 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in LTE Scenario ..................................... 152 
Table 7-11 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in LTE Scenario ..................................... 152 
Table 7-12 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 3 in LTE Scenario ..................................... 152 
Table 7-13 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 4 in LTE Scenario ..................................... 153 
Table 7-14 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 5 in LTE Scenario ..................................... 153 
Table 7-15 B and G space radius for Femtocells-WiFi scenario ................................................ 156 
Table 7-16 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in Femtocells and WiFi Scenario ........... 157 
Table 7-17 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in Femtocells and WiFi Scenario ........... 158 
xiv 
 
Table 7-18 Sensitivity analysis for SUs density in Shipborne 1 ................................................. 159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1 Forecast of global mobile data traffic ........................................................................... 9 
Figure 1-2 Forecast of global mobile traffic for voice and data 2010-2018 ................................. 11 
Figure 1-3 Mobile broadband traffic; 5 Years from 2012 baseline .............................................. 12 
Figure 2-1 Effect of adding cell sites with small radius ............................................................... 23 
Figure 2-2 Offloading to Wi-Fi or Femtocells .............................................................................. 25 
Figure 2-3 Spectrum growth vs traffic growth ............................................................................. 29 
Figure 3-1 The overall structure that was followed to narrow down the research ....................... 37 
Figure 3-2 Illustration of the research setting idea ....................................................................... 42 
Figure 4-1 The tandem of ex ante and ex post enforcement ......................................................... 47 
Figure 4-2 Tradeoff between ex ante and ex post enforcement .................................................... 50 
Figure 4-3 The concept of dynamic exclusion zones  ................................................................... 50 
Figure 5-1 Current proposed idea ................................................................................................. 62 
Figure 5-2 Research Model ........................................................................................................... 63 
Figure 5-3 PU antenna gain pattern .............................................................................................. 71 
Figure 5-4 Area of simulation, the PU receiver is located in the center ....................................... 78 
Figure 5-5 PU antenna gain visualization ..................................................................................... 82 
Figure 5-6 Relationship between SU density and space radius .................................................... 83 
Figure 5-7 Frequency band effect on G radius, SU/km2 is between 0.1 and 1 ............................. 86 
Figure 5-8 Frequency band effect on B radius, SU/km2 is between 0.1 and 1 ............................. 86 
Figure 5-9 Frequency band effect on G radius, SU/km2 is between 1 and 30 .............................. 87 
Figure 5-10 Frequency band effect on B radius, SU/km2 is between 1 and 30 ............................ 87 
xvi 
 
Figure 5-11 Effects of interference threshold on G radius with different SUs densities .............. 89 
Figure 5-12 Effects of interference threshold on G radius with different frequency bands ......... 90 
Figure 6-1 The proposed sharing is “15 MHz” of the downlink band ......................................... 97 
Figure 6-2 Illustration of two different cases of LTE operators ................................................... 98 
Figure 6-3 Locations of the 18 earth-stations (using google-earth) ........................................... 101 
Figure 6-4 Population density, based on the five different areas ................................................ 106 
Figure 6-5 Population characteristics chart for “Miami, FL” earth-station ................................ 108 
Figure 6-6 Probability distribution function of LTE-UE in small and large city areas .............. 109 
Figure 6-7 Probability distribution function in suburban and open areas ................................... 109 
Figure 6-8 Aggregate interference and B space radius ............................................................... 129 
Figure 6-9 Cumulative value of spectrum sharing benefits in “Cincinnati, OH” ....................... 136 
Figure 6-10 Cumulative value of spectrum sharing benefits in “Ford Island, HI” ..................... 137 
Figure 7-1 Depiction of exclusion zones around the East, Gulf, and West coasts of the US ..... 143 
Figure 7-2 Effect of PU minimum elevation angle over G and B radiuses ................................ 160 
Figure 7-3 Aggregate interference and B space radius ............................................................... 161 
 
Figure A 1 Differentiate between two types of distances affect SUs power .............................. 176 
Figure A 2 Mapping from transmit power to data rate ............................................................... 178 
Figure A 3 Population characteristics chart: Wallops Island, VA .............................................. 179 
Figure A 4 Population characteristics chart: Fairbanks, AK ...................................................... 180 
Figure A 5 Population characteristics chart: Suitland, MD ........................................................ 180 
Figure A 6 Population characteristics chart: Miami, FL............................................................. 181 
Figure A 7 Population characteristics chart: Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI ................................ 181 
xvii 
 
Figure A 8 Population characteristics chart: Sioux Falls, SD ..................................................... 182 
Figure A 9 Population characteristics chart: Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK ............................ 182 
Figure A 10 Population characteristics chart: Monterey, CA ..................................................... 183 
Figure A 11 Population characteristics chart: Stennis Space Center, MS .................................. 183 
Figure A 12 Population characteristics chart: Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA .................................... 184 
Figure A 13 Population characteristics chart: Yuma, AZ ........................................................... 184 
Figure A 14 Population characteristics chart: Cincinnati, OH ................................................... 185 
Figure A 15 Population characteristics chart: Rock Island, IL ................................................... 185 
Figure A 16 Population characteristics chart: St. Louis, MO ..................................................... 186 
Figure A 17 Population characteristics chart: Vicksburg, MS ................................................... 186 
Figure A 18 Population characteristics chart: Omaha, NE ......................................................... 187 
Figure A 19 Population characteristics chart: Sacramento, CA ................................................. 187 
Figure A 20 Cumulative value of Wallops Island, VA ............................................................... 197 
Figure A 21 Cumulative value of Fairbanks, AK ....................................................................... 198 
Figure A 22 Cumulative value of Suitland, MD ......................................................................... 198 
Figure A 23 Cumulative value of Miami, FL ............................................................................. 199 
Figure A 24 Cumulative value of Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI ................................................ 199 
Figure A 25 Cumulative value of Sioux Falls, SD ..................................................................... 200 
Figure A 26 Cumulative value of Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK ............................................ 200 
Figure A 27 Cumulative Value of Monterey, CA....................................................................... 201 
Figure A 28 Cumulative value of Stennis Space Center, MS ..................................................... 201 
Figure A 29 Cumulative value of Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA ....................................................... 202 
Figure A 30 Cumulative value of Yuma, AZ ............................................................................. 202 
xviii 
 
Figure A 31 Cumulative value of Cincinnati, OH ...................................................................... 203 
Figure A 32 Cumulative value of Rock Island, IL...................................................................... 203 
Figure A 33 Cumulative value of St. Louis, MO ........................................................................ 204 
Figure A 34 Cumulative value of Vicksburg, MS ...................................................................... 204 
Figure A 35 Cumulative value of Omaha, NE ............................................................................ 205 
Figure A 36 Cumulative value of Sacramento, CA .................................................................... 205 
 
 
 
 
xix 
 
PREFACE 
I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Dr. Martin Weiss, for his great advice and support. 
I appreciate his friendship, understanding, and constant guidance during every stage of my 
research. His feedback and advice have helped me greatly in honing my knowledge. 
I would like to thank the members of my Ph.D. committee, Associate Professor David 
Tipper, Assistant Professor Konstantinos Pelechrinis, and Professor Douglas Sicker for finding 
time in their busy schedule to review my dissertation, to participate in the dissertation committee, 
and for their valuable comments and suggestions to make this dissertation better. 
 I wish to express my gratitude to everyone who contributed in any way to the completion 
of this dissertation. My sincere thanks to all my colleagues at Telecommunications and 
Networking Program. 
I would also like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to my amazing 
parents for the constant encouragement that they have given me over the years, and I undoubtedly 
could not have done this without you.  
Finally, I would like to thank my beloved wife Ohoud for her continuous support, 
encouragement, and sacrifice during my Ph.D. studies. Her patience and understanding during 
many stressful and long nights of studying was unfailing and unselfish, and appreciated more than 
she knows. I dedicate this work to her. 
Above all, I thank God for everything. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The increasing demand for spectrum makes the introduction of more spectrally efficient 
technologies and management regimes essential. Recent evidence demonstrates that the demand 
for spectrum access rights exceeds the available supply [1] [2]. One of the main factors leading to 
this imbalance is that the spectrum is not as well utilized as it could be. The future of wireless 
necessitates that we use the spectrum resources more efficiently, which requires a transition to a 
future in which spectrum is shared more intensively. The growing demand pressure expanded 
access to legacy networks for new uses and the need for significant spectrum reform to enable such 
sharing has been noted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Spectrum Policy Task 
Force, reaffirmed by the National Broadband Plan (NBP) and the President's call for an additional 
500MHz of spectrum for mobile broadband [2] [1], and most recently in the President’s Council 
of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report [3] address this issue intensively. In 
addition, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has proposed 
several bands to facilitate spectrum sharing [4]. 
Realizing a future where spectrum sharing is the norm requires us to commercialize the 
next generation of wireless technologies, such as Cognitive Radios (CRs) and Dynamic Spectrum 
Access (DSA) systems that are needed to support higher spectrum utilization. These technologies 
will enable new business models and spectrum sharing regimes that pose a host of opportunities 
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and challenges for spectrum managers and the entire wireless ecosystem. DSA technology 
promises to increase spectrum access and help overcome the lack of available spectrum for new 
wireless services. DSA does this by enabling spectrum sharing between different users such as 
Primary Users (PUs) and Secondary Users (SUs). 
It is clear that mobile broadband is the great infrastructure challenge for wireless operators, 
particularly with the evidence of significant increase in mobile broadband traffic [3]. Data usage 
over mobile networks is rapidly increasing as more users surf the web, check email, and watch 
video on smart phones/tablets. Several research analysts share the view that mobile broadband 
traffic will continue a significant upward trend over the next 5 to 10 years [1] [5] [6].  
The NBP recognizes the enormous potential of mobile broadband growth [2]. It 
recommends that the FCC make available 500 MHz of new spectrum for wireless broadband, 
including 300 MHz for mobile flexible use within five years. In addition, in 2010 the President 
released an Executive Memorandum calling for 500 MHz of new spectrum for mobile and fixed 
broadband use [5].  
Due to the ever increasing demand for mobile broadband, wireless operators are forced to 
increase network capacity (the amount of data a network can carry). As the FCC stated in [1], it is 
unlikely that wireless operators will be able to accommodate this surging demand without 
additional spectrum. In addition, mobile broadband traffic has grown tremendously with the 
proliferation of smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices with internet access. Finally, 
mobile broadband has the potential to transform many different areas of the economy by providing 
a platform for new innovation, and any limitation for that potential source will affect those 
platforms [7] [8] [9]. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
The radio “spectrum”1 is a national resource, much like minerals and land; however, spectrum is 
reusable. One of the major purposes of spectrum management is to mitigate interference and 
increase spectrum efficiency. Legacy spectrum management is based on a static assignment policy, 
where government agencies assign spectrum to license holders on a long term basis for a large 
geographical regions. Recently, this policy has been faced with spectrum scarcity in particular 
spectrum bands, which increases the need for more efficient spectrum management. 
1.1.1 Spectrum Management and Licensing  
Spectrum management is the process of regulating the use of spectrum to promote efficient use 
and gain optimal social benefit from this scarce natural resource. The most common spectrum 
management approach is “command and control”, which is employed by most regulators around 
the globe [10]. Historically, spectrum has been highly regulated in order to prevent any harmful 
interference between the spectrum licensees. In the last decade, there have been significant 
innovations in the theory and practice of spectrum regulation. There is now a growing belief that 
current static “command and control” practices have delayed the introduction and growth of 
beneficial technologies and services [11].  
                                                 
 
1 Radio "spectrum" refers to the part of the electromagnetic spectrum corresponding to radio frequencies which is the 
full frequency range from 3 kHz to 300 GHz. 
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On the other hand, there is the “commons” or “unlicensed” approach where spectrum is 
available to all users who comply with certain pre-registration technical specifications and 
equipment certifications [12][13] [14]. For example, WiFi is the most common application of this 
kind of spectrum management approach and has proven its success worldwide. However, there are 
also limitations to this approach such as that the fact that the QoS is not guaranteed and it suitable 
for short-range network only [11] [15]. 
As a result, a new spectrum management approach has emerged in the regulatory field to 
increase spectrum efficiency and to facilitate the sharing. It lies somewhere between the 
“command and control” the “commons” approaches. It will enable additional users (i.e. SUs) to 
use/share the same spectrum band with the PU without causing harmful interference. This 
approach is considered in this dissertation as ground-base to facilitate spectrum sharing [16] [17]. 
1.1.2 Taxonomies of Spectrum Sharing 
Spectrum sharing can take many forms of coordination between PUs and SUs and cooperation 
between the SUs themselves. Table 1-1 illustrates these different forms where each one has its 
own level of complexity on either the PUs or the SUs side. 
 In this Table, the horizontal dimension refers to the degree or type of coordination between 
the primary and secondary users. The coordinated approach explicitly defines the usage rights2 of 
SUs by some kind of negotiation with the primary user. In the non-coordinated approach, the 
                                                 
 
2 For more insight about the concept of “usage right” in the spectrum sharing domain, please refer to [24], [77]. 
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secondary user does not require explicit permission from the primary user and will not necessarily 
get any feedback. 
The vertical axis addresses sharing among SUs, who may or may not cooperatively exploit 
the opportunity and use the idle primary spectrum bands. The focus in this dissertation will be on 
non-opportunistic sharing where an agreement takes place between the PUs and the SUs.  
Sharing between the government incumbents (i.e. Federal or non-Federal agencies3) and 
commercial wireless broadband operators/users is one of the key forms of spectrum sharing that 
is recommended by the NTIA and the FCC. In addition, one of the broad visions of President 
Obama’s Spectrum Initiative is that the Federal government must ensure sound government 
performance and effective use of its spectrum, pushing for effective repurposing, sharing, and 
innovative uses of spectrum wherever possible [3] [5]. 
Table 1-1 Illustration of different spectrum sharing cases 
 
 
Primary User Domain 
No coordination Coordination 
S
ec
o
n
d
a
ry
 U
se
rs
 D
o
m
a
in
 
N
o
n
-c
o
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
Opportunistic Sharing 
(e.g. Independent CRs) 
Non-Opportunistic Sharing 
(e.g. SU networks with small cell 
connect to regulations and policy 
database) 
C
o
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
Opportunistic Sharing 
(e.g. Exchange information 
between the CRs) 
Non-Opportunistic Sharing 
(e.g. SU networks with large cell 
such as LTE sharing the band with 
the PU) 
                                                 
 
3 Throughout this dissertation, we refer to either Federal or non-Federal agencies as government users (i.e. PUs). 
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1.1.3 Spectrum Crunch or Capacity Crunch 
The FCC has issued many reports indicating that the US is dangerously close to running out of 
spectrum for mobile data, which is why the FCC and NTIA have been working to free up more 
spectrums for wireless operators [1] [5]. Concerns about capacity and spectrum supply have 
pushed carriers to make deals and network changes. However, spectrum refarming has a roughly 
10-15 year horizon, and the spectrum crunch appears imminent [18]. It will be very visible problem 
if we chart the spectrum in the pipeline (expected spectrum bands targeting the mobile broadband 
industry) against the growth mobile broadband traffic. The spectrum crunch is threatening to 
increase the number of dropped calls, slow down data speeds and raise customer prices.  
Some researchers are considering the problem to be a “spectrum management” or 
“spectrum policy” crunch rather than a limitation on spectrum bands. A crunch occurs when 
demand outstrips supply. Others call it a “capacity crunch” problem. Either way, there is a supply 
shortage for high mobile broadband demand. The industry worries that it will not be possible to 
meet this increased demand cost-effectively and as a result, there will be congestion, higher prices, 
diminished user experience, or mix of these [19]. 
1.1.4 Mobile Broadband Traffic 
Market research studies predict a significant mobile data traffic increase over the next 5 to 10 
years. Mobile operators have to upgrade and optimize their networks to be able to meet future 
demand. The challenges of meeting escalating demand for mobile broadband applications is 
driving mobile operators to make heavy network investments and migrate to newer generation 
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technologies. Consumer demand for mobile data services is increasing at a rapid rate. Based on an 
FCC report published in 2010 [1], recent indications show strong growth of mobile broadband 
usage due to the increasing penetration of new smart phones/tablets to the market. For example: 
 AT&T has seen mobile network traffic increase 5,000% over the past 3 years, that is 
mainly caused by the exclusive introduction of new type of smart phones over AT&T 
network (the iPhone). 
 Users of Clearwire’s fourth generation (4G) WiMAX service consumed 7 GB per 
month, which is 280 times the amount of data used by a regular cell phone (in 2010). 
 PC “air-card” users consume 1.4 GB per month, which is 56 times the amount of data 
used by a regular cell phone. 
Looking forward, research generally share the view that mobile broadband traffic will 
continue a significant upward trend. This section will highlight the main drivers and forecast of 
this upward trend. 
1.1.4.1 Traffic Drivers  There are many factors driving the rapid increase in mobile broadband 
traffic. They can be grouped as follows: 
 Mobile Connections: the growth rate of the number of mobile devices is higher than 
the number of mobile subscribers. For example, by 2015, researchers forecast that there 
will be more than 5.6 billion mobile devices and more than 1.5 billion machine-to-
machine applications [20].  
 Enhanced Computing and Rich Applications: mobile devices are becoming smarter 
and are consuming more network capacity. For example, over the 2010 – 2015 forecast 
period, global mobile data traffic is forecast to outgrow global fixed data traffic by 3 
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times [20]. Mobile video specifically, is predicted to make up two-thirds of mobile data 
traffic by 2015 [21].  
 High Speeds: mobile connection speed is key enabler for mobile data traffic growth. 
In fact, mobility is becoming a requirement, not a preference. More speed means more 
consumption, and it is projected that mobile speeds will increase 10 fold from 2010 to 
2015 [20] [22].  
1.1.4.2 Traffic Forecast  Recent studies have forecasted major growth in mobile data traffic. 
According to the last Cisco Visual Networking Index report [20], global mobile data traffic grew 
70% in 2012; where data traffic increased from 520 petabytes/month at the end of 2011 to 885 
petabytes/month at the end of 2012. In addition, the average mobile network downstream speed 
doubled, up from 248 kbps in 2011 to 526 kbps in 2012. Moreover, the average mobile network 
connection speed for smartphones in 2012 was 2,064 kbps, up from 1,211 kbps in 2011; and for 
tablets in 2012, it was 3,683 kbps, up from 2,030 kbps in 2011. In 2012, a fourth-generation (4G) 
connection generated 19 times more traffic on average than a non-4G connection. Although 4G 
connections represent only 0.9% of mobile connections, they already account for 14% of mobile 
data traffic. Global mobile data traffic will increase 13 fold between 2012 and 2017. It will grow 
at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 66% from 2012 to 2017, reaching 11.2 exabytes 
per month by 2017 [20]; see Figure 1-1. To show other countries statistics, Table 1-2 gives a 
summary of mobile broadband traffic growth in different countries/regions [20] [21].  
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Figure 1-1 Forecast of global mobile data traffic  
 
Table 1-2 Examples of mobile broadband traffic growth 
Region Mobile Traffic Growth Examples 
Korea 
As reported by Korean regulator KCC, mobile data traffic on 2G, 3G, and 
4G networks increased approximately 80% between 
January and November of 2012. 
China 
China Mobile’s mobile data traffic grew 77% from mid-2011 to mid-2012. 
China Unicom’s mobile data traffic grew 112% from mid-2011 to mid-2012. 
Japan 
As measured by Japanese regulator MIC, mobile data traffic grew 113% 
from September 2011 to September 2012. 
Australia 
As reported by Australian regulator ACMA, mobile data traffic grew 40% 
from mid-2011 to mid-2012. 
Italy 
As reported by Italian regulator AGCOM, mobile traffic in Italy in 3Q12 
was up 32% compare to 3Q11. 
Middle East 
and Africa 
The Middle East and Africa will have the strongest mobile data traffic 
growth of any region at 77% CAGR. 
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As reported in the recent “Ericsson Mobility Report”, 40% of mobile phone sales were 
smartphones in the third quarter of 2012, which was an indication that smartphones will soon 
dominate mobile data traffic. Meanwhile, mobile data traffic doubled between Q4-2011 and Q4-
2012. The study also showed that smartphones were expected to grow 12 times between 2012 and 
2018 [21]; see Figure 1-2. Nokia Siemens Networks warned that the mobile industry will need to 
prepare for 1000 times as much traffic by 20204. Based on the UMTS Forum report, in 2020, total 
worldwide mobile traffic will reach a 33 fold increase compared with the 2010 figure [22]. 
Based on the 2010 FCC report [1], the amount of data used by a single mobile user 
increased over 450% between Q1-2009 and Q2-2010. AT&T, the exclusive US carrier of the 
iPhone (at time of report publication), has seen mobile network traffic increase 5,000% over the 
period of 2007 to 2010. Therefore, the FCC expects the “mobile data demand” to grow between 
25 and 50 times over 2010 levels over the coming 5 years. 
                                                 
 
4 Tomas Novosad, Senior RF Consultant, Nokia Siemens Networks [available at: http://www.ieee-
globecom.org/downloads/GLO2013_AP.pdf] 
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Figure 1-2 Forecast of global mobile traffic for voice and data 2010-2018 
The Office of Communication (Ofcom) in UK issued a strategy report [18] which 
concluded, in an average scenario, the demand for mobile data will experience an 80 fold increase 
between 2012 and 2030, and that number could reach a 300 fold increase in the high increase 
scenario. In the UK, mobile data volumes were approximately four times greater at the end of 2010 
than they were at the end of 2007.  
All these traffic forecasts indicate that there is dramatic growth in the capacity demand. 
Figure 1-3 shows a summary of forecasts addressed in this section over the coming 5 years based 
on different furcated projections. The average growth between 2013 and 2017 is over 20 times 
over the 2012 baseline (we did not include Nokia Siemens Networks expectations, because it is 
very high compared to others).  
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Figure 1-3 Mobile broadband traffic; 5 Years from 2012 baseline 
1.1.5 Dynamic Spectrum Access 
Spectrum sharing requires the commercialization of the next generation of wireless technologies, 
such as CRs and SDRs to enable DSA systems needed to support a higher utilization of spectrum. 
CRs and SDRs are often referred to together and sometimes the terms may be used 
interchangeably. CRs distribute decision-making functionality into the radio access network, and 
ultimately to the handsets, allowing them to make operational decisions, including such functions 
as sensing the spectrum environment for spectrum holes, controlling frequency selection, power, 
or other operating parameters/modes. In contrast, SDRs are an implementation technology, 
implementing in software what previously would have been implemented in radio hardware. As 
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such, SDRs are a key enabling technology for CRs. For further discussion of the distinctions 
between SDRs and CRs, please refer to [23].  
DSA, like SDRs and CRs, is another term that may be interpreted narrowly or broadly. In 
its narrow definition, DSA refers to the use of CR/SDR and related radio technologies to enable 
more dynamic spectrum management methodology. Used more broadly, DSA refers to the whole 
class of technologies, business models, and policies that enable spectrum resources to be shared 
more intensively across users, uses, and locations (where "locations" refers to the full 
dimensionality of the spectrum, time, space, waveform, etc.). In this dissertation, we will use DSA 
in both senses. It is the need to share spectrum more broadly that provides the principal economic 
driver for adopting novel radio technologies like CR/SDR, but it is the special regulatory 
enforcement challenges and opportunities associated with these new radio technologies that are 
the principal focus of this dissertation. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
Due to the expected high growth rate of mobile broadband traffic over the coming years (demand), 
there is a need for more network capacity (supply) by finding the optimal and visible sharing 
solutions among available options to increase network capacity. There is an urgent need for on-
going spectrum policy reform to make spectrum sharing a reality. Generally speaking, spectrum 
can be shared in frequency, time and geographical dimensions or any combination thereof. Beyond 
the technical aspects of spectrum sharing that must be resolved, lie questions about how much 
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benefits we can get out of each shared spectrum scenario and which one of the possible sharing 
scenarios has the most incentive to share. 
While DSA embeds functionality that poses additional enforcement challenges, it also 
offers new tools for technical enforcement. Distributed intelligence to radio means that radio is 
increasingly capable of participating in intelligent and dynamic automated spectrum sharing. 
Through protocols, policy-based language frameworks, and other tools, radio systems’ ability to 
technically manage compliance with sharing protocols has been enhanced [24]. 
Spectrum sharing imposes risk for both PUs (e.g. harmful interference) and SUs (abuse by 
PUs to prevent sharing). Thus, enforcement is essential to minimize that risk and achieve multiple 
goals, such as: ensuring "fair" access to spectrum, and enforcing sharing contracts. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The focus of this dissertation is to determine the benefits of spectrum sharing through sharing 
between government and commercial users. We quantify enforcement benefits in real case studies 
and test the proposed hypotheses. This includes finding a relationship between different sharing 
aspects and characteristics, such as geographical size of spectrum shearing area, frequency, and 
spectrum opportunity cost. There are many scenarios where spectrum sharing can take place, so 
the emphasis of the dissertation is on government and commercial spectrum sharing. The 
government incumbent will be the PUs, and the commercial users will be the SUs. 
This dissertation evaluates the benefits of enforcement. In other word, it sets the upper 
bound of the reasonable cost of enforcement to share the spectrum in specific scenarios. We 
 15 
 
evaluate the shared area by moving from pure ex ante enforcement toward ex post enforcement 
settings in our model. 
1.4 RELATED WORK 
There are few papers that consider spectrum sharing in connection with enforcement and DSA 
systems. Most notably, a series of papers by Sahai and his co-authors consider mechanisms to 
enforce sharing [25][26][16][17][18]. Sahai’s papers focus on opportunistic sharing enabled by 
cognitive radios that actively sense and respond to their local environments, and the focus of 
enforcement in those papers is on mechanisms that are embedded in CR technology. Also, [30] 
proposed a system to secure dynamic spectrum transmissions, where authorized users embed 
secure spectrum permits into data transmissions. However, all the above papers focus on 
opportunistic sharing, whereas the focus in this dissertation will be on non-opportunistic sharing. 
In the area of spectrum sharing, there are active initiatives and plans to make the sharing 
between government and commercial word reality. The NTIA react to the President’s call to seek 
opportunities to make spectrum available for wireless broadband [5]. It is the task to assess the 
“Near-Term Viability of Accommodating Wireless Broadband Systems in the 1675-1710 MHz, 
1755-1780 MHz, 3500-3650 MHz, 4200-4220 MHz, and 4380-4400 MHz Bands”5. Thus, the 
                                                 
 
5 Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee (CSMAC) formed five working group to repurpose 
candidate bands for wireless broadband. 
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NTIA6 issued a “technical analysis” in October 2010 showing their views of enabling the spectrum 
sharing in these bands [4]. It is considered as one of the fundamental reports examining candidate 
bands for sharing in focused action plan. The final recommendations, which are related to this 
dissertation, is to have exclusion zones to protect the PUs. They build those zones based on the 
worst case scenarios, zones are large and the spectrum opportunity cost is very high [31]; for more 
information about “spectrum opportunity cost” concept, please refer to Appendix (A). 
A recent report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) recommended using small cell in 3.5GHz band [3]. In the PCAST Report, two 
technological advances were identified that promise for increasing spectral efficiency. First, 
increase the use of small cell network deployments will multiply wireless capacity within existing 
spectrum resources. Second, increase spectrum sharing between government and commercial 
applications. The proposed 3.5GHz band would foster the widespread utilization of both of these 
technological advances and promote the efficient use. The PCAST report is a high level guidelines 
report, it does not specify the detailed sharing scenarios or how the enforcement will take place. 
The FCC, also, issued number of recent studies and reports showing the importance of this 
type of sharing and the critical role of enforcement. They highlight clearly the existence of 
“spectrum crunch” and they believe spectrum sharing is a major driver to overcome this problem 
[1]. In addition, the FCC issued a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order” in December 2012 
[32], and further notice in April 2014 [33], in which they propose to create a new Citizens 
                                                 
 
6 The NTIA work in this project with other partners as the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, 
Department of the Interior, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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Broadband Service in the 3.5 GHz band. The FCC proposed this band to be shared between the 
current government agencies and small cell SUs. They also mentioned briefly that the shared band 
would be managed by a Spectrum Access System (SAS) incorporating a dynamic database and, 
potentially, other interference mitigation techniques. 
A recent paper by Leon and Sicker model the interference between PU and expected SUs 
and shows the need for an appropriate spectrum sharing policy in 3.5GHz band [34]. It is one of 
first papers to examine the effect of different propagation models over the spectrum sharing value. 
Globally, there is increasing interests in this type of sharing, as well, and the way it should 
be regulated. For example, the Ofcom in the UK issued a public consultation titled “Securing long 
term benefits from scarce spectrum resources” which demonstrate the increasing concern of 
capacity crunch and the optimal way to regulate/enforce more spectrum sharing [18]. In addition, 
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) issued recently a report (titled: 
“Towards 2020 - future spectrum requirements for mobile broadband”) stating the same concerns 
and the advantages of government and commercial sharing [35].  
“Spectrum pooling” is another way to enhance spectral efficiency. The goal of “Spectrum 
pooling” is to enhance spectral efficiency by overlaying a new mobile radio system on an existing 
one [36]. There are main two differences between the idea of “Spectrum pooling” and my proposed 
work. First, in “Spectrum pooling”, there should be perfect channel knowledge at the primary 
receiver and transmitter [37] [38]. Second, there should be full interaction between the PUs and 
SUs, such as time synchronization between the two [36] [37]. As a result, the technology options, 
to be used by the SUs is limited by the PU specifications. 
These reports and public consultations set a high-level framework about capacity crunch 
problem and the need to find an optimal solutions; without going deeply and demonstrate the 
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tradeoff between different spectrum sharing scenarios. This work has started from this 
understanding and take the research farther, and so far we published five papers in this regards 
[39] [24] [40] [41] [42]. 
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2.0  FACTORS TO INCREASE NETWORK CAPACITY 
Due to the ever increasing demand for mobile broadband, wireless operators are forced to keep up 
and increase network capacity. Generally, three factors increase mobile network capacity: (1) 
adding more cell sites, (2) technology, and (3) adding more spectrum. In this chapter, the roles and 
the expectation for each factor will be studied and illustrated. Then, the importance of spectrum 
sharing (as part of third factor) will be highlighted.  
According to historical data, Cooper’s Law [43] stated that global wireless network 
capacity7 increased about 1 million times from 1950 to 2000. Approximately, this increased 20 
times from adding more spectrum, 25 times from more efficient technologies and 2,000 times from 
adding more cells [19] [44].  
There is broad agreement throughout the literature that this historical increase has been 
dominated by the "cell sites" factor [6] [45] [19]. The expectation is that "cell sites" factor will 
continue to dominate the spectrum and technology; see Table 2-1. The challenge now is how those 
three factors will affect the capacity in the future? If network capacity/efficiency doubled every 
2.5 years (based on Cooper’s Law), is this enough to carry the forecasted traffic demand? Which 
one of those factor can play more of a role compared to historic data to overcome the capacity 
shortage? These are some of the point we are addressing in this chapter. 
                                                 
 
7 Based on Marty Cooper statement: (…. compare the number of “conversations” (voice or data) that can theoretically 
be conducted over a given area in all of the useful radio spectrum. It turns out that this number has doubled every 
two-and-a-half years for the past 104 years) [43].  
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Table 2-1 Main factors to increase the capacity over the past 50 years 
Factor Coefficient of Increase 
Adding more cell sites 2000 
Technology 25 
Adding more spectrum 20 
2.1 MORE CELL SITES 
A cell site is a cellular site where electronic communications equipment (e.g. antennas) are placed, 
such as on a tower, pole or even the rooftop of a high building. Adding more cell sites is one of 
the three factors that can expand the network capacity. This option is unlimited and unbounded. It 
is unlike the “spectrum”, where the spectrum is a finite resource. It is also unlike “technology”, 
which is limited by Shannon’s Law of transmission capacity. The only constraining factor for cell 
site is cost. This is why over the last few decades, most of the gains in capacity have come from 
more cell sites [19].  
Adding more cells can be done to cover more areas (coverage), and/or to increase the 
capacity in a specific areas (dense the network). In fact, frequency may be reused by subdividing 
cells (replacing large cell with small ones), thus increasing the amount of traffic that an “Hz” of 
spectrum can carry within an overall geographic area. This is measured by bps/km2 and is known 
as “spectral efficiency”. Although it is a very effective mechanism to deepen network capacity, it 
is expensive and requires the construction of extra towers, deploying more antennas and base 
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station equipment, etc. In addition, it needs additional backhaul to link new towers back into the 
core network. 
2.1.1 Number of cell sites  
According to data published by the Wireless Association (CTIA) [46], the number of cell sites in 
the US has been growing at about a 6% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) over the past 
five years; see Table 2-2. It is evident that the growth rate has been decreasing over the time. One 
of the main reasons for that growth reduction is the fact that the incremental benefits of adding a 
cell site are lower than before.  
Mobile operators usually handle mobile broadband traffic growth by adding new cell sites 
to existing towers. However, that is an expensive process, and many metropolitan areas are now 
so packed with cell sites which implies that adding new ones would be riddled with interference 
concerns [1].  
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Table 2-2 Number of cell sites in the US 
Date 
Number of 
Cell Sites 
Yearly Growth 
Average Growth 
over 5 Year 
1997 38,650 - - 
1998 57,674 49.2% - 
1999 74,157 28.6% - 
2000 95,733 29.1% - 
2001 114,059 19.1% - 
2002 131,350 15.2% 28.2% 
2003 147,719 12.5% 20.9% 
2004 174,368 18.0% 18.8% 
2005 178,025 2.1% 13.4% 
2006 197,576 11.0% 11.7% 
2007 210,360 6.5% 10.0% 
2008 220,472 4.8% 8.5% 
2009 245,912 11.5% 7.2% 
2010 251,618 2.3% 7.2% 
2011 256,920 2.1% 5.4% 
2012 285,561 11.1% 6.4% 
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William Webb in his book “Understanding Weightless” [6] demonstrated the effect of 
adding cells with a lower radius; see Figure 2-1 8. Based on this graph, reducing cell range from 
5km to 2km will require increasing number of cells from 1 to 6 cells. However, there is around a 
25 fold increase in the total capacity which gets the advantage of more modulation efficiency by 
lowering the cell size. Thus, adding more cells is expected to continue as a main factor in the future 
to solve the capacity crunch, where wireless operators would logically deploy the lowest cost 
option to increase network capacity.  
 
Figure 2-1 Effect of adding cell sites with small radius   
 
                                                 
 
8 Source: W. Webb, "Understanding Weightless" book [6]. 
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2.1.2 Offloading to Wi-Fi and Femtocells 
Offloading technique can be defined as the process of transferring the broadband/data traffic that 
is ordinarily generated on the cellular network to a fixed network such as WiFi or Femtocell access 
points. The offloaded traffic frees up capacity on the cellular network, which gives a cost effective 
solution for a cellular operator.  
The European Union published a book recently discussing the idea of how is traffic 
offloading evolving over time, and how does this evolution influence the need for spectrum? [47]. 
The argument in this book is based on other research analyses (i.e. Cisco). The related findings of 
this book can be summarized as follow 
 The volume of traffic that is already being offloaded (through Wi-Fi mainly) 
already exceeds that of the cellular network. 
 The current offloading traffic is under estimated, and can be expected to grow even 
faster than the forecasted figures.  
 Seek to make more spectrum for WiFi applications (unlicensed bands). 
The Ofcom has expected that offloading mobile data traffic onto fixed networks using Wi-
Fi and Femtocells could serve over half of the predicted increased demand for mobile data traffic 
[18]. Cisco has estimated that mobile offload increases from 33% (429 petabytes/month) in 2012 
to 46% (9.6 exabytes/month) in 2017, as a percentage of total mobile broadband traffic from all 
mobile-connected devices; see Figure 2-2.  
Based on Cisco report, without offload taken into account, global mobile data traffic would 
grow at a CAGR of 74% instead of 66% [20]. This gives an indication of that even the offloaded 
traffic is underestimated (as the European Union suggested), the expected increase in the demand 
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is really high and need more preparation to bridge the gap between forecasted demand and 
expected supply. In addition, there is increase desire for mobility which gives the cellular 
connectivity more advantage over fixed/nomadic offloading connectivity.  
Although there is growing offloaded traffic over WiFi or Femtocell access point, it is still 
not clear what percentage of traffic is counted as offloaded, and what traffic is originally fixed. 
The FCC and the UMTS Forum, in their latest related reports, did not take account of the 
offloading factor. The UMTS Forum said that WiFi and Femtocells imply some usage 
restrictions/limitations on the quality, mobility and security of the service. They are a ”second 
choice” option to a primary mobile broadband access and should be considered as complementary, 
not competing [48]. Traffic growth is high regardless whither offloading is considered as part of 
“more cell sites” factor or as a complementary option for wireless operators, so we will ignore it.   
 
Figure 2-2 Offloading to Wi-Fi or Femtocells 
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2.2 TECHNOLOGY 
From the previous section, it is clear that the “more cell sites” option will not be a cost effective 
solution to supply all needed forecasted capacity [1] [3] [19] [27] [28]. So, will technology be a 
sufficient complement? If the efficiency (due to technology) could be doubled, could twice the 
capacity be obtained?  
It appears that multiple antenna (MIMO) systems hold the most promise, with apparently 
large gains possible. Transmission from multiple cells, which is called coordinated multi-point 
transmission (CoMP9) in 4G [6], is another approach as well. Carrier aggregation is also part of 
new cellular technology (i.e. LTE-Advanced), whereby a device can simultaneously use multiple 
bands of frequencies to deliver higher data rates [50] [51].  
The first generations of wireless communication (1G) technologies had a spectral 
efficiency of less than 0.1 bps/Hz on a sector basis. The 2G technologies had an efficiency of 0.25 
bps/Hz. The 3G technologies had an efficiency of 0.5 bps/Hz which has been rising to 1.0 bps/Hz 
for advanced implementations. Now, the 4G technologies have an approximate efficiency of 1.4 
bps/Hz [52]. The highest spectral efficiency of LTE-Advanced with 4x4 MIMO is 3.7 bps/Hz at 
the center of the cell site coverage [53]. 
This factor is strictly bounded by the Shannon capacity formula, and that limitation is not 
easy to go around [54]. Evolution in wireless technologies includes a steady series of 
                                                 
 
9 This idea could be challenging, where it will be hard to make a user-equipment that can work across large numbers 
of bands. There are now some 40 bands identified for 4G; it seems unlikely that any user-equipment device could 
support them all. 
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improvements in spectral efficiency, however, technologies are approaching the theoretical limits 
of spectral efficiency [55]. Based on these statistics; technology alone will be insufficient to bridge 
the capacity gap between the forecasted demand and the expected supply. 
2.3 MORE SPECTRUM 
There is a wide belief that the current spectrum allocations for mobile broadband services is not 
enough to line with the forecasted demand; even they called this as “spectrum crunch”. Adding 
more spectrum to the market can involve three main techniques: 
 Allocate exclusive spectrum to mobile broadband operators.  
 Allowing spectrum sharing between different types of uses/users. 
 Assign more spectrum for unlicensed usages, such as WiFi bands. 
This section will highlight these three different techniques and shows the most expected 
one to overcome the capacity problem in the near future. 
2.3.1 Exclusive Spectrum 
For mobile operators, the most common technique to obtain spectrum is to obtain exclusive 
spectrum band. This allocated spectrum gained either (1) from available spectrum, which means 
that it is not been allocated to anybody, or (2) from allocation due to the spectrum refarming 
process, where the government moves spectrum assignment/allocation from one user type to 
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another due to the change in demands and needs. In either case, this is an exclusive allocation 
where a licensee has the full usage right (unshared) across the usage right area.  
The fact is that there is not much “unused” spectrum now to allocate and “spectrum 
refarming” process takes years to be effective (and varies from a country to another). Spectrum 
refarming takes from 10 to 15 years to be achieved [1]. It is not a good strategy to see previous 
spectrum allocations in the US, for example, and scale it up for the future; Table 2-310 illustrates 
the significant assignments of spectrum by the FCC. Spectrum is a finite resource. Thus, it is more 
accurate and informative to compare growth in mobile traffic versus spectrum resources; please 
see Figure 2-3 [44]. It shows details of spectrum allocation efficiency (the amounts of spectrum 
licensed vs spectrum utilization).  
Table 2-3 The US mobile spectrum allocations 
Year Allocation Band Name 
1983 40 MHz 850 MHz Cellular 
1989 10 MHz 850 MHz Cellular 
1993 14 MHz 800 MHz SMR 
1995 130 MHz 1900 MHz PCS 
2005 194 MHz 2500 MHz EBS/BRS 
2006 90 MHz 1700/2100 MHz AWS-1 
2008 70 MHz 700 MHz 700 MHz 
Totals 
548 MHz (assuming all EBS/BRS spectrum to be usable) 
409.5 MHz (assuming only 55.5 MHz of EBS/BRS spectrum) 
                                                 
 
10 These data in Table 2-3 had been assembled from multiple sources including the FCC by [44].  
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Figure 2-3 Spectrum growth vs traffic growth 
Webb in his article about “the European Spectrum Capacity Crunch” said 6.3 GHz of 
spectrum would be needed by 201611 [19] [56]. He adds “since operators require spectrum below 
3 GHz to achieve viable propagation, this is clearly impossible, so there is no way whatsoever that 
the capacity crunch can be wholly addressed by using more spectrum”. 
2.3.2 Shared Spectrum 
There are limitations (e.g. time, cost, and availability) to supply the mobile broadband market with 
“exclusive spectrum” to solve the near future problem of rising demand. Therefore, the reasonable 
solution must rely on the “shared spectrum” approach. That is why the FCC [1], the NTIA [4] [5], 
                                                 
 
11 If we just consider the “spectrum” as the only available factor to increase the network capacity. 
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and the PCAST group [3] confirms this direction as the most significant approach for overcoming 
the problem. 
The first wave of spectrum sharing between PUs and SUs is the TV White Space (TVWS) 
scenario. It is non-opportunistic sharing, where the major element to facilitate this process is the 
TVWS database. This dissertation focusses on the second wave of spectrum sharing, which is 
sharing between government agencies (as PUs) and commercial operators (as SUs).   
2.3.3 Unlicensed Spectrum 
In specific type of usage right, there is what is called “unlicensed usage right” where the spectrum 
is available for use by all under certain specifications and rules, for example, the 2.4GHz band for 
WiFi [57] [58]. It is part of the "commons” model of open-spectrum where spectrum is shared 
equally between users. It implies more supply of spectrum to the market. There is overlap between 
(a) unlicensed spectrum and (b) small cell site. If mobile operator offload the traffic to a small cell 
(e.g. WiFi) though unlicensed band, we can say both (a) and (b) are exploited to help in capacity 
crunch problem.   
Unlicensed spectrum could be seen as special case of spectrum sharing where all the 
sharing party have the same usage right. This means there is no PUs or SUs, they are equal. Using 
unlicensed band by mobile operators to help overcome the high traffic growth is beneficial 
progression. However, there are many limitations, as mentioned in section 2.1.2 (Offloading to 
Wi-Fi and Femtocells). 
 31 
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
Based on Copper’s Law (and based on historical data), the capacity of the network will increase 2 
times every 2.5 years. On the other hand, based on our analysis summarized in Figure 1-3, the 
average forecasted mobile broadband traffic increased 10 times every 2.5 years. Clearly there is a 
gap between the two numbers.  
The first two factors, mentioned in this chapter (i.e. “cell site” and “technology”), are 
expected to have the similar effect rate over the capacity in the future; whereas the “more 
spectrum” could be the key solution in this case by adding the “sharing” inspiration. Although, as 
it was mentioned above, the “cell site” factor is still expected to be the superior factor in the 
increase since the capacity scales exponentially with number of cell sites. However, the capacity 
scales approximately linearly with spectrum and technology, so doubling the spectrum provides 
double the capacity. Similarly, doubling the technical efficiency doubles capacity [6].  
To sum up the discussion, the “cell site” factor is bounded by the cost, the “technology” 
factor is limited by efficiency evolving path, and the “more spectrum” factor through spectrum 
sharing approach is the most applicable way to expand the capacity faster in a shorter time to meet 
the forecasted demand. It is one of the main motivations for us in this work to explore more in 
spectrum sharing field. 
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3.0  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine and quantify the benefits of spectrum sharing 
through different enforcement scenarios. It includes finding a relationship between different 
sharing aspects and characteristics. As mentioned earlier, the review of literature shows the critical 
need to add more wireless network capacity. There are three factors to overcome this capacity 
crunch: (1) adding more cell sites, (2) technology, and (3) adding more spectrum. The focus will 
be on spectrum sharing as part of the third factor, which can be considered as adding more 
spectrum liquidity to the wireless market.  
Implementing spectrum sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing 
agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable. This 
dissertation will discuss the enforcement of spectrum sharing and will demonstrate and examine 
diverse scenarios, which can be implemented, at different spectrum sharing environments. 
This analysis is valuable because it will help regulators/governments prepare for possible 
future scenarios in addressing the capacity crunch. In addition, it can give government users more 
insight into expected future sharing as well as into how to optimize the mitigation of possible 
harmful interference due to sharing. 
It is also of value to commercial users and operators in that they can use the results of this 
work to make more informed decisions as to the economic benefits of different spectrum sharing 
market and opportunities. Spectrum sharing can take different forms, so, precise operating 
principles must be established and a clear understanding of the desired scenario is necessary as 
well.  
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3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research for this dissertation is guided by the following questions: 
Q.1) What is the role of enforcement in spectrum sharing to solve the capacity crunch 
in mobile broadband networks? 
Q.1.1) How can spectrum sharing be an important factor to overcome the 
capacity crunch? 
Q.1.2) How can enforcement be an incentive for the PUs and the SUs to share 
the spectrum? 
Q.1.3) What are the differences between centralized and decentralized 
enforcement? 
Q.2) What are the possible spectrum sharing scenarios? How will those scenarios 
vary based on different spectrum sharing environments? 
Q.3) How can “ex ante” and “ex post” enforcement approaches affect spectrum 
sharing utilization? 
Q.3.1) What is the “ex ante” enforcement approach? 
Q.3.2) What are the pros and cons of the “ex ante” enforcement approach? 
Q.3.3) What is the “ex post” enforcement approach? 
Q.3.4) What are the pros and cons of the “ex post” enforcement approach? 
Q.3.5) What possible enforcement scenarios exist between the extremes of 
those two approaches? 
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Q.4) What is the relationship between sharing approach and spectrum opportunity 
cost12? 
Q.4.1) What is the opportunity cost of exclusive spectrum? 
Q.4.2) How the opportunity cost of shared spectrum will vary with “ex ante” 
and “ex post” enforcement approaches? 
Q.5) What are the benefits of spectrum sharing? 
Q.5.1) How can we quantify the benefits of different spectrum sharing 
scenarios? 
Q.5.2) What is the upper bound of the reasonable cost of enforcement to 
share the spectrum in a specific scenario? 
Q.6) How can the proposed levels of sharing and enforcement be generalized to take 
place in different sharing scenarios? 
Q.6.1) How that can be applied to real case scenarios, such as: 1695-
1710MHz band and 3.5GHz band? 
Q.6.2) What are the commonalities between these mechanisms in light of 
changing sharing environments?  
                                                 
 
12 For more information about “spectrum opportunity cost” concept, please refer to Appendix (A). 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section shows the overview research settings followed by the research hypotheses.  
3.2.1 Research settings 
The high-level preamble of this research is summarized in Figure 3-1. It shows the overall structure 
that we followed to narrow down the research scope from large capacity problem to spectrum 
sharing and enforcement domain. There are list of settings that are considered before we test the 
hypotheses: 
S1) Define the enforcement concept in the spectrum sharing domain. 
 Identify the importance of spectrum sharing as a leading enabler compared 
to other factors (e.g. more cell site and technology) to address the capacity 
crunch. 
 Identify the differences between centralized and decentralized enforcement. 
 Identify the types of harmful interference that are considered in this work, 
and who should be protected. 
S2) Classify enforcement approaches in spectrum sharing and highlight the most 
reasonable approaches in the domain of spectrum sharing. 
S3) Define the “ex ante” enforcement approach.  
  Highlight the main features of the “ex ante” approach. 
 “Ex ante” tools that will be analyzed in this dissertation includes:  
o Exclusion zones (main tool in the research model) 
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o Policy language  
o Device standardizations  
S4) Define the “ex post” enforcement approach.  
 Highlight the main features of the “ex post” approach. 
 “Ex post” tools that will be analyzed in this dissertation includes:  
o Sensing network  
o Litigation and fines  
o Interference threshold at PU location    
S5) Identify possible enforcement scenarios that exist between the extremes of “ex 
ante” and “ex post” enforcement approaches.   
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Figure 3-1 The overall structure that was followed to narrow down the research  
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3.2.2 Hypotheses 
This is a list of hypotheses that we are testing in this dissertation. The following section will show 
how these hypotheses are connected to the research questions and outline. 
The current and most common spectrum management approach is to allocate exclusive 
spectrum licenses (i.e. exclusive usage right) for wireless operators. Some licensees (i.e. PUs) do 
not operate and build wireless networks over the whole usage right area, such as particular 
government agencies. Their usage exists in specific locations and the rest of the usage right area 
is left unutilized. This means that there is high opportunity cost of these exclusive spectrum 
licenses. Spectrum sharing will increase spectrum utilization, either by allowing sharing at 
unutilized “PU’s usage right area” or within “PU area of operations”.   
H1) The opportunity cost of exclusive spectrum is high and it is inversely proportional 
to spectrum sharing utilization.  
Historically, spectrum has been highly regulated in order to prevent any harmful 
interference between the spectrum licensees. By introducing spectrum sharing as critical enabler 
to overcome the capacity crunch problem, preventing harmful interference through an appropriate 
enforcement level is a central point of effective spectrum sharing. There are two loci at which 
spectrum sharing may be enforced: “ex ante” enforcement (prevent any potentially harmful 
interference event before it has occurred), and “ex post” enforcement (after a potentially harmful 
interference event has occurred).  
H2) Complexity and cost of the “ex post” enforcement approach is higher than the 
“ex ante” enforcement approach. 
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There are possible spectrum sharing scenarios that exist between the extremes of “ex ante” 
and “ex post” approaches. The choice of ex ante approach affects ex post strategies. There will be 
a point where the marginal benefit is equivalent to the marginal complexity/cost of enforcement. 
The best hybrid of those two enforcement approaches for a sharing environment is varies based on 
different characteristics, include but not limited to: 
 
 PUs features:  
o PUs’ Receiver characteristics 
o Location of PU operation and network 
 Fixed location 
 Mobile applications bounded in a zone 
 Mobile applications all over the “spectrum usage right” area 
 SU features: 
o Small cell networks (indoor and outdoor) 
o Large cell networks 
 Frequency of shared band 
 Power of SUs transmitters 
 
H3) There is more than one relationship-curve by moving from the “ex ante” towards 
the “ex post” enforcement approaches, which varies by changing the sharing 
environment characteristics. 
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We believe that the additive benefits will vary by changing the sharing mechanisms. By 
moving towards the “ex post” enforcement approach, spectrum utilization increase, and the 
exclusion zone to protect the PUs will be smaller.  
H4) Spectrum utilization will increase by raising the dependency on the “ex post” 
enforcement approach. 
3.3 RESEARCH OUTLINE 
Table 3-1 summarizes the correspondence of research settings and hypotheses with the 
comprehensive research questions in previous sections. One of the main outcomes of this research 
is to quantify the benefits of enforcement in shared spectrum bands. We try to facilitate spectrum 
sharing while protecting the PUs from adverse impact.  
These benefits will draw the upper line limit for reasonable enforcement cost. We are not 
trying to build separate cost model to figure out precisely how much an enforcement scenario will 
cost; since DSA is still a relatively new research field and there is a lot of uncertainty associated 
with this cost estimate (e.g. cost and density of sensor networks). It will be part of the proposed 
future works beyond this research to try to model the enforcement-cost and compare it with the 
outcome of this research. 
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Table 3-1 Correspondence research settings and hypothesis with research questions 
Research Settings and Hypothesis Research Questions 
S1 and S2 Q1, Q2 
S3 and S4 Q3.1- Q3.4 
S5 Q3.5 
H1 and H2 Q4, Q5.2 
H3 Q3.5 
H4 Q5.1, Q6 
 
 
As an approach to address the setting (S1-S5) of this research, chapter (4) covers that and 
links the foundations that are covered in chapter (2) to the rest of this work. It lays the basis of 
spectrum sharing notion and explain why the enforcement is a key enabler for sharing and then 
capacity. Figure 3-2 illustrates the idea of interaction between enforcement and spectrum sharing 
benefits. In addition, enforcement concept at spectrum sharing environment is described in details 
to show significant aspect that need to be considered. Finally, it shows the pros and cons of “ex 
ante” and “ex post” enforcement approaches, and possible enforcement scenarios exist between 
the extremes of those two. 
 In chapter (5), we demonstrated the model of spectrum sharing in which all factors that 
affect the sharing can be examined and studied. This chapter will demonstrate the simulation model 
design which can be applied to a variety of spectrum sharing environments. In addition, it is 
flexible to be customized to capture the characteristics for both PUs and SUs. 
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In chapter (6) and chapter (7), we modeled two real case studies. The first case examines 
the 1695-1710 MHz band. The second case focusses on the 3550-3650 MHz band. These two 
chapter also test the propose hypotheses. They are demonstrating advantages of spectrum sharing 
and the idea that there is not a single approach that applies for all type of sharing environment, 
nevertheless, at each case there are custom design sharing approach. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Illustration of the research setting idea 
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4.0  ENFORCEMENT IN SPECTRUM SHARING 
The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the 
expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless 
demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile wireless networks, and 
on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share 
spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing 
harmful interference is the enforcement of those rights13. Since the rights to use spectrum and to 
protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) 
and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the 
enforcement approaches may need to vary as well. 
4.1 ENFORCEMENT CONCEPTUALIZATION 
The ultimate goal of enforcement is to induce “socially optimal” behavior, which may deviate 
from “individually optimal” behavior because of externalities, mistakes, or other sources of market 
failures. Socially optimal behavior includes investments in protection (harm avoidance) 
                                                 
 
13 The enforcement approach is linked directly to the usage rights regime (two sides of the same coin). Spectrum 
sharing regimes are allocations of usage rights over the electrospace. Because the usage of an electrospace may 
result in incidental or deliberate interference, enforcement seeks to ensure compliance with the usage rights regime. 
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technology and in operating behavior that results in socially desirable outcomes. The full 
consideration of what an appropriate definition of harmful interference is beyond the scope of this 
work. For further discussion about harmful interference, please refer to [59], [60]. The enforcement 
approach may mandate certain behaviors or impose rewards/sanctions that may induce incentives 
toward desirable behaviors or penalize undesirable behaviors or outcomes (harmful interference). 
Traditionally, in the spectrum field, the enforcement process is to prevent an interference 
event before it happens, such as geographical or spectral (i.e. guard band) separation between 
licensees, and transmitters/receivers specifications [24]. Transmitter specifications include 
“emission masks” which indicate how signal energy may be transmitted in frequency and antenna 
parameters, including type and height. Together, these transmitter specifications can be used to 
predict, with high likelihood, the electrospace the signal/service will occupy. Receiver 
specifications are useful in predicting the performance of a wireless communications system.  
4.1.1 Spectrum Holes  
Spectrum may be considered underutilized when the signal to noise ratio of the primary 
transmission is above the minimum needed for successful communications. Thus, secondary 
transmission opportunities can exist by adding small levels of transmit power or by identifying 
periods and spaces of no (or very low) primary user signal power and utilizing those at higher 
power levels. 
One of the attempts to define the spectrum holes is Tandra et al. [61] where the authors 
tried to find strategies for sensing spectrum holes based on probabilistic models. In addition, the 
density of spectrum holes is based on the sensitivity of sensing methodology and the amount of 
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interference the primary user can tolerate to allow sharing. For more about spectrum holes, please 
refer to one of my papers in this regards [39] [24] [41].  
4.1.2 Centralized vs Decentralized Enforcement 
The enforcement can be centralized or decentralized, or more generally, a mix of both. The classic 
form of centralized enforcement relies on a regulator such as the FCC or NTIA, but could be 
undertaken by a spectrum sharing broker or band manager. Decentralized enforcement might 
include other radios in the environment that might, for example, refuse to forward packets or 
connect to radios that are behaving badly. Centralized or decentralized enforcement might rely on 
reputation effects. 
For example, a database with information about the availability of spectrum holes or other 
operating instructions may be employed as centralized technical enforcement components, such as 
the database used in TV White Space applications. On the other hand, radio "black boxes"[62] or 
collaborative sensing might be employed as elements in decentralized enforcement. 
Spectrum sharing pushes the enforcement towards decentralized case. While CRs embeds 
functionality that poses additional enforcement challenges, it also offers new tools for technical 
enforcement. Distributed intelligence to radio means that radio is increasingly capable of 
participating in intelligent and dynamic automated enforcement.  
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4.1.3 In-Band and Out-Of-Band Interference 
Traditionally, interference is classified as in-band or out-of-band interference. The former mainly 
due to devices using the same spectrum band, and the latter due to devices’ emissions using out-
of-band spectrum and partially due to receiver sensitivity as well.  
From an enforcement perspective, the “usage right” regime determines whether there is 
harmful interference or not. For example, under some interpretations of exclusively/licensed 
spectrum, the PU has a right to exclude other users/uses from the spectrum. 
 This dissertation considers in-band interference only, where the SUs use the share the same 
band with the PU. 
4.1.4 Ex Ante and Ex Post Enforcement 
There are two loci at which usage rights may be enforced: 
 Ex ante enforcement:  
o The actions that been taken to prevent and avoid any potentially harmful interference 
event before it has occurred. 
 Ex post enforcement:  
o The actions that been taken after a potentially harmful interference event has 
occurred. 
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Figure 4-1 The tandem of ex ante and ex post enforcement 
Ex ante and ex post approaches work in tandem, not in isolation. Thus, the choice of ex 
ante approach affects ex post strategies [24]. The choice of how to design the enforcement 
approach directly and indirectly impacts the enforcement-cost. In particular, the costs of inducing 
good behavior (avoiding bad one) must be balanced against the social costs and benefits under 
different scenarios. Therefore, the cost of strong ex ante rules is that they need to be enforceable 
and may pose the risk of overly restricting behaviors that may be reduce the welfare enhancing 
(e.g. innovation) as well as decreasing the value of the sharing opportunity for the entrant (i.e. 
SUs).   
4.1.5 Analogy 
Police perform the action of ex ante and ex post enforcement. They act to detect bad acts (before 
harm happens) by giving citations for cars with illegal brake lights or for driving too fast, even if 
not unsafely, for example. Their presence provides assurance of enforcement thus deterring bad 
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behavior just through their presence. They enforce after harm has already happened (ex post) by, 
for example, assessing liability in accidents, penalizing unsafe driving with stronger tickets, and 
by testifying in court. The police behave differently in a world with cameras; that is, they know 
where traffic is most likely to require their oversight, what evidence they need to establish at the 
scene vs. what is recorded remotely [24].  
To extend the analogy a little bit further, one may think that the “traffic laws” could be 
changed with technology as CRs/SDR changes the DSA mechanisms. For example, a "speed pass" 
that allows different vehicles to travel at different speeds based on some criteria (e.g. ex ante driver 
skill certification), variable fines for use of HOV lanes during congestion periods, or modifications 
to car operation in response to car/road real-time diagnostics (e.g. detection of low tire pressure 
and bad road conditions). 
4.2 EX ANTE 
As described above, ex ante enforcement measures are designed to prevent in-band interference 
from occurring. In this section, major ex ante enforcement tools are highlighted and their effects 
on “sharing benefits” are examined. 
4.2.1 Exclusion Zones 
The development of exclusion zones – spatial regions where the SU may not operate – is a principal 
ex ante tool. The exclusion zone is basically constructed by a database that summarizes all PU 
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spectrum usages. PU spectrum usages can be static or dynamic (temporally or spatially), in either 
cases they can be stored with a feedback kink between the PU and the database. The database can 
subsequently be accessed easily by SUs to determine exclusion zone boundary. In this case, there 
is no need for the SU to sense the PU signal. This is consistent with the PCAST report 
recommendation of using the database approach in static sharing environment [3]. In other cases 
where the PU spectrum usage is not predictable, the SUs should sense the PU existence to be able 
to share the spectrum with them. 
Generally speaking, spectrum can be shared in frequency, time and spatial dimensions or 
any combination thereof. If two users do not share the spectrum on at least one of these three 
dimensions, each of them is said to have exclusive right to that part of the spectrum that they do 
use. In this regards and at this dissertation, the sharing between the PUs and SUs exist at two 
dimensions: (1) spectrum and (2) time; with different level of spatial dimension. Exclusion zones 
are a special tool to facilitate an ex ante enforcement mechanism which prevents harmful 
interference. Exclusion zones are not the only ex ante enforcement mechanism; however, it is the 
most important and the one we are focusing on at this research. 
In this dissertation, we propose different “protection/exclusion zone” concept to increase 
spectrum sharing efficiency (i.e. increase benefits). Protection/exclusion zone will encompass a 
smaller area with increasing dependence on ex post enforcement approach; see Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2 Tradeoff between ex ante and ex post enforcement 
 
 
Figure 4-3 The concept of dynamic exclusion zones 14 
 
                                                 
 
14 The exclusion zone will shift and vary based on the “PU antenna” shifts (the PU antenna is fixed station). If a static 
exclusion zone is used, it must be the union of all possible antenna positions.   
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In some cases, the exclusion zone could be dynamic which increases the spectrum 
utilization compared with static exclusion zones. For example, in the case where the PU antenna 
orientation is not fixed, the use of static exclusion zones represents a worst-case situation. In any 
particular reception episode, the exclusion zone is ovate, as shown in Figure 4-3. If a static 
exclusion zone is used, it must be the union of all possible antenna positions. It would thus be large 
compared with the exclusion zone associated with a particular receiving episode. 
4.2.2 Policy Language 
Spectrum sharing “policy language” research is another way to achieve ex ante enforcement. It is 
considered as a decentralized enforcement approach as well. For example, SUs should be required 
to have this policy language installed on their devices to be able to share the spectrum. These 
policies will dictate the SUs’ usages to be within the agreed sharing limitations. 
A policy is a selection of facts specifying spectrum usage [63]. These facts are interpreted 
through a reasoning instance, which is called “policy reasoner”. The “policy reasoner” is able to 
consider a flexible number of policies realizing a policy adaptive cognitive radio [63] [64]. One 
advantage of this type of ex ante enforcement is to reduce the certification effort of SUs’ devices, 
where the policy is not static and can be changed dynamically. If policies, policy reasoners, and 
devices can be accredited separately, accreditation becomes a simpler task for each component. In 
addition, devices and enforcement-policies can evolve independently over time, which is superior 
to separating policies from devices.  
There is a dramatic increase in standards work due to the progress of CR technologies. The 
IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 41 (SCC41) represents standards projects in the areas of 
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DSA, CRs, interference management, coordination of wireless systems, advanced spectrum 
management, and policy languages for next generation radio systems [65]. While policy language-
based approaches hold great promise, they should be harmonized with an enforcement ecosystem 
that ensures compliance with agreed-upon rules and supplements the detection and enforcement 
adjudication process with complementary mechanisms. 
4.2.3 Device Standardizations 
In a wireless world, device standardization is the process of developing and implementing 
technical standards. There are many useful advantages to this process, including but not limited 
to: assuring compatibility between devices working by the same standard, managing in-band/out-
band interference, making type approval or certificate of conformity possible (which is granted to 
a device that meets a minimum set of regulatory, technical and safety requirements). The most 
important benefit of standardization - and most relevant to this dissertation - is to avoid harmful 
interference between wireless networks/devices as a process of “ex ante” enforcement 
mechanisms. 
For example, WiFi devices are standardized and approved (i.e. type approval) to operate 
only at limited frequency bands, such as 2.4GHz or 5GHz, which prevent the device from 
interfering with the PU of other bands. Another part of the standardization process is the power 
characteristics and limitations that manage interference. Those standards are part of “ex ante” 
enforcement to avoid interference before it happens.  
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4.2.4 Summary 
The tools discussed in this section are the three common “ex ante” enforcement tools. For the 
scope of this dissertation, we are focusing and examining the “exclusion zone” specifically. In 
spectrum regulations, the static exclusion zone is already applied in many applications. For 
example, we can assume the spectrum-exclusion-license in a given country as a large nationwide 
exclusion zone for that licensee. In spectrum sharing, we propose the idea of small exclusion zones 
which will play a critical role in increasing sharing efficiency. In addition, we propose that SUs 
can work within the exclusion zones under different types of enforcement regulations. 
4.3 EX POST 
Weak ex ante enforcement mechanisms must often be paired with stronger ex post enforcement 
mechanisms to deal with inevitable interference events. Since ex post mechanisms involve the 
adjudication of actual interference events, they typically involve collecting information that can 
be used in agreed-upon adjudication procedures. In the absence of particular procedures (which 
would normally be negotiated between primary and secondary users), we can assume this 
information would include the detection of interference events attributable to the SU(s). It is likely 
that this information would include a time stamp and other information, such as the location at 
which the signal is detected, as well.   
In addition, exclusion zones do not provide a guarantee of in-band interference avoidance. 
Since propagation is unpredictable, signals could occasionally travel farther than expected. 
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Likewise, the exclusion zones do not explicitly account for tall features, like tall buildings and 
mountains, which can cause longer than expected propagation distances. Moreover, a SU can 
intentionally or accidently cross the boundary of an exclusion zone and cause interference. As a 
result, ex post mechanisms are needed to provide data to PUs and SUs to better adjudication 
procedure and to further tune the system for future interference avoidance. 
This section will cover the three major tools to facilitate “ex post” enforcement related to 
spectrum sharing. 
4.3.1 Sensing Network 
As a main element of ex post enforcement tools in spectrum sharing, there should be a sensor 
network able to detect and determine any interference source. Attributing an interference event is 
necessary for enforcement settlement because it is not reasonable to hold SUs accountable for all 
interference events. In some exclusion zones, there should be more than one sensor station for 
greater accuracy in detecting interference events. Therefore, there is a need for a sensing network 
that can detect interference events across the zone. It is a critical element of the enforcement 
process in shared environments15. There is a tradeoff between the cost of a sensing network and 
its accuracy in detection interference events.  
                                                 
 
15 In some static sharing environment or under specific circumstances, there may not be a need for sensing network, 
such as TVWS case. At TVWS, the enforcement based only on very large exclusion zones (ex ante) and a database 
gathering the static TV stations characteristics. 
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Attributing an interference event to an SU is necessary for appropriate adjudication. For 
example, inter-modulation products from a nearby but unrelated user could cause significant 
electromagnetic energy to occur in the PU’s band, causing interference. To associate an 
interference event with the SU(s) means that the PU has either some knowledge about the SU’s 
signal characteristics and/or an identification code that can easily be obtained by demodulating 
part or all of the SU’s signal. In some cases, the ex post process can be relaxed. For example, if 
the SU is a single cellular operator (e.g. LTE), demodulation of the cellular signal to uniquely 
identify the SU (i.e. causing the harmful interference) may not be necessary since all the users 
belong to a single operator (and that operator is responsible for them); that will lead to a reduction 
in ex post enforcement costs. If multiple SUs exist, the cellular signal would have to be 
demodulated to identify the source of the interference.    
Spectrum sharing is a complex dynamic and multi-stakeholder system that could benefit 
from the feedback provided by practice so that the system can be optimized to perform “better” by 
an agreed-upon set of attributes. A collaborative and adaptive ex post enforcement approach could 
(and probably would) result in benefits to both PUs and SUs. The PUs could look forward to a 
decreasing rate of significant interference events and the SUs could look forward to reduce ex ante 
rules (e.g. exclusion zones) that would allow them to use the shared spectrum as effectively as 
possible.   
Generally speaking, the sensor density is dependent on a variety of factors, including 
spectrum band, characteristics of the primary signal and sensing bandwidth. In addition, there is a 
tradeoff between the number of sensor stations and the ability to minimize the exclusion zone size 
that should be considered during implementation (to the extent that the definition of the “ex ante” 
exclusion zone is dependent on the greater precision of the “ex post” sensors). 
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4.3.2 Litigation  
In ex post enforcement, the PU must present evidence to an adjudicator in support of a claim of 
interference16. In some cases, they may need to provide evidence that the interference event was 
disruptive. Gathering evidence to support an interference claim would almost certainly require the 
existence of a sensor network that is capable of gathering adjudication evidence. This sensor must 
be able to (1) detect signal energy at or above an agreed-upon interference threshold and (2) 
determine if the signal energy could reasonably be attributed to a SU.  
It is likely that the sensing would be performed (at least) by the PU, since they would be 
making claims for adjudication. The SU may wish to have an independent sensor to (1) validate 
the claim of the PU and (2) provide additional information that the PU may not have provided. 
Such additional information might include the direction of the interfering signal and the ID of the 
SU-unit that transmitted the offending signal.   
A mutually trusted third party could also provide sensing information to both the primary 
and secondary users if the costs of sensing are too high. It is most likely to be the case in many 
real government and commercial sharing scenarios. The FCC and the PCAST report predict this 
likelihood and there is suggestion of what is called “band manager” [3].  
                                                 
 
16 It is not always clear who is the adjudicator. In the USA, the NTIA retains responsibility for civilian federal spectrum 
management, whereas the FCC does for commercial spectrum management.  Furthermore, courts have jurisdiction 
for resolving property disputes.  Thus, the adjudication venues, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, must 
be defined in advance. 
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4.3.3 Interference Threshold at PU Location 
A traditional exclusion zone, usually, is a setting to make the PUs does not notice the existence of 
the SUs. This means, the PUs’ receivers will not be exposed with any additional interference due 
to the sharing. In certain case, where there is a bit high trust between the PU and SUs, it is possible 
to relax the ex ante enforcement process to be only agreed interference threshold (above the regular 
PU’s noise floor) that the SUs promise to not exceed. That does not mean we do not have to have 
sensing networks to locate the interferer, but it gives the SUs the choice to internally decide the 
way prevent exceeding the threshold at the PU area.  
4.3.4 Summary 
In this section, three ex post tools was highlighted. Although the major role of ex post enforcement 
is to detect and identify who caused harmful interference, it is very important to set the appropriate 
penalty/sentence against him. Following the law and economics literature, the purpose of 
enforcement is to make rights definition meaningful. If we assume rational economic actors, we 
can establish some parameters around penalties as well as enforcement costs.   
Penalties serve to promote coordination between primary and secondary users and also to 
compensate for violations. To ensure cooperation, the SU should find it cheaper to coordinate than 
to pay a penalty. Thus, the product of the penalty and the probability of detection should be greater 
than the benefit the SU obtains from transmitting in a way that causes interference. 
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𝒅 × 𝑷 ≥ 𝑩    
Where: 
{
𝒅:  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                       
𝑷:  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑                                                                                                                          
𝑩:  𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑈 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
 
 
The uncertainties of frequency propagation mean that interference events may be 
accidental. If the average payment is based on willful interference, the SU will (1) have an 
incentive to optimize their system to eliminate interference events and (2) be indifferent to intent 
(i.e. willful or accidental).   
4.4 BENEFITS AND COST OF ENFORCEMENT 
One of the main outcomes of this research is to quantify the benefits of enforcement in shared 
spectrum scenarios. These benefits will draw the upper line limit for reasonable enforcement cost. 
Therefore, the model has been built in this dissertation is not a cost model to figure out precisely 
how much an enforcement scenario will cost, rather quantify the sharing benefit over different 
level of enforcement methodologies. 
4.4.1 Precision of Enforcement 
In general, we consider an enforcement approach to be more precise if it more specifically 
differentiates legitimate users and uses from illegitimate ones. The enforcement-cost (including 
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the complexity) of precision depends on some attributes of the system itself. The maximum 
practical cost of enforcement is closely linked to the value of the resource: the more valuable 
resource becomes, the more worthwhile it may be to invest in more precise enforcement 
technology.   
For SUs, the most precise enforcement approach would be ability to control/identify (on a 
moment-by-moment basis) a particular event based on factors such as the device’s location and 
the PU’s instantaneous usage. Ex ante enforcement would involve permission to transmit on the 
shared band, and ex post enforcement would entail identifying the precise time and location of SU 
devices whose signals exceeded the agreed-upon in-band interference threshold. By contrast, the 
least precise enforcement mechanism would involve the creation of large exclusion zones as an ex 
ante tool, and a simple in-band interference threshold detection system, perhaps with signal 
classifiers (to exclude non-secondaries interference) but without any attempt to locate the 
interfering mobile.   
4.4.2 Enforcement Cost  
Funding of the enforcement infrastructure is yet another important issue. Several methods for 
funding have been applied in different industries. For example, in many contexts, the enforcement 
action is funded from general government tax receipts (e.g. Homeland Security), while in others, 
industry-specific taxes or fees (e.g. license fees for hunting and fishing) may be used to fund the 
enforcement effort. Also, funds collected in the form of sanctions may be used to help defray 
enforcement costs [24]. 
 60 
 
An optimal enforcement approach is inextricably linked to the usage rights regime and 
economic environment in which it is expected to function. Thus, costs of inducing good behavior 
(avoiding bad behavior) must be balanced against the social costs and benefits under different 
scenarios. Also, enforcement-cost is associated with the collection of evidence and establishing its 
provenance at various stages in the process. The process needs to anticipate the challenges of 
detecting "bad" behaviors (i.e. behaviors that have a high probability of resulting in actual harm) 
or actual harm itself, establishing liability, adjudicating whatever sanctions are appropriate, and 
then imposing those sanctions. 
 Evidence collection can be done by the market participants or by a third party (such as 
government). The costs of such information processing/decision-making may be significant, and 
these costs need to be weighed with due consideration of the costs/benefits associated with the 
rights that the enforcement approach is intended to enable [24]. Thus, when it is difficult 
(expensive) to detect harmful behavior, it may be preferable to rely on stronger ex ante rules. 
The ex ante and ex post enforcement effects are intimately linked as well. For example, if 
the ex ante rules and processes are sufficiently strong, then ex post harm may be prevented 
altogether. Also, certain types of ex ante rules may be easier to monitor, hence lowering the cost 
of enforcement. Even strong ex ante rules may require ex post enforcement; for example, licensing 
approval for equipment is usually based on a prototype or pre-production unit, but compliance of 
production units may require some kind of policing to ensure compliance. 
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5.0  SPECTRUM SHARING MODEL  
The centerpiece of this dissertation is a model of spectrum sharing in which all factors that affect 
the sharing can be examined and studied. In addition, it is being used to test the hypotheses of this 
dissertation. Although, our goal to test these hypotheses, we try to draw the possible lessons that 
can be taken from simulating real case scenarios of spectrum sharing.  
 This chapter will demonstrate the simulation model design which can be applied to a 
variety of spectrum sharing environments. In addition, it is flexible to be customized to capture 
the characteristics for both PUs and SUs. The following chapters will illustrate the simulation 
results of this model in two case scenarios. 
5.1 GENERAL MODELING 
The current approach to spectrum sharing using exclusion zones (as suggested by NTIA) is based 
primarily on ex ante enforcement by setting a very large exclusion zones, see Figure 5-1. This 
dissertation, however, increase the role of ex post enforcement. The proposed modeling of 
geographical exclusion zones moves from a purely ex ante approach (large exclusion zone only) 
towards ex post enforcement, see Figure 5-2. The model includes these additions: 
 Benefits evaluation of spectrum sharing within the exclusion zone. 
o Model of a “Gray space” area.  
o Model of a “Black space” area. 
 62 
 
 Benefits evaluation of spectrum sharing outside the exclusion zone.  
o Model of a “White space” area. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Current proposed idea 
 
In Figure 5-2, the PU antenna is represented in the center of simulated area/circle. The x-
axis represents the distance from the PU antenna to the perimeter of the “PU usage right area”.  
 R1: proposed radius of Back space. 
 R2: proposed radius of Gray space. R1 and R2 are the key variables affecting the 
function of sharing utilization. 
 R3: the radius of PU usage right area. It is the total area where the PU is originally 
licensed to use the spectrum. We assume this radius to be 100km during the simulation. 
 
 
Shared Zone 
Exclusion Zone 
PULocation 
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Figure 5-2 Research Model 
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5.1.1 White Space (W) 
 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 = 𝜋 (𝑅3
2  −  𝑅2
2) 
 This is the area where the SUs can operate at the maximum standardized power-limit 
without causing harmful interference to the PU. 
 The expected enforcement effort to facilitate sharing in this area is relatively less 
compared to the other proposed areas.  
o In special cases where the cost of ex post enforcement is higher than the benefits 
of sharing Gray and Black spaces, we probably need ex ante enforcement only 
to share the W space, through simple database holding the boundary of the 
exclusion zone at R2.  
o The relatively low enforcement effort in W space area is one of the major 
advantages of sharing, where utilization increases at lower enforcement cost.  
 R3 represents either the border of “spectrum usage right” of the PU or it could be 
bounded by another exclusion zone domain.  
 It is very important to differentiate between “operations area” and “usage right area”.  
o The usage right area is the geographical area where the PU is licensed to use its 
spectrum/frequency. 
o  The operations area is the geographical location where the PU uses the spectrum 
(i.e. builds its network).  
o In special domain, W space sharing benefits will increase if the difference 
between “operations area” and “usage right area” increases (the “operations 
area” is always less than or equal the “usage right area”. 
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5.1.2 Gray Space (G) 
 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 = 𝜋 (𝑅2
2  −  𝑅1
2) 
 This is the area where the aggregated interference from SUs will be greater than the 
interference threshold of the PU receivers and below the maximum interference 
threshold set by the PU which is part of sharing enforcement procedure.  
 R1 depends on the sensitivity of PU receivers to additive noise caused by spectrum 
sharing.  
5.1.3 Black Space (B) 
 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 = 𝜋 (𝑅1
2) 
 This area is close to the PU receiver, where the penalties for interference would be set 
to give the SU an incentive to create profit maximizing zones out from sharing. 
 Sharing in this area is expected to be heavily based on ex post enforcement.  
  B space is expected to be shared by a centralized SU, represented, for example, by a 
single operator or interface that would manage all the related secondaries. This is the 
most likely case when we have large cells of SUs (i.e. LTE network). Thus, enforcing 
SU behavior will be achieved through this single interface. For more information about 
the differences between centralized and decentralized SUs, please refer to [24] [41]. 
 In special cases, B space could be very small or almost zero, in which case the PU can 
coexist with the maximum possible interference threshold caused by SUs (where the 
whole exclusion zone becomes G space).  
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 One of the purposes of this model is to evaluate the benefits of W, G, and B spaces, even 
if it is not possible to share the G and/or B spaces. In the end, we need the value of the 
exclusion zone for each level of enforcement scenario, so that, for example, we could 
recommend re-locating the PU antenna if possible based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
Table 5-1 Summary of proposed classifications 
Sharing Domains17 
Space Type Enforcement Nature 
S
p
ec
tr
u
m
 
T
em
p
o
ra
l 
S
p
a
ti
a
l 
yes yes no WSpatial 
Heavily based on Ex Ante 
enforcement 
yes no yes WTemporal Not considered in this dissertation 
yes yes yes 
G 
Based on both Ex Ante and Ex 
Post enforcement 
B 
Heavily based on Ex Post 
enforcement 
                                                 
 
17 For more information, please refer to section 1.1.2 ( Taxonomies of Spectrum Sharing). 
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5.2 MAIN FUNCTION OF SIMULATION 
The key component of this simulation is the methodology that has been used to determine the 
aggregated interference level at a PU location with many SUs sharing the band. The aggregate 
interference level at PU receivers depends on several factors, such as channel parameters, spatial 
distribution of SUs, and transmit power level. In this work, we have created a reasonable 
representation of the aggregate interference in the spectrum sharing environment where multiple 
SUs cause interference to a single PU. Moreover, we will explore the impact of aggregate 
interference over sharing benefits. 
In this model, each simulated SU can cause interference to the PU which can be defined in 
equation (1). Then, aggregated interference is calculated by converting the individual interference 
in “dBm” to “Watt” in order to add them together. Then the sum is converted to “dBm” again in 
equation (2). 
𝑰 = 𝐈𝐒𝐔 +  𝐆𝐏𝐔 +  𝐆𝐒𝐔 −  𝐏𝐋 −  𝐅𝐃𝐑 −  𝐋𝐏𝐔 −  𝐋𝐀𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥                                                               (𝟏)                      
𝑰𝑨𝑮𝑮 = 𝟏𝟎𝑳𝒐𝒈𝟏𝟎 [∑ 𝑰
𝑵
𝒋=𝟏
] + 𝟑𝟎                                                                                                                  (𝟐) 
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Table 5-2 Model equations descriptions 
 Description Unit 
I SU interference (at the PU receiver) dBm 
ISU SU transmitted power dBm 
GPU Antenna gain of the PU dBi 
GSU Antenna gain of the SU dBi 
PL Propagation Loss dB 
FDR Frequency Dependent Rejection dB 
LPU Losses at PU antenna dB 
LAdditional Additional Losses (e.g. penetration loss factor) dB 
IAGG Aggregated interference power at PU receiver dBm 
N Number of SU N 
 
5.2.1 SU Transmitted Power 
Since the number of simulated SUs is very large (i.e. tens of thousands) around the PU location, 
the transmit power should be modeled in a more accurate way18. To do this, we follow a probability 
distribution function for the transmit power of SUs. More details follow in the two case studies in 
the following chapters.  
                                                 
 
18 Some researchers in this field suggest using average transmit power which will be reasonable for small number of 
SUs in a small area of simulation. 
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5.2.2 Antenna Gain 
The gain of SU antennas is set at zero in this model, which means that we are not considering any 
gain on the SU side due to the characteristics of the technology representing the SUs, such as LTE-
UE, Femtocells, and WiFi. 
For the PU, we follow the ITU-R F.1245-1 recommendation [66]. This is a mathematical 
model of the average radiation pattern that should be adopted for frequencies in the range 1-40 
GHz. This ITU recommendation is the best prediction model for antenna pattern which has been 
used widely in this type of research. We believe that if there is a percentage of error due to relying 
on this recommendation, it will be very miner and will not affect the results significantly. There 
are two cases:  
 
Case-1: When the ratio between the antenna diameter and the wavelength is greater than 100 (D / 
λ > 100), the following equation should be used: 
𝐺(𝜑) =  𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 2.5 ×  10
−3 (
𝐷
𝜆
𝜑)
2
              𝑓𝑜𝑟                              0𝜊  <  𝜑 <  𝜑𝑚 
𝐺(𝜑) =  𝐺1                                                              𝑓𝑜𝑟                              𝜑𝑚  ≤  𝜑 <  max (𝜑𝑚, 𝜑𝑟) 
𝐺(𝜑) =  29 − 29 log 𝜑                                       𝑓𝑜𝑟           max (𝜑𝑚, 𝜑𝑟)  ≤  𝜑 <  48
𝜊 
𝐺(𝜑) =  −13                                                         𝑓𝑜𝑟                              48𝜊  ≤  𝜑 ≤  180𝜊 
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Where: 
𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 :     𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 (𝑑𝐵𝑖) 
𝐺(𝜑):     𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎  (𝑑𝐵𝑖) 
𝜑:           𝑜𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 (𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) 
𝐷:           𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟) 
𝜆:            𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟) 
𝐺1 = 2 + 15 log (
𝐷
𝜆
)                  ;     (𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑒) 
𝜑𝑚 =  
20𝜆
𝐷
 √(𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐺1 )       ;    (𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) 
𝜑𝑟 =  12.02 (
𝐷
𝜆
)
−0.6
                   ;    (𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) 
 
 
Case-2:  When the ratio between the antenna diameter and the wavelength is less than or equal to 
100 (D/λ ≤ 100), the following equation should be used: 
𝐺(𝜑) =  𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 2.5 ×  10
−3 (
𝐷
𝜆
𝜑)
2
                    𝑓𝑜𝑟             0𝜊  <  𝜑 <  𝜑𝑚 
𝐺(𝜑) =  39 − 5 log (
𝐷
𝜆
) − 25  log 𝜑                      𝑓𝑜𝑟            𝜑𝑚  ≤  𝜑 <  48
𝜊 
𝐺(𝜑) =  −3 − 5 log (
𝐷
𝜆
)                                           𝑓𝑜𝑟            48𝜊  ≤  𝜑 ≤  180𝜊 
 
 
 
 71 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the azimuth and elevation antenna pattern from the simulation model 
where the maximum antenna gain equals 43 dBi and the minimum elevation angle for PU antenna 
is 27 degrees. 
 
Figure 5-3 PU antenna gain pattern 
5.2.3 Path Loss 
Path loss is the reduction or attenuation in power density of a signal wave as it propagates through 
space. This model uses the Hata path loss models to relate the size of a shared area (W, G, and B 
space areas) with SU signals. Its effects on transmit power were represented in Figure 5-2 as a 
dashed line. It shows two cases: (1) the representation of maximum allowable signal power of the 
SU while working in the W space area; (2) the representation of maximum allowable signal power 
of the SU at the G space area. In the second case, a sharing distance gain of ∆𝐷 at the expenses of 
∆𝐼 at the PU side. Due to the characteristics of path loss, the marginal distance increase is typically 
larger than the increase in marginal interference, ∆𝐷 >  ∆𝐼 . 
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To reflect the terrain of the simulated area, four Hata models were implemented: open, 
suburban, small city, and large city. These models are the most commonly used in wireless 
communication field, particularly because they can capture the long distances as well as four 
distinct terrain models. The following equation represents the value of path loss: 
 
𝑃𝐿 = 69.55 + 26.16𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑓) − 13.82 𝐿𝑜𝑔10(ℎ𝑏) − 𝑎(ℎ𝑚)                                                        (𝟑)
+ [44.9 − 6.55𝐿𝑜𝑔10(ℎ𝑏)]𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑑) − 𝐾 
Where: 
ℎ𝑚: 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
ℎ𝑏: 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑎(ℎ𝑚) = { 
[1.1𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑓) − 0.7]ℎ𝑚 − [1.56𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑓) − 0.8] → 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑢𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑛, 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦
3.2 [𝐿𝑜𝑔10(11.75ℎ𝑚)]
2 − 4.97                                → 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦                                
   
𝐾 = {
4.78[𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑓) − 18.33𝐿𝑜𝑔10(𝑓) + 40.94]                   → 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛                                       
2[𝐿𝑜𝑔10 (
𝑓
28
)]2 + 5.4                                                         → 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑢𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑛                              
0                                                                                             →  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦   
 
5.2.4 Frequency Dependent Rejection 
Per the ITU19 and NTIA documents [67], “Frequency Dependent Rejection (FDR) accounts for 
the fact that not all of the undesired transmitter energy at the receiver input will be available at the 
detector. FDR is a calculation of the amount of undesired transmitter energy that is rejected by a 
                                                 
 
19 See, Recommendation ITU-R SM.337 (2008). 
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victim receiver. This FDR attenuation is composed of two parts: on-tune rejection (OTR) and off-
frequency rejection (OFR). The OTR is the rejection provided by a receiver selectivity 
characteristic to a co-frequency transmitter as a result of an emission spectrum exceeding the 
receiver bandwidth, in dB. The OFR is the additional rejection, caused by specified detuning of 
the receiver with respect to the transmitter, in dB”. 
Based on ITU recommendations (ITU-R SM.337), there are many ways to measure FDR 
value. In this spectrum sharing model, we tend to go for the most conservative option when there 
is a list of possibilities, meaning that we choose the option with the most protection for PU 
receivers. Therefore, the value of FDR is set at zero since its value (if any) is very small and not 
significant in many cases in this analysis. Although FDR has been built into the simulator for future 
analysis, in this dissertation, we ignore its effects in both 1.7 GHz and 3.5 GHz cases to simplify 
the exposition.   
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5.2.5 Assumed Losses  
5.2.5.1 Losses at PU antenna  These are losses associated with PU receivers, such as insertion 
loss, cable loss, or polarization mismatch loss. This depends heavily on the characteristics of the 
antenna. It will be assumed to be 2dB in our analysis. 
5.2.5.2 Additional Losses  This captures the additional power loss coefficients for any losses over 
the transmission space, such as indoor transmission loss calculation or floor penetration loss factor. 
For this factor, we rely on some of the assumptions from ITU recommendation ITU-R P.1238-6.  
5.2.6 Aggregate Interference  
To model the accumulated interference, equation (2) aggregates interference power from all SU 
transmitters surrounding a primary receiver. This is the most complex step of the model because 
the model simulates each SU individually (i.e. based on its location, path loss, terrain effects, gain, 
transmit power, etc.), then aggregates them to measure the interference level at each specific 
exclusion zone radius calculations. 
5.3 MODEL DESIGN 
One of the goals in the building of this model has been to be expandable to any future spectrum 
sharing scenario. In this dissertation, the PU is assumed to be a single PU receiver and there are a 
large number of SUs. In the case of spectrum sharing, the SUs will be seen by the PU as additive 
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noise/interference on top of any pre-existing noise (i.e. noise before sharing). This additive 
interference will affect PU receivers only, not the transmitters. Therefore, the location of the PU 
receivers is what we are considering to force a protection distance between SUs’ location and PU 
receivers.  
5.3.1 Settings 
 A single PU receiver that is bounded by three types of zones: B, G and W spaces.  
 The external radius of W space (i.e. R3) is 100km.  
 A large group of SUs. 
 We set the interference threshold level of the PU to be Gboundary which determines the 
closest distance between the SUs and the PU. 
 It is assumed that the PU will agree to tolerate some extra interference (i.e. ∆𝐼) to 
increase the sharing utilization (i.e. ∆𝐷). This extra interference level is bounded by 
Bboundary. 
o 𝐺boundary 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵boundary  are negative values    [dBm]   
o 𝐺boundary  <  𝐵boundary              𝑜𝑟        |𝐺boundary|  >   |𝐵boundary| 
 From these distances, we can find out the additive area that can be added to the sharing 
scenario. 
5.3.2 Research Assumptions 
In this dissertation, certain assumptions are taken into consideration:  
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 We assume that PUs are not utilizing the spectrum efficiently over the whole usage right 
area. Certain parts of usage right areas are unutilized, which allows for spatial spectrum 
sharing.  
 The harmful interference caused by SUs affect PU receivers, not the transmitters. 
Therefore, the location of those PU receivers are specifically considered during the 
construction of the exclusion zone in order to protect PU operation.  
 Generally speaking, there are two types of spectrum sharing: opportunistic or non-
opportunistic sharing.  
o We consider non-opportunistic sharing, where there is an agreement (i.e. 
coordination) between PUs and SUs to make the sharing possible. 
 SUs are expected to be either centralized or decentralized users. By that we mean: 
o Centralized: a single operator or interface (e.g. LTE operator) manages all the 
related secondaries. It is the most likely case when we have large cells of SUs. 
Thus, enforcing SUs will be accomplished through this single interface. 
o Decentralized: each SU shares the spectrum under a pre-registration type of 
process (albeit still non-opportunistic sharing). These are most likely small cells 
(e.g. WiFi).  
 We expect that the PU is a government incumbent (i.e. Federal or non-Federal agency) 
and that the SU is a commercial wireless broadband operator/user. 
 There are two types of in-band interference that may exist due to the sharing scenario 
illustrated in this dissertation:  
o Interference from a SU to a PU: 
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  This is the interference under consideration in this work, where the PU 
should be protected. 
 This interference will be mitigated by ex ante and ex post enforcement 
scenarios. 
o Interference from a PU to a SU: 
 This type of interference is caused by the PU signal reaching the 
operation area of SUs. 
 The exclusion zone will be modeled to protect the PU only. 
 This type of interference is beyond the scope of this work, where the SUs 
should, typically, expect this type of interference as part of the sharing 
environment. 
5.3.3 Area of simulation 
The simulated area is a circle of 100km radius where the PU receiver is centered in the middle. 
Since 100km is a long distance, the model is capable of dividing it into different segments, each 
with its own terrain and population characteristics. For simplicity’s sake, we divide it into two 
segments: 
 Inner area: the area is relatively small in order to capture the terrain characteristics 
of the most interferer area to the PU. For example, Figure 5-4 shows that the inner 
area has a radius of 40km. 
 Outer area: the area between the inner area radius and 100km. SUs in this area 
have less effect on the PU receiver compared to SUs in the inner area. 
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The SUs are randomly distributed over the simulated area. The key input to the model is 
the population density (people per km2) to represent the existence of SUs. Not all the population 
of that area transmit at the same time, so, we multiply the population density by what we call the 
“Active Factor”, which can vary based on the of simulated SU technology type.  
 
 
Figure 5-4 Area of simulation, the PU receiver is located in the center 
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5.4 FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS 
There are many inputs and variables in this model. In this section, we will examine the main ones; 
the rest will be covered through the real case scenarios that follow in the next chapters. The major 
inputs to this model analysis are listed in Table 5-3. 
As we mentioned in the main model design (i.e. Figure 5-2), we are trying to quantify the 
benefits of spectrum sharing under different enforcement and sharing scenarios. The following are 
some of the main variables that we highlighted here: 
 The radius of B space and G space. 
 Frequency of shared band. 
 The PU Gain (Azimuth & Elevation angles). 
 SU density per km2. 
 Interference protection threshold of PU receiver. 
 G boundary limit in dBm which define the radius of G space [e.g.   IAGG  ≤  (-110)]. 
 B boundary limit in dBm which define the radius of B space [e.g.   IAGG  ≤  (-90)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
Table 5-3 Major model inputs and variables 
Frequency 2 GHz 
“PU Antenna” azimuth angle 360 Degrees 
Minimum “PU Antenna” elevation angle 20 Degrees 20 
SU transmit power (ISU) Standard LTE-UE (see 6.2.2) 
Maximum “PU Antenna” gain 40 dBi 
SU gain (GSU) 0 dBi 
Additional Losses (LAdditional) 0 dB 
FDR 0 dB 
LPU 2 dB 
Inner area 
Radius From 0 to 40km 
Density 6 Active SUs per km2 
Outer area 
Radius From 40km to 100km 
Density 2 Active SUs per km2 
Gboundary -110 dBm 
Bboundary -90 dBm 
Terrain Type Suburban 
PU Antenna Height 20 m 
Note:  
If one/number of these inputs mentioned in the x-axis or in the legend of the following 
figures, that means they take the values mentioned in such figures. The rest stay as they 
are listed in this table. 
                                                 
 
20 The minimum elevation angle is consider as fixed input to the model and added to the “gain function” in the 
simulation model; that because we try to represent the worst case scenario which is the case where the interference 
increase as we decrease the elevation angle. 
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5.4.1 PU Antenna Gain 
Figure 5-5 shows the gain from the perspective of the PU antenna. It demonstrates the setting of 
our model. Please note, this figure is a 3-D visualization of an area that was originally circular 
(Note: In this figure, to aid visualization, the inner and outer area densities are reduced to 2.5 
SU/km2 and 0.3 SU/km2, respectively). 
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Figure 5-5 PU antenna gain visualization 
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5.4.2 SUs Density  
This section examines the relationship between the level of SUs density and the radius of different 
types of exclusion zones. W space radius is fixed at 100km and is constant thought out the 
simulation. G and B space radiuses vary based on SUs density. Figure 5-6 summarize these 
relationships.  
 
Figure 5-6 Relationship between SU density and space radius 
By examining the above figures, we can conclude the following about this model setting: 
 Interestingly, the G radius is relatively constant for SUs density greater than 10 
users per km2. Thus, we conclude that the W space area is not sensitive to SUs 
density above 10 users per km2.  
 In this figure, (G-B) distance is the difference between R2 and R1. 
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o (G-B) is very sensitive to any change in SUs density up to 13 users per km2, 
after which point the radius remains relatively constant. 
 G space area increases as the SUs density decrease. This is very interesting where 
there is more incentive to have larger G space in the case with less SUs density. 
o At SU
density
 = 1/km2; the (G-B) radius, which defines the G area, is 60km.  
o At SU
density
 = 5/km2; the (G-B) radius is 20km only.  
5.4.3 Frequency  
In this section, we will show how the simulated model reacts to different frequency bands. The 
frequency will vary from 0.5 GHz to 5 GHz and we will examine how the G and B radii reacts. 
The major variables are still the same as in Table 5-3, where the frequency is the variable. From 
Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8, Figure 5-9, and Figure 5-10, we can conclude the following: 
 The effect of SUs density decreases as we lower the frequency in a sharing 
environment. We can see that G radius has less variance at 0.5 GHz compared to 5 
GHz, by moving along the x-axis. This is also the case in B radius. 
o The reason for that is longer propagation for lower frequencies which 
increase the aggregated interference. 
 At higher SUs density, the differences between the radiuses at different frequencies 
is minimized. 
o In Figure 5-9, the frequency band effect on G radius is very minimal for 
SU
density
 > 5/km2.  
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o In Figure 5-10, the frequency band effect on B radius is also minimal for 
SU
density
 > 10/km2. 
 In Figure 5-8, it is notable that at low density, the B radius is zero. This means the 
exclusion zone will be G space only. 
To highlight the important of this findings, we will demonstrate this example. Let assume 
spectrum sharing at W space only, see Figure 5-9, where W area is bounded by G radius. Suppose 
there is a regulator who wants to assign two different SUs services with two different expected 
densities of SUs, all else being equal:  
 Two different SUs services: 
o Service A: has SU
density
 = D per km2 
o Service B: has SU
density
 = 3D per km2 
 Assume there are two spectrum bands that are recommended for sharing with these 
two services. 
o Band-X: 1GHz 
o Band-Y: 3GHz 
 How the regulator will react? 
o The intuitive answer could be that: service B (higher density) should share 
band-Y (to exploit the frequency propagation of higher frequency) and 
service A should share band-X.  
o That is true if D = 0.1, relatively low densities for both services. 
o However, if D = 10, the answer is it does not matter and the frequency is 
not a sensitive factor any more.  
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Figure 5-7 Frequency band effect on G radius, SU/km2 is between 0.1 and 1 
 
Figure 5-8 Frequency band effect on B radius, SU/km2 is between 0.1 and 1 
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Figure 5-9 Frequency band effect on G radius, SU/km2 is between 1 and 30 
 
 
Figure 5-10 Frequency band effect on B radius, SU/km2 is between 1 and 30 
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5.4.4 Interference Threshold 
Here, we examine the effect of changing the interference threshold boundary (in dBm) on the 
exclusion zone radius. To do that, we will consider one interference threshold in this simulation. 
We pick the G boundary to examine this relationship over two different entries: (1) changing the 
SUs density, and (2) changing the frequency band.  
In Figure 5-11, the G radius remains at approximately 100km till reaching (-130dBm) for 
all different SUs densities. Also, the G radius reaches zero around (-75dBm). That leads to these 
findings: 
 If the PU antenna interference threshold is less than (-130dBm), it is very sensitive 
to interference, and the exclusion zones will be very large.  
 If the interference threshold is higher than (-80dBm), this means we will not need 
any exclusion zones at this model setting at SUs density less than or equal to 1. 
This means, there is no G space in the case. 
 By increasing the SUs density, the interference threshold limit changes 
accordingly. 
As mentioned in Table 5-3, the difference between G and B boundaries is assumed to be 
(+20dBm). This is the amount we assumed that the PU will accept as additional aggregated 
interference on top of its “interference threshold” level to practice the sharing at G space. Based 
on research model (Figure 5-2), to push the exclusion zone radius from “R2” to “R1”, we will 
increase the aggregated interference level from (-110dBm) to (-90dBm). The benefit is an area of 
sharing that is vary in size based on SUs density sharing the band. From Figure 5-11; we notice 
the following: 
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 In this part, we ignored W and B spaces and focus on G space only. 
 We got different size of G space by changing the SUs densities. 
o In (SUdensity = 1/km2) case, the gain of adding (+20dBm) is 55 km. It is 
reduction on exclusion zone radius that is proportional to G area (R2 – R1 
= 55 km).  
o In (SUdensity = 5/km2) case, the gain of adding (+20dBm) is 20km. 
 This prove one of the findings at previous section (5.4.2), where the incentive to 
gain more G area is increased as we decrease the SUs density. 
 
Figure 5-11 Effects of interference threshold on G radius with different SUs densities 
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In Figure 5-12, the inner area density is 10 SU/km2 and the outer area density is 1 SU/km2. 
We can conclude the following: 
 At a specific point on the G boundary (x-axis), as the frequency decreases, the G 
radius increases. 
 The curve pending at radius=40 km is due to the difference in SUs density between 
inner and outer areas. 
 The sensitivity of the interference threshold is lower at higher SUs densities. That 
is clear from this figure, where the slope of the curves above radius=40km is higher 
(in magnitude) than below it.  
 
Figure 5-12 Effects of interference threshold on G radius with different frequency bands 
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5.4.5 MIMO Effects on Aggregated Interference Level 
In wireless field, Multiple Input and Multiple Output (MIMO) is the use of multiple antennas to 
improve wireless-channel performance. Recently, there are a growing number of technologies that 
adopt the use of MIMO. In this dissertation model, we assume all the SUs to be SISO (Single Input 
and Single Output). Therefore, we will try to highlight in brief this case: if a SU uses MIMO 
systems instead of SISO, how that will influence the aggregated interference level at PU receiver? 
MIMO systems have been studied intensively in recent years. Majority of the work done 
in this area focusses on the relationship between the performance of the network and number of 
antennas that been used and the optimal combination figure [68] [69]. Many suggest that under the 
same throughput requirements, MIMO systems require less transmission energy compared to SISO 
systems [70] [71]. A study done over LTE networks showed that (for given reference data rates) 
there is power efficiency gain [72]. MIMO system will minimize the transmission energy more at 
long-range compare to small-range networks. Hence it is tempting to believe that MIMO systems 
are more energy efficient than SISO systems.  
The distance between the transmitter and the receiver (within the SUs network) will play 
also a role that affects the power efficiency of MIMO system. For the PU, we are only concerned 
about the aggregated interference at its location, so, we assume the PU receiver to be single 
antenna. 
 In this dissertation, we assume that the SUs using SISO systems, and this is considered a 
conservative approach, since the SISO will cause more aggregated interference at the PUs. If we 
add MIMOs in the SUs network, the aggregate interference at the PU receiver is expected to be 
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either less or the same (at maximum) as SISO. For more detailed information, please refer to 
Appendix (B). 
5.5 SPECTRUM PRICING 
Generally, a wireless operator will base its decision to acquire a spectrum band on costs as well as 
on a projection of future revenues [73]. Doing that in addition to evaluating other alternatives is 
part of the process to measure its opportunity cost. To calculate the cost of obtaining access to 
spectrum resources, it is very common for wireless operators to use the concept of net present 
value (NPV). They evaluate the cost of any spectrum as an expression of the price per megahertz 
[73], where they value spectrum opportunities by MHz POP (the price per megahertz - population).   
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑀𝐻𝑧 𝑃𝑂𝑃
=  [
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒($)
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ (𝑀𝐻𝑧) × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
] 
Based on a recent ITU broadband report [73], we summarize the following: 
 Per German spectrum auction results in May 2010, the average $[USD]/MHz POP 
for four different bands, based on World Bank 2009 population count, is $0.28 per 
MHZ POP. 
 In Hong Kong, the 4G auction (90 megahertz of paired spectrum in the 2.6 GHz 
band) was completed in early 2009, finishing with an average of $0.31 per MHz 
POP. 
 The global average for 700 MHz and 800 MHz auctions is $0.9 per MHz POP. 
 Since 2002, the global average for 2.1 GHz spectrum has been $1.33 per MHz POP. 
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 The global average for 2.6 GHz has been $0.07 per MHz POP since 2005. 
In the US market, the FCC held an auction in 2008 for broadcast TV spectrum in the 700 
MHz band; the average spectrum valuation for mobile broadband use was $1.28 per MHz POP, 
and the value of unpaired spectrum was $0.78 per MHz POP [2]. For 1.9 GHz band (in 2004) and 
AWS band (in 2006), the average was $1.7 per MHz POP and $0.54 per MHz POP, respectively 
[74]. 
For spectrum bandwidth, population, and spectrum price in a specific scenario, we can 
arrive at its real value based on the market price of spectrum21. Since we will examine two cases 
in the following chapters (1.7GHz band and 3.5GHz band) within the US, we will base our 
evaluation of cost per MHz POP on the FCC database. More detailed procedures will be provided 
in the following chapters. 
5.6 CASE STUDIES OF GOVERNMENT-COMMERCIAL SHARING 
Sharing between the government incumbents (i.e. Federal or non-Federal agencies) and 
commercial wireless broadband operators/users is one of the key forms of spectrum sharing that 
is recommended by the NTIA and the FCC. In addition, one of the broad visions of President 
Obama’s Spectrum Initiative [3] is that the Federal government must ensure sound government 
                                                 
 
21 We will use this “spectrum opportunity cost” to evaluate the benefits of spectrum sharing in the proposed model 
instead of exclusive usage right. For more information about opportunity cost definition, please refer to Appendix 
(A). 
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performance and effective use of its spectrum, pushing for effective repurposing, sharing, and 
innovative uses of spectrum wherever possible. The NTIA has issued reports [4] [5] to evaluate 
different Federal and non-Federal spectrum bands for the near-term viability of accommodating 
wireless broadband systems. Those bands include the 1675-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, 3500-
3650 MHz, and 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz Bands. In this dissertation, the PUs are the 
Federal and non-Federal agencies whereas the proposed wireless broadband systems are the SUs. 
Two bands have been selected to be case studies in this work: 1675-1710 MHz and 3500-
3650 MHz bands. In the 1675-1710 MHz band, the PU is fixed and the expected SU is centralized 
(LTE mobile operator). For 3.5 GHz band, the PU is mobile service and the expected SUs are 
technologies with limited power transmission (small cells). The following two chapters will cover 
these two bands. 
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6.0  SPECTRUM SHARING IN THE 1.7 GHZ BAND 
The 1675-1710 MHz frequency range (35MHz) is allocated to Meteorological-Satellite (MetSat; 
space-to-earth) and meteorological aids (MetAids; radiosondes) services. It is one of the bands 
proposed by the NTIA to accommodate new spectrum sharing between government and 
commercial usages. However, due to the large number unlicensed or unregistered (fixed, 
transportable, and mobile) non-Federal meteorological receivers, the NTIA has limited the 
expected sharing band to be the 1695-1710 MHz band (15MHz).  
The Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee (CSMAC) has formed five 
working groups to repurpose candidate bands for wireless broadband; one of them specifically 
focuses on 1695–1710 MHz Weather Satellite Receive Earth Stations (WG-1). According to the 
last full report released from WG1 [67], sharing in the 1695-1710 MHz band should be limited to 
commercial systems operations (LTE mobile uplink use only) because, in part, the 1695-1710 
MHz is immediately adjacent to the AWS-1 uplink band (which will maximize its usefulness for 
commercial services) and also because mobile uplinks transmit at much lower power than 
downlinks. 
6.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY USERS 
This section will provide brief technical specifications/information on MetSat-earth-stations (PU) 
and the expected LTE-User-Equipment (LTE-UE) that could share the spectrum band. 
 96 
 
6.1.1 Primary User 
The PU is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA, which provides the 
weather satellite receive earth-stations (MetSat) [4] [5]. The NOAA operates both geostationary 
and polar-orbiting satellite transmitting systems in the 1675-1710 MHz band. The NOAA, the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the 
Department of Interior (DoI) and other Federal and non-Federal entities operate earth-stations to 
receive environmental research and weather data transmitted from the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite (GOES) and Polar- Orbiting Environmental Satellites (POES). The GOES 
is used for rapid real time observations of hurricanes, severe weather, short-range warning, and 
weather forecast models. The POES makes high resolution real time hazard observations and 
weather forecast models. 
MetSat is a fixed service working in 1675-1710MHZ band (Space-to-Earth). The NTIA 
report [4] concluded that sharing is possible in the 1695-1710 MHz band (15 MHz) between 
MetSat receive stations and wireless broadband systems. Originally, 18 MetSat earth-stations will 
continue to operate where they will be protected by exclusion zones. Based on a recent WG1 report 
[67], there are an additional 9 stations that need protection as well, resulting in a total of 27 earth 
stations.  
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6.1.2 Secondary User 
The SU is expected to be a commercial mobile LTE operator where the shared band would be used 
for uplinks from the handsets to the base stations. It is expected to be paired with the 2180-2200 
MHz band for the downlink [67]. From the SU viewpoint, there are many possible scenarios that 
may take place in this sharing environment. A single SU (i.e. mobile LTE operator) sharing the 
band with MetSat at the same location is a likely scenario.  
The SU has two possibilities: either it has exclusive LTE spectrum bands in addition to 
MetSat/LTE shared band (1695-1710MHz), or it will have only the shared spectrum band, see 
Figure 6-2. In case A, the LTE-UE will still have connectivity by handing off from the shared band 
to an exclusive band. In case B, the LTE-UE will have no choice but to stop the service within the 
Satellite 
Earth Station 
Downlink  
Figure 6-1 The proposed sharing is “15 MHz” of the downlink band 
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boundary of exclusion zones. It is most likely that this band will be shared by an LTE operator 
who has other exclusive LTE bands (case A). 
There are two types of in-band interference that may exist due to the sharing scenario 
illustrated in this band. First, the interference from LTE-UE (i.e. user’s handset) to MetSat-earth-
stations, where the PU should be protected. Second, the interference caused by MetSat satellite to 
the SU base station. The space-to-earth signal will interfere with the LTE-base-stations, which 
may need special filters to avoid this interference. This second type is not considered in this 
dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Illustration of two different cases of LTE operators  
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6.2 SIMULATION SETTINGS 
The published information about MetSat earth-stations (by NTIA) is only for the original 18 earth 
stations; information on the additional 9 earth-stations is not available. Therefore, we will illustrate 
our simulation methodologies using these 18 MetSat stations and that could be generalized to any 
additional future station, although some of these 9 additional earth-stations are in the same location 
as the original 18 (i.e. adjacent to each other).  
The specifications of the 18 earth-stations are summarized in Table 6-1. To give more 
realistic insight into the location of these earth-stations, we drew them using “google-earth” in 
Figure 6-3. Some of them are located in very populated areas. Therefore, part of our analysis is to 
find out which of these earth-stations should be re-located to increase the benefits of spectrum 
sharing.  
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Table 6-1 Specifications of the MetSat 18 earth-stations 
Earth Station Name Latitude Longitude 
Zip 
Code 
Station 
Type 
1 Wallops Island, VA 375645N 0752745W 23337 POES/GOES 
2 Fairbanks, AK 644814N 1475234W 99709 POES/GOES 
3 Suitland, MD 385107N 0765613W 20395 POES/GOES 
4 Miami, FL 254700N 0801900W 33126 POES/GOES 
5 Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI 212212N 1575744W 96818 POES/GOES 
6 Sioux Falls, SD 434409N 0963733W 57022  POES/GOES 
7 Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK 610859N 1492812W 99518 POES/GOES 
8 Anderson Air Force Base, GU  133452N 1445528E 96929 POES/GOES 
9 Monterey, CA 363600N 1215400W 93940 POES/GOES 
10 Stennis Space Center, MS 302359N 0893559W 39529 POES/GOES 
11 Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 341746N 1160944W 92285 POES/GOES 
12 Yuma, AZ 323924N 1143622W 85365 POES/GOES 
13 Cincinnati, OH 390608N 0843036W 45202 GOES 
14 Rock Island, IL 413104N 0903346W 61201 GOES 
15 St. Louis, MO 383526N 0901225W 63118 GOES 
16 Vicksburg, MS 322123N 0905129W 39183 GOES 
17 Omaha, NE 412056N 0957534W 68064 GOES 
18 Sacramento, CA 383550N 1213234W 95605 GOES 
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Figure 6-3 Locations of the 18 earth-stations (using google-earth) 
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6.2.1 PU Characteristics  
Most of the technical specifications of the MetSat earth-stations are gathered from NTIA report 
[4] and CSMAC WG-1 report [67], including minimum elevation angle, maximum antenna gain, 
antenna height, and interference protection threshold. One of the major additional factor that has 
been added to this analysis is the real population affected by the exclusion zone of each MetSat 
earth-station. To do that, a full analysis was performed at each earth-station to determine the 
population surrounding the earth-station. Table 6-2 summarizes these details. Some of the stations 
exist beside the coast line or on an island. Thus, we used the level of “zip-code area” to determine 
the population density to increase the accuracy of our analysis. 
There are many advantages of doing population density analysis. First, we try to avoid 
assumption of the population density around each station. That allows us to determine a more exact 
cost/value of exclusion zones. Second, it gives us the ability to more accurately predict the number 
of “active SUs” in each sharing scenario. Also, we use this information to determine the type of 
path loss to use around each station based on the population density (e.g. open, suburban, small 
city, or large city). 
The 100km radius is divided into five sections: 
1. Area from 0km to 20km from the earth-station  
2. Area from 20km to 40km 
3. Area from 40km to 60km 
4. Area from 60km to 80km 
5. Area from 80km to 100km 
All collected information is summarized in Table 6-3 and Table 6-4. 
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Table 6-2 Detailed specifications for each MetSat 18 earth-station 
Earth 
Station 
Number 
POP within 
Radius=100 km 
(Population) 
Minimum 
Elevation Angle 
(Degrees) 
Antenna 
Gain 
(dBi) 
Antenna 
Height 
(m) 
Interference 
Protection 
Threshold 
(dBm) 
1 553,281 14 43.1 17 -120.6 
2 98,102 14 43.1 17 -120.6 
3 8,537,701 5 29.5 86.8 -120.9 
4 5,075,122 5 29 33 -124.1 
5 955,959 5 29 33 -120.9 
6 408,398 27.7 31 14.5 -121.6 
7 401,952 5 29 33 -120.9 
8 22 0 5 29 33 -120.9 
9 2,574,415 5 29 33 -120.9 
10 1,780,419 5 29 33 -120.9 
11 2,710,745 5 29 33 -120.9 
12 334,248 5 29 33 -120.9 
13 3,376,536 43.9 39 200 -122.5 
14 974,045 24.4 39.6 25 -122.5 
15 2,999,809 42.6 36.7 20 -122.5 
16 746,133 48.6 36.7 20 -122.5 
17 1,327,903 28 36.7 20 -122.5 
18 4,669,749 43.2 36.7 20 -122.5 
                                                 
 
22 “Anderson Air Force Base, GU” earth-station (station#8) is not included in the simulation analysis, because it is on 
an unpopulated island. Thus, it will be ignored at the rest of this chapter. 
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Table 6-3 Population density analysis (1/2) 
station 
# 
Station Name 
0 - 20 km 20 - 40 km 
POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 
1 Wallops Island, VA 21457 735.8 29.2 43395 1629.5 26.6 
2 Fairbanks, AK 56162 336.8 166.8 34801 5445.6 6.4 
3 Suitland, MD 2084464 1108.8 1879.9 2278840 3740.9 609.2 
4 Miami, FL 1887459 909.3 2075.7 1413334 1163.2 1215.0 
5 
Ford Island, Pearl 
Harbor HI 
740057 787.6 939.7 213150 761.7 279.9 
6 Sioux Falls, SD 9432 854.9 11.0 62945 4082.9 15.4 
7 
Elmendorf Air Force 
Base, AK 
254274 707.3 359.5 39408 2554.4 15.4 
9 Monterey, CA 128900 427.5 301.5 273575 2191.7 124.8 
10 
Stennis Space Center, 
MS 
71275 935.2 76.2 149562 2678.8 55.8 
11 Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 12458 1150.3 10.8 85081 4997.4 17.0 
12 Yuma, AZ 146618 673.6 217.7 49072 909.3 54.0 
13 Cincinnati, OH 946640 1137.3 832.4 825550 3976.7 207.6 
14 Rock Island, IL 294980 1160.6 254.2 87174 3463.7 25.2 
15 St. Louis, MO 985290 1095.9 899.1 1139953 3795.3 300.4 
16 Vicksburg, MS 45862 968.9 47.3 27552 4095.9 6.7 
17 Omaha, NE 157068 976.7 160.8 598972 3660.6 163.6 
18 Sacramento, CA 934006 1020.7 915.0 936335 3906.7 239.7 
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Table 6-4 Population density analysis (2/2) 
station 
# 
40 - 60 km 60 - 80 km 80 - 100 km 
POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 
1 137519 1709.8 80.4 114334 2655.4 43.1 236576 3663.2 64.6 
2 3866 518.1 7.5 942 0.0 0.0 2331 29269.4 0.1 
3 1972273 4753.9 414.9 1504070 7365.3 204.2 698054 9619.2 72.6 
4 849692 3025.9 280.8 419607 5559.6 75.5 505030 5401.6 93.5 
5 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 2752 323.8 8.5 
6 205383 5277.2 38.9 47603 9953.4 4.8 83035 10981.9 7.6 
7 52270 4930.1 10.6 34828 8160.6 4.3 21172 619.2 34.2 
9 331163 2474.1 133.9 687062 4215.0 163.0 1153715 7860.1 146.8 
10 360108 4186.5 86.0 900947 5686.5 158.4 298527 6862.7 43.5 
11 181948 2940.4 61.9 977583 6054.4 161.5 1453675 8230.6 176.6 
12 2315 1274.6 1.8 15313 15665.8 1.0 120930 1272.0 95.1 
13 363904 6111.4 59.5 622054 9233.2 67.4 618388 10603.6 58.3 
14 110831 6673.6 16.6 189199 8401.6 22.5 291861 11453.4 25.5 
15 375529 5528.5 67.9 282903 9787.6 28.9 216134 10399.0 20.8 
16 166967 6046.6 27.6 360933 9331.6 38.7 144819 10427.5 13.9 
17 164614 6650.3 24.8 309786 9393.8 33.0 97463 9546.6 10.2 
18 549464 5958.5 92.2 1173529 8935.2 131.3 1076415 9093.3 118.4 
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These population analyses provide a powerful tool to evaluate the “opportunity cost” of B, 
G and W space. This allows us to list the earth-stations based on: area impacted, population, value 
of spectrum, and so on. Figure 6-4 summarizes the population density for all 18 earth-stations 
based on the five different areas. One of the highest impacted area is the Miami earth-station, 
where there are 1.8 million people living within a 20km radius of the earth-station. 
 
Figure 6-4 Population density, based on the five different areas 
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For each earth-station, we produce a population density chart that relates the POP/km2 with 
the radius of the circled area around the PU location. Figure 6-5 illustrates the population 
characteristics chart of the Miami, FL earth-station. The following observation can be made: 
 This chart gives the sharing benefits function versus distance from the PU antenna. 
o If the exclusion zone shrinks from 100km to 60km, the marginal additive 
benefits are comparatively lower compared to the rest of the area. 
o  This means that shrinking the exclusion zone from 100km to 60km is less 
valuable compared to shrinking it from 60 to 20km, for example. 
 This gives an indication of the benefits function by moving from ex ante towards 
ex post approach. 
 It also gives an indication that the marginal benefits of spectrum sharing along the 
x-axis (distance from the PU) varies with the environment. 
 
Appendix (C) shows the population density chart for other earth-stations. 
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Figure 6-5 Population characteristics chart for “Miami, FL” earth-station 
6.2.2 SUs Characteristics  
The SUs is LTE-UE (uplink). Since the simulation involves a huge number of SUs, we prefer to 
use the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) to represent the power of each SU23. Figure 6-6 
and Figure 6-7 represent the PDF of the path loss models. We can see that there is a greater 
probability of transmitting by high power in open/suburban areas than in small/large city areas due 
to the relative distance of the LTE-UE from the base stations (i.e. eNodes). 
                                                 
 
23 It is very common in the literature to use single average transmit power (e.g. all SUs transmit at 1dBm); however, 
we prefer to be more realistic and use this setting. These values are from NTIA tables when they analyses LTE-UE 
characteristics [67]. 
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Figure 6-6 Probability distribution function of LTE-UE in small and large city areas 
 
Figure 6-7 Probability distribution function in suburban and open areas 
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6.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
6.3.1 Inputs to Simulation Model 
One of the most critical settings in simulation models is the G and B space boundaries (in dBm), 
which defines each specific boundary. They are defined in MetSat as follows: 
 Gboundary 
o This is the “interference protection threshold24” at the PU antenna 
specification. 
o In the MetSat case, it is in the range of -120 dBm. Table 6-2 lists the 
interference protection threshold at each earth-station. 
 Bboundary 
o This is a new approach to be used to define B space area. 
o Its value (in the classical scenario) is (+20dBm) over G space boundary. 
o For example, if Gboundary = -122dBm, then Bboundary = -102dBm. 
o As mentioned earlier, the PU is assumed to accept additional aggregated 
interference to its interference threshold as part of sharing enforcement 
methodology. 
 
                                                 
 
24 In this dissertation, the “interference protection threshold” and the “threshold” for an antenna are used 
interchangeably. 
 111 
 
The model starts with no sharing area, so the exclusion zone equals the simulated area (i.e. 
radius = 100km). Then, the simulation model shrinks the exclusion zone, which increases the 
aggregated interference at the PU antenna, until it reaches the boundary of the G space. From this 
we arrive at the G space radius. It then continues to shrink the exclusion zone until it reaches the 
boundary of B space, from which we arrive at the B space radius. Any aggregated interference 
below the G space boundary is considered to be caused by SUs sharing in the W space area, and 
the PU will not be affected by this level of interference. 
As mentioned earlier, the Hata model is used to represent the path loss model and reflect 
terrain characteristics. Since we have the real data for population density at each earth-station 
location, this information will be exploited to form a relative terrain type. It is classified based on 
the population density (pop/km2) as follows25: 
 POP/km2  < 50 
o “open” terrain 
 50  ≤  POP/km2  <  100 
o It is “suburban” type of terrain 
 100  ≤  POP/km2  <  200 
o  “small city” terrain 
 POP/km2  ≥  200 
o “large city” terrain 
                                                 
 
25 This is novel methodology developed here instead of assumed density or terrain type. The terrain is classified based 
on the density of inner circle with a radius of 40km. 
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Table 6-5 summarizes the relevant inputs to the simulation model based on MetSat case 
specifications. The population data are based on the latest official U.S. Census Bureau (2010) [75], 
see Table 6-6. 
Table 6-5 Relevant inputs to the simulation model based on MetSat case 
Input Value Note 
Frequency 
1702.5  
[MHz] 
 It is the center frequency of 1695-1710 MHz band 
PU Azimuth Angle 
-180 to 180  
[Degrees] 
- 
PU Elevation Angle 
From Table 6-2 
[Degrees] 
 This value represent the PU minimum elevation angle 
 To reflect the worst case scenario to insure protection for 
the PU 
Additional Losses 
0 
 [dBm] 
 This is the classical scenario where we did not consider 
any additional losses (most conservative scenario) 
Density1 
(0 to 40km) 
From Table 6-3 
 [SU/km2] 
 This is real population density within circle of radius of 
40km or within area between radius 40km and 100km 
 Then, it will be multiplied by 0.1% to reflect the expected 
active SUs transmit at the same time. 
 “Active Factor = 0.1%” is the classical value, and it will 
examine at the sensitivity analysis part at the end of this 
chapter 
Density2  
(40 to 100km) 
From Table 6-4 
 [SU/km2] 
PU losses 
2 
[dBm] 
- 
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Table 6-6 Population data based on the latest U.S. Census Bureau (2010) 
Station 
# 
0 - 40 km 40 - 100 km 
Terrain 
Type 
POP 
Land 
Area(26) 
POP/km2 POP 
Land 
Area 
POP/km2 
1 64852 2365.28 27.42 488429 8028.50 60.84 Open 
2 90963 5782.38 15.73 7139 29787.56 0.24 Open 
3 4363304 4849.74 899.70 4174397 21738.34 192.03 Large City 
4 3300793 2072.54 1592.63 1774329 13987.05 126.86 Large City 
5 953207 1549.22 615.28 2752 323.83 8.50 Large City 
6 72377 4937.82 14.66 336021 26212.44 12.82 Open 
7 293682 3261.66 90.04 108270 13709.84 7.90 Suburban 
9 402475 2619.17 153.67 2171940 14549.22 149.28 Small City 
10 220837 3613.99 61.11 1559582 16735.75 93.19 Suburban 
11 97539 6147.67 15.87 2613206 17225.39 151.71 Open 
12 195690 1582.90 123.63 138558 18212.44 7.61 Small City 
13 1772190 5113.99 346.54 1604346 25948.19 61.83 Large City 
14 382154 4624.35 82.64 591891 26528.50 22.31 Suburban 
15 2125243 4891.19 434.50 874566 25715.03 34.01 Large City 
16 73414 5064.77 14.50 672719 25805.70 26.07 Open 
17 756040 4637.31 163.03 571863 25590.67 22.35 Small City 
18 1870341 4927.46 379.57 2799408 23987.05 116.71 Large City 
                                                 
 
26 Land Area: is the size of all areas designated as land in the Census Bureau's national geographic database (i.e. 
exclude water such as lake or seas). 
 114 
 
6.3.2 Benefits Evaluation of Spectrum Sharing  
To show the benefits of sharing scenarios that are represented in this dissertation, we get the real 
cost/price of spectrum from the FCC auction-database of comparable spectrum bands. The most 
relevant and reasonable band to 1.7GHz is the AWS-1 band. This band was auctioned in 2006. For 
a more detailed analysis of the prices of the AWS-1 band and the FCC geographic licensing 
schemes, please see Appendix (D).  
We analyze AWS-1 band based on FCC auction-database [76] for each earth-station area 
to find the real cost of spectrum ($/MHz-POP) and use that to evaluate the benefits that are gained 
from allowing sharing. For each station, we did the following: 
 Collect “spectrum auction” data to find the spectrum cost at each relevant area of 
an earth-station at three different spectrum bands: 
o Block A: 1710-1720 / 2110-2120 (20 MHz) - Cellular Market Area (CMA) 
licenses 
o Block B: 1720-1730 / 2120-2130 (20 MHz) - Economic Area (EA) licenses 
o Block C: 1730-1735 / 2130-2135 (10 MHz) - Economic Area (EA) licenses 
o We consider these three blocks since they are licensed in a small area and 
they are adjacent to 1695-1710MHz band. The other three (Block D, E, and 
F) are licensed at Regional Economic Area Grouping (REAG) licenses 
which is very large area that does not help in predicting the spectrum value 
for a circle area with a radius of 100km. 
 Calculate the average spectrum price for each station area (based on A, B, and C 
blocks) to be used in this analysis. 
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o Collect population density for circle area centered by the earth-station with 
different radiuses to determine real density for pop/km2 for each earth-
station throughout each surrounding circle area around. Then, these data is 
used to find the $/MHz-POP value for each earth-station separately. 
 Find the value based on the following function: 
 
𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒 "𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒" =   [
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑀𝐻𝑧 𝑃𝑂𝑃
] × 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝐵𝑊 
Where: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑀𝐻𝑧 𝑃𝑂𝑃
=  [
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒($)
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ (𝑀𝐻𝑧) × 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
] 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 
𝐵𝑊 = 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑 
 
The following tables summarize our analysis for each earth-station27.  Table 6-10 shows 
the average $/MHz-POP for each one of the stations, which is being used as input to evaluate the 
spectrum sharing benefits in our model.  
 
 
                                                 
 
27 Earth-station #8 (Anderson Air Force Base, GU earth-station) is not included in the following tables, because it is 
on an unpopulated island. 
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Table 6-7 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block A (20 MHz) 
Station # Net Price Population 
$/MHz-
POP 
1 $695,000.00 188,579.00 0.18 
2 $549,750.00 128,275.00 0.21 
3 $133,150,000.00 4,182,658.00 1.59 
4 $35,633,000.00 3,876,380.00 0.46 
5 $3,583,000.00 876,156.00 0.20 
6 $426,000.00 148,281.00 0.14 
7 $539,000.00 260,283.00 0.10 
9 $974,000.00 401,762.00 0.12 
10 $2,920,000.00 246,190.00 0.59 
11 $179,161,000.00 15,620,448.00 0.57 
12 $119,000.00 179,741.00 0.03 
13 $19,451,000.00 1,553,843.00 0.63 
14 $405,000.00 359,062.00 0.06 
15 $25,089,000.00 2,518,470.00 0.50 
16 $75,750.00 160,830.00 0.02 
17 $1,543,500.00 673,884.00 0.11 
18 $7,722,000.00 1,640,558.00 0.24 
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Table 6-8 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block B (20 MHz) 
Station # Net Price Population 
$/MHz-
POP 
1 $246,000.00 363,970.00 0.03 
2 $1,809,000.00 626,932.00 0.14 
3 $148,708,000.00 8,403,130.00 0.88 
4 $61,055,000.00 5,602,222.00 0.54 
5 $4,254,000.00 1,211,537.00 0.18 
6 $940,000.00 519,143.00 0.09 
7 $1,809,000.00 626,932.00 0.14 
9 $80,834,000.00 9,111,806.00 0.44 
10 $3,264,000.00 396,754.00 0.41 
11 $215,620,000.00 18,003,420.00 0.60 
12 $215,620,000.00 18,003,420.00 0.60 
13 $21,894,000.00 2,184,860.00 0.50 
14 $1,394,000.00 558,913.00 0.12 
15 $23,498,250.00 3,558,651.00 0.33 
16 $4,212,000.00 1,432,518.00 0.15 
17 $6,735,000.00 1,044,156.00 0.32 
18 $8,878,000.00 2,311,567.00 0.19 
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Table 6-9 Analysis summary of AWS-1, block C (10 MHz) 
Station # Net Price Population $/MHz-POP 
1 $109,000.00 363,970.00 0.03 
2 $1,111,000.00 626,932.00 0.18 
3 $76,066,000.00 8,403,130.00 0.91 
4 $21,314,000.00 5,602,222.00 0.38 
5 $2,440,000.00 1,211,537.00 0.20 
6 $404,000.00 519,143.00 0.08 
7 $1,111,000.00 626,932.00 0.18 
9 $23,028,000.00 9,111,806.00 0.25 
10 $443,000.00 396,754.00 0.11 
11 $114,816,000.00 18,003,420.00 0.64 
12 $114,816,000.00 18,003,420.00 0.64 
13 $5,124,750.00 2,184,860.00 0.23 
14 $1,193,000.00 558,913.00 0.21 
15 $8,421,750.00 3,558,651.00 0.24 
16 $3,258,000.00 1,432,518.00 0.23 
17 $1,737,000.00 1,044,156.00 0.17 
18 $4,960,500.00 2,311,567.00 0.21 
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Table 6-10 Analysis summary, based on average spectrum auction prices  
Station # Earth Station Name $/MHz-POP 
1 Wallops Island, VA 0.07 
2 Fairbanks, AK 0.16 
3 Suitland, MD 1.07 
4 Miami, FL 0.48 
5 Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI 0.19 
6 Sioux Falls, SD 0.10 
7 Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK 0.14 
9 Monterey, CA 0.37 
10 Stennis Space Center, MS 0.39 
11 Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 0.60 
12 Yuma, AZ 0.61 
13 Cincinnati, OH 0.48 
14 Rock Island, IL 0.12 
15 St. Louis, MO 0.36 
16 Vicksburg, MS 0.16 
17 Omaha, NE 0.22 
18 Sacramento, CA 0.21 
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6.3.3 Sharing Benefits 
In this section, we quantify the spectrum sharing benefits in MetSat case. First, the model will 
deliver the B and G radiuses as exclusion zones around each earth-station. Then, by using 
population and spectrum price analyses, we can evaluate the additive gain of the additional 
proposed areas shared as B, G, or W spaces.  
6.3.3.1 Black Space  The summary of B space analysis based on the classical scenario (as 
mentioned in Table 6-5) is listed in Table 6-11. The total spectrum value for the B space area is 
$193 million. Some black spaces are very small in area and impact relatively large populations; 
the value, then, depends more on the population density than on the size of the geographic area. 
According to our definition, which is based on the classical scenario inputs, the B space 
boundary occurs when the PU receiver will accept more than 20dBm as additional aggregated 
interference above the interference threshold of that receiver. So, in some earth-stations, the black 
space is very valuable and may be worth sharing. 
“Anderson Air Force Base, GU” earth-station is not included in the table, because it is on 
an unpopulated island. Thus, effect of the exclusion zone is insignificant at this location. 
6.3.3.2 Gray Space  The summary of G space analysis based on the classical scenario is shown in 
Table 6-12. The total G space area is worth $52 million. Appendix (E) summarizes the analysis of 
both B and G spaces together. The total spectrum value of the G+B space is $244 million. 
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Table 6-11 Benefits evaluation summary of B Space 
station # 
Black Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land Area  
(km2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value ($) 
1 56.73 3,930 175,304 0.06% 187,945 
2 3.55 26 7,894 0.00% 19,223 
3 78.55 16,298 7,707,479 2.50% 123,248,661 
4 40.12 2,078 3,310,138 1.07% 23,856,598 
5 29.52 1,119 913,032 0.30% 2,612,780 
6 5.41 73 1,579 0.00% 2,261 
7 25.54 1,145 268,289 0.09% 579,678 
9 63.53 5,694 775,494 0.25% 4,333,835 
10 83.00 14,896 1,015,651 0.33% 6,000,135 
11 98.49 21,207 2,610,050 0.85% 23,402,738 
12 13.81 451 114,054 0.04% 1,040,131 
13 21.65 1,311 1,036,004 0.34% 7,473,844 
14 2.20 8 14,867 0.00% 27,861 
15 0.99 8 26,937 0.01% 146,598 
16 4.28 60 7,128 0.00% 17,466 
17 1.27 8 2,819 0.00% 9,453 
18 0.82 8 19,001 0.01% 60,152 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.70% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 5.83% 
Total Value ($) 193,019,360 
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Table 6-12 Benefits evaluation summary of G Space 
station # 
Gray Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
1 92.20 4,723 259,949 0.08% 278,693 
2 12.75 461 49,258 0.02% 119,948 
3 97.62 9,117 733,388 0.24% 11,727,452 
4 90.51 11,456 1,451,888 0.47% 10,463,947 
5 39.48 430 40,175 0.01% 114,967 
6 62.44 12,295 276,428 0.09% 395,858 
7 60.37 7,047 77,663 0.03% 167,802 
9 91.21 8,995 1,607,321 0.52% 8,982,486 
10 95.10 3,518 597,666 0.19% 3,530,816 
11 99.70 75 63,413 0.02% 568,586 
12 36.44 1,119 80,125 0.03% 730,711 
13 46.20 5,588 876,570 0.28% 6,323,670 
14 32.30 3,192 322,087 0.10% 603,595 
15 13.44 490 542,969 0.18% 2,954,973 
16 70.57 15,210 472,218 0.15% 1,157,093 
17 10.19 282 121,799 0.04% 408,420 
18 21.39 1,378 1,065,758 0.35% 3,373,926 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.87% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 2.80% 
Total Value ($) 51,902,943 
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6.3.3.3 White Space  The information listed in Table 6-13 is very critical and clearly shows the 
benefits of sharing the band with the PU. When the SUs share the band, and aggregated 
interference falls below the interference threshold of the PU (W space sharing) yields a spectrum 
value of $2.3 billion. This will incur a lower enforcement-cost compared to G or B space sharing.  
Table 6-13 Benefits evaluation summary of B, G, and W Space 
 Black Gray Black + Gray White 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.70% 0.87% 1.56% 98% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 5.83% 2.80% 8.63% 91% 
Total Value ($) 193,019,360 51,902,943 244,922,303 2,327,334,430 
6.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Adjusting the input assumptions to the model allows us to understand the sensitivity of the results 
to potential variance of critical input data. In this section, we test the sensitivity of our results 
against any variance in the critical inputs to the simulation model.  
6.4.1 Additional Losses 
This section shows the effect of conceding additional power loss coefficients for any losses over 
the transmission space, such as indoor transmission loss calculation or floor penetration loss factor. 
In the last section (classical scenario), the additional losses are set at zero to represent a 
conservative scenario in order to protect the PU antenna. Here, we will consider two additional 
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values to examine the sensitivity of this factor to the sharing benefits analysis. Appendix (E) 
summarizes all the analysis performed in this section. 
LAdditional = 0 dB 
This is the analysis shown at last section. In this case, the total G+B space is worth $244 
million and the W space is worth 2.3 billion. This case is the “classical scenario” where the 
additional losses are set at zero. 
LAdditional = 10 dB 
Table 6-14 summarizes this analysis; see Appendix (E) for full analysis. 
Table 6-14 Sensitivity analysis in B, G, and W space: additional losses = 10 dB 
 Black Gray Black + Gray White 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.43% 0.66% 1.08% 99% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 3.23% 3.40% 6.63% 93% 
Total Value ($) 111,757,643 95,668,974 207,426,617 2,378,335,113 
 
LAdditional = 20 dB 
Table 6-15 summarizes this analysis; see Appendix (E) for full analysis. 
Table 6-15 Sensitivity analysis in B, G, and W space: additional losses = 20 dB 
 Black Gray Black + Gray White 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.28% 0.45% 0.73% 99% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 2.02% 3.20% 5.22% 95% 
Total Value ($) 76,142,942 99,111,533 175,254,475 2,414,081,926 
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It is clear that the “Additional Losses” factor is not very sensitive in the overall perspective, 
and did not cause high variance at the B, G, and W space values. However, for each earth-station, 
as shown in Appendix (E), some station shows sensitivity to this factor. For example, the value of 
G+B space in “Sioux Falls, SD” earth-station drops significantly after adding losses to the model. 
For “Additional Losses” equals 0, 10, and 20 dBm, the values are $398k, $29k, and $2k, 
respectively  
6.4.2 SUs Active Factor and Density  
In the classical scenario and from the real population density values, we multiply the population 
density by the “Active Factor”, to reflect the expected active SUs transmitted at the same time, 
which is 0.1%. This means that we expect 1 of each 1000 of total population to be active at the 
same time to share the band with the PU. The active factor is intended to be a realistic estimate, 
and we will evaluate it in this sensitivity analysis. 
We compute it at G radius, where we repeat the analysis with two values: 
 Active Factor = 0.5% (5 times the classical scenario value) 
 Active Factor = 0.05% (half the classical scenario value) 
From the analysis summarized at Table 6-16, it is clear that this factor is very critical and 
its sensitivity is different from one station to another. The variance due to each “active factor” (i.e. 
0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.05%) increases at earth-stations that have a small radius, such as station #2 and 
station # 17. The reason is that the Gboundary is very sensitive to SUs density when SUs are located 
a relatively small distance from the PU location.  
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Although, there is not solid base that we can validate this assumption, we believe that 
(0.1%) percentage of active SU is reasonable assumption in such spectrum sharing environment, 
and we set that value as an input to our classical scenario. 
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Table 6-16 Active factor of SUs for G space 
station # 
Gray Space Radius [km] 
Active Factor = 
0.5% 
Active Factor = 
0.1% 
(Classical Scenario) 
Active Factor = 0.05% 
1 96.7 92.20 85.3 
2 33.6 12.75 6.4 
3 99.6 97.62 95.6 
4 98.4 90.51 83.0 
5 68.2 39.48 38.3 
6 85.6 62.44 41.3 
7 89.3 60.37 42.4 
9 98.0 91.21 87.9 
10 99.1 95.10 93.2 
11 99.9 99.70 99.3 
12 64.7 36.44 30.2 
13 89.1 46.20 38.5 
14 57.0 32.30 23.3 
15 29.1 13.44 4.5 
16 91.7 70.57 51.9 
17 30.0 10.19 3.3 
18 49.2 21.39 8.2 
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6.4.3 Black Space Boundary 
The G space boundary is given in this analysis as a constant (i.e. it is one of the PU’s antenna 
specifications that define the interference threshold). The focus on in this section is to examine the 
effect of the difference between G and B boundaries. Figure 6-8 shows that at the Miami FL earth-
station, and we notice the following: 
 If the G and B boundary are the same, the radius will be around 90km (matches the results 
listed at Table 6-12). 
 By increasing the difference between the G and B boundaries by moving along the x-axis, 
the radius of B space decreases. 
o At difference equal 20dBm (as the classical scenario) between G and B boundary, 
the B radius is 40km which match also the result at Table 6-11. 
 The sensitivity of this factor will vary based on the characteristic of sharing environment. 
In this figure (Miami, FL earth-station), we reduce the exclusion zone radius by 50km by 
making the PU accept additional 20dBm of aggregated interference. 
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Figure 6-8 Aggregate interference and B space radius 
6.4.4 Relocation Benefits 
In this section, we assess the benefits of relocating earth-stations that cause the most impacted 
percentage on sharing utilization (based on classical scenario). The following Table 6-17 lists the 
stations based on the classical scenario inputs. We can see that the first five earth-stations account 
for 90% of the benefits gained from sharing. 
The idea here is to relocate the earth-stations with the highest sharing benefits to another 
locations with less population. If we assume the total cost (including the cost of the impacted 
population in the new locations) of relocating an earth-station would be $10 million, then the value 
of the spectrum based on the affected population exceeds the cost of relocation for the first five 
earth-stations. This suggests that there may be a social benefit to their relocation. 
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Table 6-17 Relocation benefits analysis of the 18 earth-stations 
Station 
# 
Earth Station Name Value ($) 
Order 
# 
Relocation Suggestion 
Option A Option B 
3 Suitland, MD 134,976,113 1 
90% 
79% 4 Miami, FL 34,320,545 2 
11 Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 23,971,324 3 
13 Cincinnati, OH 13,797,514 4 
21% 
9 Monterey, CA 13,316,321 5 
10 Stennis Space Center, MS 9,530,951 6 
10% 
18 Sacramento, CA 3,434,079 7 
15 St. Louis, MO 3,101,571 8 
5 Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI 2,727,747 9 
12 Yuma, AZ 1,770,843 10 
16 Vicksburg, MS 1,174,559 11 
7 
Elmendorf Air Force Base, 
AK 
747,481 12 
14 Rock Island, IL 631,456 13 
1 Wallops Island, VA 466,638 14 
17 Omaha, NE 417,872 15 
6 Sioux Falls, SD 398,119 16 
2 Fairbanks, AK 139,170 17 
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6.4.5 NTIA Analysis VS Simulation Results 
The NTIA did two analyses of the 1.7GHz band in 2010 and 2013 [4] [67]. By excluding 
exceptional cases, there is a relative similarity between the NTIA analysis and our results; see 
Table 6-18. It should be noted that the NTIA analysis used different settings, such as the network 
topology of SUs, density of SUs, and the assumption of the terrain model, which result the variance 
between NTIA and our results. 
 In 2010 analysis [4], the NTIA used LTE networks (both LTE base-stations and LTE-UE) 
to represent the SUs. In 2013, the NTIA used LTE-UE only (similar to our simulation). LTE base-
stations added more interference, which explains that our results are more comparable to the 2013 
analysis.  
The NTIA 2013 analysis [67] considered 18 SUs (i.e. LTE-UE) in each LTE cell with a 
cell-radius of either 0.93km or 3.76km. However, in our simulation, we used real population 
analysis where we did not assume the population. As a result, each earth-station simulated based 
on real population around it (the population analysis in a level of “zip-code area”). 
If we take “Miami, FL” earth-station as an example (station #4), the NTIA 2013 analysis 
shows that the radius is 46km, whereas our result shows that it is 90.5km with zero additional 
losses being considered. The population density in our simulation is 1592.63 SUs/km2 at inner area 
and 126.86 SUs/km2 at outer area. We believe, the NTIA 2013 report underestimated the 
population at the “Miami, FL” earth-station. 
In the “Yuma, AZ” earth-station case (station #12), the NTIA 2013 analysis shows that the 
radius is 95km, whereas our result shows that it will be 36.4km. At this station, the population 
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density in our simulation is 123.63 SUs/km2 in the inner area and 7.61 SUs/km2 in the outer area. 
The real population is very low in the outer area (i.e. 40km ≤ radius ≤ 100km). 
Finally, in the NTIA 2013 analysis [67], the percentage of population (based on 2010 
Census) impacted by the 18 exclusion zone is 8.96%. In my analysis, the percentage of impacted 
population is 8.63%, 6.63%, and 5.22% for addition losses equal to 0, 10, and 20dB; respectively. 
For more details, please refer to Appendix (E). 
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Table 6-18 Comparison between NTIA analysis VS simulation results 
sta
tio
n
 #
 
Radius of Exclusion Zone (G radius) [km] 
NTIA Analysis 
Dissertation Analysis (Active SUs Factor=0.1%) 
Addition 
Loss =0 dB 
Addition 
Loss =10 dB 
Addition 
Loss =20 dB 
2010 2013 
1 90 29 92.2 82.3 56.9 
2 90 81 12.7 6.2 4.1 
3 121 91 97.6 91.9 77.8 
4 110 46 90.5 73.6 40.4 
5 110 25 39.5 36.9 29.1 
6 80 40 62.4 18.9 4.4 
7 110 14 60.4 35.6 25.9 
8 110 42 Not included (unpopulated island); see section 6.3.3.1 
9 110 85 91.2 84.1 65.1 
10 110 58 95.1 92.6 83.6 
11 110 80 99.7 99.2 98.4 
12 110 95 36.4 24.4 14.8 
13 96 32 46.2 34.9 22.1 
14 78 10 32.3 8.3 1.8 
15 76 34 13.4 2.2 0.7 
16 72 14 70.6 37.6 3.9 
17 76 30 10.2 1.8 1.6 
18 72 55 21.4 2.9 1.1 
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6.5 HYPOTHESES TEST 
This chapter examines and quantifies the benefits gained from spectrum sharing through three 
levels of sharing/enforcement scenarios (W, G, and B spaces). It also tests the four hypotheses that 
are listed at chapter#3 of this dissertation.  
There are enormous benefits to sharing the spectrum at 1.7GHz band. For example, there 
is an approximately around $2.3 billion benefit out of sharing the W space at this spectrum band. 
These sharing benefits prove valuable opportunity cost is lost by having exclusive usage right at 
1.7GHz band. Therefore, the opportunity cost is getting larger in the case where the spectrum 
utilization is less, which means that we can accept H1.  
If we consider that the most stringent ex ante enforcement position is to prevent any sharing 
in this band, the next step towards ex post enforcement is to allow sharing in W spaces. The 
aggregated interference will be below the PU interference threshold and the enforcement-cost will 
be at its lowest (compare to other cases). By moving towards ex post enforcement, we will allow 
sharing in the G space and then the B space. Both need more enforcement costs since the PU 
should agree to tolerate additional aggregated interference. In this classical scenario, the W 
benefits are $2.3 billion, whereas both G and B benefits together are $244 million. Throughout all 
18 earth-stations, the benefits are higher and the expected costs are lower in W space sharing. 
Spectrum utilization increases by sharing the G and then the B space (moving towards ex post 
enforcement). This led to the acceptance of both H2 and H4. 
To evaluate H3, we will illustrate the cumulative benefits versus the radius of the simulated 
area. Figure 6-9 shows a different perspective by relating the radius (in km) with the sharing 
benefits (in $) at “Cincinnati. OH” earth-station. For all other MetSat earth-stations, please see 
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Appendix (F). The y-axis illustrated in the figure shows the cumulative benefits starting from the 
boundary of the simulated area (100km) to the earth-station location.  
In our example (Table 6-11 and Table 6-12) of the Cincinnati earth-station, the B radius is 
21.7km with a benefit value equivalent to $7.5 million. We can see this benefit clearly from the 
cumulative curve, between 0 and 21.7km. Similarly, the G radius is 46.2km with G space area 
worth $6.3 million. Both these results and the analysis in section 0 match identically. 
We can summarize this in the following functions for “Cincinnati, OH” earth-station: 
𝑊𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  ∫ 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒
100
46
 𝑑𝑟  
𝐺𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  ∫ 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒
46
22
 𝑑𝑟 
𝐵𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  ∫ 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒
22
0
 𝑑𝑟 
The W benefit case shows the benefits of W space sharing in the simulated area (R=100km) 
only. This does not take into consideration the W spaces between the simulated earth-stations as 
total.  
In G benefit case, this is the upper bound of the reasonable cost for enforcement at this 
scenario. This enforcement-cost include, but not limited to, the amount that probably been paid to 
the PU to accept additional aggregated interference and shifting the threshold from Gboundary to 
Bboundary (additional 20 dBm). If the enforcement-cost exceeds the benefits (enforcement cost ≥ 
$6.3 million), the sharing at G space does not worth it.  
The B benefit case is the total gain from sharing the spectrum without any type of exclusion 
zones. In this case, the SU will determine the optimal protection zone where there will be a balance 
between enforcement penalty and sharing gain out of this additional area. 
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Figure 6-9 Cumulative value of spectrum sharing benefits in “Cincinnati, OH” 
As we can see in Appendix (F), each earth-station has its own curve that represents the 
benefits of sharing by moving from the ex ante towards ex post enforcement scenario. For example, 
Figure 6-10 illustrates this for Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, HI earth-station. We can see that the 
exclusion zone is worthless between 100km to 40km. After that, however, there is a significant 
increase in benefits by shrinking the zone towards the PU location. This led to the acceptance of 
H3, where there is more than one relationship-curve by moving from the “ex ante” towards the “ex 
post” enforcement approaches, which varies by changing the sharing environment characteristics. 
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Figure 6-10 Cumulative value of spectrum sharing benefits in “Ford Island, HI” 
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7.0  SPECTRUM SHARING IN THE 3.5 GHZ BAND 
The FCC proposes specific rules for a “Citizens Broadband Radio Service” in the 3.5 GHz band 
that would make the 3.5 GHz sharing regime, originally described by the PCAST report, a reality. 
In December 2012, the FCC published the first “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”, which was 
followed by a revised proposed framework described in the “Licensing Public Notice” [32]. In 
April 2014, the FCC issued the most recent notice (called “Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking”), which was developed based on responses to a series of prior proposals and 
workshops [33].  
The 3500-3650 MHz frequency range is divided into the 3500-3600 and 3600-3650 MHz 
bands in the US National frequency table. These two frequency bands include allocations to 
Federal radio-location and radio navigation services. Therefore, since the bands represent similar 
uses throughout the 3500-3650 MHz band, the 3500-3600 and 3600-3650 MHz bands have been 
addressed as a single frequency band in the NTIA analysis. 
Originally, the NTIA in the Fast Track report recommended reallocating 100 megahertz of 
the 3550-3650 MHz band for wireless broadband use within five years (Fast Track report 
published in October 2010) [4]. In this chapter, we will describe the recommended sharing 
scenarios and examine the expected sharing benefits.  
 139 
 
7.1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY USERS 
7.1.1  Primary User 
The 3500-3650 MHz band (150MHz) is used by DoD radar systems with installations on land, 
ships, and aircraft. Based on the NTIA [4], most of the aircraft and land-based systems are operated 
at military training areas and test ranges. Functions performed by these systems include search for 
near-surface and high altitude airborne objects, sea surveillance, tracking of airborne objects, air 
traffic control, formation flight, and multi-purpose test range instrumentation.  
To share this band, the NTIA Fast Track Report recommends geographic separation to 
mitigate interference. NTIA recommends exclusion zones around ground-based and shipborne 
radar systems28. With respect to shipborne radars, NTIA has determined that extremely large 
geographic exclusion zones are necessary, reaching a maximum of 310km. That is estimated to 
exclude approximately 60% of the United States population that falls within that exclusion zone29. 
As a result, our focus in this dissertation will be on shipborne radars only, as the main PU antenna 
type reducing sharing utilization. For more information about PU types at this band, please refer 
to Appendix (G). 
                                                 
 
28 For airborne radar systems, there is no need for exclusion zones. The NTIA has concluded that a frequency offset 
of approximately 40 MHz is needed to eliminate the need for exclusion zones for airborne radar systems. This is 
one of the rationales for limiting the sharing band to 3550-3650MHz instead of the full 3500-3650MHz. 
29 NTIA analysis considers WiMAX technology for shared use of the 3.5 GHz band. 
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7.1.2 Secondary User 
As mentioned in a recent report from the FCC [33], many services/technologies have been 
proposed to share the band with the PUs. The most common feature is expected to be “small cell” 
topology(s). Even the PCAST report goes in this direction, recommending small cells in the 
3.5GHz band [3].  
We believe that both Femtocells and WiFi have almost the same effect on the PU antenna, 
especially given that both have the same maximum standardized transmit power and that both are 
used mainly indoors. Thus, we group them together in this analysis. In this dissertation, we will 
consider the following three types of technologies to demonstrate our model: 
1. LTE-UE: uplink only. 
2. LTE network: both LTE base stations and LTE-UE. 
3. Femtocells-WiFi networks. 
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7.2 SIMULATION SETTINGS 
7.2.1 PU Characteristics  
The technical specifications used in this model are based on the NTIA report [4]. Some necessary 
information is missing from that report; however, we have made certain assumptions as detailed 
below. Table 7-1 summarizes the specifications about the shipborne radars. Please refer to 
Appendix (H) for more details. 
Table 7-1 Specifications of shipborne radars 
 
Antenna 
Gain 
(dBi) 
Antenna 
Losses 
(dB) 
Antenna 
Height 
(m) 
Gboundary (dBm) 
{Interference 
Threshold} 
Bboundary 
(dBm) 
{Gboundary + 10} 
Shipborne 1 32 2 50 -114 -104 
Shipborne 2 47 2 30 -101 -91 
Shipborne 3 41.8 3.4 30 -100 -90 
Shipborne 4 38.9 2 30 -110 -100 
Shipborne 5 43.3 2 30 -110 -100 
 
One critical characteristic that is not available is the minimum elevation angle for each of 
these five types of shipborne radars. As a result, the PU elevation angle is assumed to be 10 degrees 
as a classical input in this case30, and we will include this assumption in our sensitivity analysis at 
                                                 
 
30 We believe that “10 degrees” is a very reasonable assumption for the worst possible scenario, given the fact that 
these radars are used to track objects flying over the ground. 
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the end of this chapter. In addition, the PU azimuth angle is between -180 and 180 degrees, and 
the center frequency in this case is 3600MHz. 
 
7.2.2 SUs Characteristics  
7.2.2.1 Area of Simulation  The shipborne radars run along the East, Gulf, and West coasts of the 
US. For an illustration of an exclusion zone around the coast lines, please see Figure 7-1. In this 
figure, the red line represents the boundary of an exclusion zone. The radius of the simulated area 
is 100km. 
 In the NTIA analysis [4], they expect the PU antennas (shipborne radars) to be 10km away 
from the coast line. However, that assumption is not binding. Thus, we chose to assume the 
location of the PU antennas in this simulation model to be right at the coast line to represent a 
conservative strategy to protect the PU.  
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Figure 7-1 Depiction of exclusion zones around the East, Gulf, and West coasts of the US 
7.2.2.2 SUs Density  In the case of 3.5GHz, we are dealing with a very large area of sharing with 
a very large exclusion zone proposed to protect the PUs. Based on the NTIA analysis, in order to 
protect the shipborne radars along the three coastal lines, the proposed exclusion zone area causes 
the exclusion of around 60% of the population. This very large proportion of the population will 
lower the value of sharing in this critical band. 
Based on Census Bureau data [75], the average population density of the coastal shoreline 
counties (excluding Alaska) is 172 persons per km2. The density in the US as a whole averages 40 
persons per km2. To capture those data in the model, and in similar way we did the setting at the 
1.7GHz band analysis, the SUs densities as follow: 
 Density1 (0 to 50km)      =  172 person per km2 
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 Density2 (50 to 100km)  =  40 person per km2 
To reflect the terrain effect on the path loss, four of the Hata models are simulated for each 
type of shipborne radars (i.e. open, suburban, small city, and large city). The radius of G and B 
spaces varies widely over these four path loss models due to differences in the PU antenna 
characteristics of each shipborne radar.  
7.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Three SUs types, which share this band, will be examined. Each of them will be simulated over 
three different SUs active factors: 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.05%, to represent different SUs density scales. 
In addition, W, G, and B space are evaluated for each shipborne radar. 
There is 100MHz of spectrum to be shared over a very large area along the US coasts. 
There is no benchmark which to base the spectrum price at 3.5GHz band ($ per MHz-POP)31. 
Therefore, we use a value of $0.1 per MHz-POP in this band (3.5GHz).  
                                                 
 
31 Based on the ITU broadband report [73], since 2002, the global average for 2.1 GHz spectrum has been $1.33 per 
MHz POP. However, the global average of spectrum auction for 2.6 GHz has been $0.07 per MHz POP since 2005.  
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7.3.1 LTE-UE Scenario 
In this scenario, the SUs is considered to be LTE-UE (uplink only). The technical characteristics 
and probability distribution function of these LTE-UE devices is the same as that described in 
section 6.2.2. From Table 7-2, we notice the following: 
 The order from largest to smallest exclusion zone radius32 is as follows: 
 Shipborne 1, 
 Shipborne 4, 
 Shipborne 5, 
 Shipborne 2 and Shipborne 3 are almost the same. 
 In some cases, there is no need for B space. For example, where the SUs active 
factor = 0.1%, there is no need for B space in the small and large city terrain model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
32 In this chapter, the distance from the coast line to boundary of G or B space is called “radius” of the exclusion zone. 
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Table 7-2 B and G space radius for LTE-UE scenario 
 
Black Space (km) Gray Space (km) 
SUs Active Factor = 0.5% 
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Shipborne 1 94.2 47.1 30.7 30.6 98.1 76.6 42.1 41.3 
Shipborne 2 48.3 16.3 1.7 1.0 77.7 34.9 7.6 5.8 
Shipborne 3 47.5 16.1 1.1 0.9 76.7 34.9 7.6 5.8 
Shipborne 4 77.8 35.8 8.4 6.8 92.2 46.1 29.8 29.1 
Shipborne 5 74.1 33.5 6.0 5.3 90.6 44.9 28.5 28.2 
 
SUs Active Factor = 0.1% 
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Shipborne 1 70.1 32.8 4.9 4.4 90.2 41.7 23.3 23.0 
Shipborne 2 27.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 42.8 7.7 1.6 1.5 
Shipborne 3 29.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 42.3 4.7 2.4 1.8 
Shipborne 4 42.0 10.0 0.9 0.7 60.9 31.4 2.9 2.3 
Shipborne 5 42.7 9.2 0.5 0.1 64.1 28.9 2.6 2.2 
 
SUs Active Factor = 0.05% 
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Shipborne 1 48.7 20.6 1.6 1.6 76.1 34.5 8.9 7.7 
Shipborne 2 22.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 36.0 3.8 3.0 1.4 
Shipborne 3 21.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 36.1 3.8 3.2 1.3 
Shipborne 4 39.4 4.1 0.6 0.4 52.1 20.1 2.8 2.8 
Shipborne 5 36.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 46.5 15.5 2.4 2.8 
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To show the benefits of sharing the band with each shipborne radar independently, please 
see Table 7-3 till Table 7-7. The SUs active factor in these tables is 0.1% (the classical value). 
Four terrain models have been simulated, where the radius decreases by moving from “open” area 
towards “large city” area. Therefore, by assuming that each terrain type has 25% of the terrain 
topography along the coast lines, we can determine the average value of W, G, and B spaces at 
each shipborne radar. The difference in W space value between shipborne 1 and shipborne 4 (the 
second largest radiuses) is around $176 million. 
 
Table 7-3 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in LTE-UE Scenario 
 ($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 658 394 59 53 291 
Gray 56 107 222 224 153 
Black + Gray 715 502 281 277 444 
White 2,373 2,586 2,807 2,810 2,644 
 
Table 7-4 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in LTE-UE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 325 21 0 0 87 
Gray 189 71 19 18 74 
Black + Gray 515 92 19 18 161 
White 2,573 2,995 3,068 3,070 2,926 
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Table 7-5 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 3 in LTE-UE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 361 8 3 0 93 
Gray 149 48 26 22 61 
Black + Gray 510 56 29 22 154 
White 2,578 3,031 3,058 3,065 2,933 
 
 
Table 7-6 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 4 in LTE-UE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 505 120 10 8 161 
Gray 127 258 25 19 107 
Black + Gray 632 378 35 27 268 
White 2,455 2,710 3,052 3,060 2,819 
 
 
Table 7-7 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 5 in LTE-UE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 514 111 6 2 158 
Gray 127 237 26 25 104 
Black + Gray 641 349 31 27 262 
White 2,446 2,739 3,056 3,060 2,825 
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7.3.2 LTE Scenario 
Here, a full LTE network is considered (both LTE base stations and LTE-UE), although, this 
scenario is not consistent with the direction of having only small cell technologies in this band. 
However, we want to examine several possible scenarios in this research. 
The relation of LTE base stations to each other is completely independent. Both LTE base 
stations and LTE-UE are randomly distributed over the simulated area, since we are examining the 
aggregated interference effect on the PU antenna and not the performance of the LTE network. 
Table 7-8 summarizes the assumed ratio which is used between LTE base stations and LTE-UE. 
In dense areas (i.e. large and small cities), we assume that there is 1 base station for each 22 LTE-
UE, whereas in suburban and rural areas, there is 1 for each 6. In the NTIA-CSMAC analysis [67], 
1 to 18 ratio has been used over all different terrain types. 
From Table 7-9, we can notice the following: 
 The radius of G and B spaces is larger compared to the LTE-UE, due to the addition 
of LTE base stations.  
o Shipborne 1 still has the largest radii.  
o By comparing LTE-UE and LTE scenarios (Table 7-2 and Table 7-9), if G 
or B radius is relatively small, the variance between LTE and LTE-UE cases 
is large due to the sensitivity of both G and B boundaries. For example: 
 At Shipborne 5 with “large city” terrain and (0.5%) active factor, the 
B radius is 5.3km and 38.4km for LTE-UE and LTE cases, 
respectively. 
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 At Shipborne 5 with open terrain and (0.5%) active factor, the G 
radius is 90.6km and 97.3km for LTE-UE and LTE cases, 
respectively. 
 In some cases (e.g. the terrain type of “large city” at Shipborne 2 and 3), the B and 
G radius is very small. 
o NTIA assumes that the shipborne radar will be at a distance of 10km from 
the coast line. If we consider that in our analysis, we will end up with some 
cases where the B and G radius is zero. (We considered the shipborne radars 
on the coast line as the worst case scenario in our model). 
 
The SUs active factor in Table 7-10 till Table 7-14 is (0.1%). These tables show the benefits 
of sharing the band with each shipborne radar independently. G and B space value at Shipborne 1 
case is worth an average of $645 million, compared to 444 million in LTE-UE scenario. This 
benefit shows the existence of more incentive to share G and/or B space at this scenario. 
Table 7-8 LTE network topology 
Terrain Type Ratio 
Small and large city areas 
{1 to 22} 
One LTE base station for each 22 active LTE-UE 
Suburban and open areas 
{1 to 6} 
One LTE base station for each 6 active LTE-UE 
 All the LTE base station transmit at fixed power = 46 dBm. 
 LTE-UE transmit based on the PDF listed in section 6.2.2 
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Table 7-9 B and G space radius for LTE scenario 
 
Black Space (km) Gray Space (km) 
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Shipborne 1 95.5 87.4 57.9 54.9 99.2 94.5 84.3 83.2 
Shipborne 2 67.3 42.4 24.7 25.9 93.5 60.8 37.9 38.5 
Shipborne 3 70.1 43.3 26.5 25.6 94.5 60.9 39.6 38.5 
Shipborne 4 88.2 66.6 40.2 39.7 97.7 85.6 55.5 51.8 
Shipborne 5 77.7 56.7 38.4 38.4 97.3 84.2 51.0 50.1 
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Shipborne 1 72.0 52.3 36.8 36.3 93.3 79.4 51.3 47.2 
Shipborne 2 41.9 19.0 2.0 2.8 66.2 40.9 12.2 13.6 
Shipborne 3 34.5 24.8 3.4 2.5 69.5 37.8 15.2 17.5 
Shipborne 4 61.7 36.7 18.2 13.3 89.3 55.3 34.5 32.7 
Shipborne 5 69.0 34.1 12.3 17.7 87.6 50.0 32.1 33.7 
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Shipborne 1 63.9 46.7 26.4 26.2 93.0 65.9 42.5 39.3 
Shipborne 2 31.6 8.7 1.3 1.0 53.7 33.4 9.1 5.2 
Shipborne 3 35.3 8.6 0.9 1.4 57.3 28.7 5.7 8.0 
Shipborne 4 52.0 22.2 7.3 4.6 78.3 44.9 22.5 26.0 
Shipborne 5 51.2 25.0 4.6 5.3 75.6 46.8 21.0 19.9 
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Table 7-10 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in LTE Scenario 
 ($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 664 608 443 437 538 
Gray 60 76 162 131 107 
Black + Gray 723 684 606 568 645 
White 2,364 2,403 2,482 2,519 2,442 
 
 
Table 7-11 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in LTE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 504 229 24 33 198 
Gray 143 263 122 130 165 
Black + Gray 647 492 147 164 362 
White 2,440 2,596 2,941 2,924 2,725 
 
 
Table 7-12 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 3 in LTE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 415 299 41 31 197 
Gray 241 157 142 180 180 
Black + Gray 657 455 183 210 376 
White 2,431 2,632 2,905 2,877 2,711 
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Table 7-13 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 4 in LTE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 635 442 219 160 364 
Gray 77 175 196 234 171 
Black + Gray 712 617 415 394 535 
White 2,375 2,470 2,672 2,693 2,553 
 
Table 7-14 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 5 in LTE Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 655 410 148 213 357 
Gray 52 192 238 193 169 
Black + Gray 707 602 386 406 525 
White 2,380 2,485 2,701 2,682 2,562 
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7.3.3 Femtocells and WiFi Scenario 
In this scenario, it is assumed that both the transmitter and receiver have the same probability 
distribution function (PDF); therefore, we will not differentiate between an access point or user 
equipment. We assume that the PDF for transmit power is the same as LTE-UE in urban areas, 
where the transmit power is relatively less given the short distance between the transmitter and 
receiver33.  
We ignore traffic type differences that have been carried over SUs network, we simulate a 
PDF of transmit power (dBm) whether for Femtocells or WiFi users. The SU density has been 
examined over three cases (Active factor = 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.05%) to compare their sensitivity.  
Since Femtocells and WiFi applications are mainly indoor, and based on ITU 
recommendation (please refer to section 5.2.5.2), the ITU recommend power loss coefficient for 
indoor transmission calculation to be around (27 dB). To be in the conservative side, we will add 
only 10dB as additional losses in this scenario. From Table 7-15, we conclude the following: 
 Since these types of technologies are small cell, there is a huge reduction in G and 
B radii compare to previous two scenarios, which gives an advantage to small cell 
technologies over LTE in sharing this band. This in turn will increase sharing 
utilization. 
                                                 
 
33 At 3.5GHz, there is no official standards yet that we can base the “transmit power” on them for either Femtocells 
or WiFi. Therefore, it is reasonable to set it to be similar to LTE-UE PDF. 
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 The majority of the cases at either small or large city terrain model, listed in 
Table 7-15, show that G and B radii will be zero. 
o This will decrease the benefits of sharing the G and/or B spaces. So, we can 
conclude that the incentive to share G and B space will be less at this 
scenario. 
o However, the W space benefits will be at its largest compare to other 
scenarios. 
 These findings are consistent with the FCC recommendations of using “small cell” 
technology in this type of spectrum sharing environment. 
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Table 7-15 B and G space radius for Femtocells-WiFi scenario 
 
Black Space (km) Gray Space (km) 
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Shipborne 1 50.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 81.0 27.3 0.8 0.0 
Shipborne 2 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.7 0.6 0.0 
Shipborne 3 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 
Shipborne 4 30.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.9 1.9 0.8 0.0 
Shipborne 5 28.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.3 2.0 0.8 0.0 
 
SUs Active Factor = 0.1% 
O
p
en
 
S
u
b
u
rb
an
 
S
m
al
l 
C
it
y
 
L
ar
g
e 
C
it
y
 
O
p
en
 
S
u
b
u
rb
an
 
S
m
al
l 
C
it
y
 
L
ar
g
e 
C
it
y
 
Shipborne 1 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 4 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 5 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 
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Shipborne 1 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shipborne 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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The previous table list the radii for all simulated scansions, now, how about evaluating the 
benefits? WiFi technology commonly deployed at unlicensed band, which means the spectrum is 
free of cost. LTE-Femtocells commonly utilize the same spectrum as the mobile operator. This 
dissertation does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the benefits to society that may result 
from making spectrum sharing available. So, under Femtocells-WiFi scenario, it is likely that SUs 
may share this band without paying for the spectrum. 
If there will be a price for it, there is no benchmark which to base the spectrum price ($ per 
MHz-POP). Therefore, we use a value of $0.1 per MHz-POP in this band (3.5GHz), same as 
previous two scenarios. Table 7-16 and Table 7-17 show sharing benefits for only two shipborne 
(since the radii is very small for G and B space) for active factor equals (0.1%). Shipborne 1, which 
product the largest exclusion zone, and Shipborne 2, which product the smallest exclusion zone. 
We conclude that G and B space values on all shipborne radars are relatively small and W space 
value is greatest. This shows the advantage of this type of small cell over other scenarios. 
Table 7-16 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 1 in Femtocells and WiFi Scenario 
 ($ Million) 
Terrain Type 
Average 
 (25% each) 
Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 
258 0 0 0 64 
Gray 
275 24 0 0 75 
Black + Gray 
533 24 0 0 139 
White 
2,555 3,063 3,087 3,087 2,948 
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Table 7-17 B, G, and W space value for Shipborne 2 in Femtocells and WiFi Scenario 
($ Million) 
Terrain Type Average 
 (25% each) Open Suburban Small City Large City 
Space 
Type 
Black 0 0 0 0 0 
Gray 0 0 0 0 0 
Black + Gray 0 0 0 0 0 
White 3087 3087 3087 3087 3087 
7.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of the results to potential variance of critical input data. 
To avoid prolixity, unless mentioned otherwise, all analysis is based on the LTE-UE scenario for 
0.1% SUs active factor and for Shipborne 1. 
7.4.1 SUs Active Factor and Density 
The above section shows that changing the SUs active factor results in a significant change in the 
G and B radii. For example, Table 7-18 summarizes the variance among three different densities.  
Sensitivity in small and large city terrain areas is higher than in open or suburban areas 
because the total aggregated interference in the “open” terrain area is higher than in the “large city” 
area, which makes it less sensitive to SUs density changes compared to the second one. For 
example, if we increase the active factor from (0.1%) to (0.5%) in the open terrain case, the B 
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radius increases by 34%, and the G radius increases by 9%. On the other hand, the B radius 
increases by 599%, and the G radius increases by 80% in the large terrain case. 
Table 7-18 Sensitivity analysis for SUs density in Shipborne 1 
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0.5% (Change %) 34% 44% 531% 599% 9% 84% 81% 80% 
0.1% (km) 70.1 32.8 4.9 4.4 90.2 41.7 23.3 23.0 
0.05% (Change %) -30% -37% -67% -64% -16% -17% -62% -67% 
(*) This is the percentage of active SUs among the total simulated population 
7.4.2 Minimum Elevation Angle 
As previously mentioned, the elevation angle of PU antenna (i.e. shipborne radars) was not known; 
and we assume it to be 10 degrees as the minimum elevation angle. From the MetSat case, it is 
clear that the elevation angle of the PU antenna is very sensitive input. Thus, to examine its effect, 
we plot how the G and B radii will change based on the variance of the minimum elevation angle 
from 0 to 40 degrees; please see Figure 7-2. This figure is based on the Shipborne 1 specifications 
for a suburban terrain type. 
Clearly, this input is critical, and the radius becomes very small after 40 degrees. If we 
consider that 43 degrees is the minimum elevation angle, which is similar to some MetSat earth-
stations, the G and B space will decrease significantly, leading to a larger W space area. This figure 
matches the result listed in Table 7-2 at angle=10 degrees, where G radius is 41km and B radius is 
32km.  
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Figure 7-2 Effect of PU minimum elevation angle over G and B radiuses 
7.4.3 Black Space Boundary 
The G space boundary in this analysis (i.e. interference threshold listed in Table 7-1) is given as (-
114dBm) for Shipborne 1. Hence, we will examine the effect of changing the B boundary to B 
radius. At a difference of 10 dBm (the classical value), the B radius is 32km, which matches the 
previous result. The B boundary can be negotiated between the PU and SU, which will affect both 
G and B space areas.  
From the figure, we can also see that if B boundary is set below -89 dBm (-114+25), the B 
radius will be zero. From this fact and the above tables, it is clear that the B space is diminished in 
many cases, especially if the terrain area is the “small city” or “large city” model.  
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Figure 7-3 Aggregate interference and B space radius 
7.5 HYPOTHESES TEST 
In the LTE-UE scenario, the average value of G+B space is worth $444 million in the Shipborne 
1 case, $645 million in the LTE scenario and $204 million in the Femtocells-WiFi scenario. We 
can say clearly that the Femtocells-WiFi scenario gives the highest opportunity cost to share this 
band compared to the other two scenarios. The W space is worth around $3 billion in the 
Femtocells-WiFi scenario, and it is expected to be shared with the minimal cost of enforcement 
compare to the other G and B enforcement. These findings let us accept H1. 
If we only consider Shipborne 2, there are different findings based on four different terrain 
types. In the LTE scenario, for example, the value of G+B space in “open terrain” type is worth 
$647 million. However, in “large city terrain”, it is worth $164 million. In the same analogy we 
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used in the last chapter, if we consider these benefits as the upper and reasonable enforcement-
cost curves for each scenario, There are different curves link the path between the two extreme 
sides: ex ante and ex post enforcement scenario; which led to the acceptance of H3. 
Overall, according to these three scenarios, if we share only W space, the benefit is huge. 
Also, it is possible to share more (i.e. G and/or B spaces), albeit with less benefits, but it is still 
worth it if the benefits exceed the enforcement cost. More sharing means additional and higher 
spectrum utilization, as well as more dependency on ex post enforcement; which means we can 
accept H2 and H4. 
All our analyses are based on the assumption that the spectrum value is based on 0.1$ per 
MHz-POP. However, if we change that number to 0.3, for example, we have to multiply all our 
final findings by 3, and so on. In addition, this simulation considers the shipborne radars to be right 
on the coast lines, with zero distance, although, the NTIA analysis suggests a 10km distance. If we 
add that to this model, many B spaces will be eliminated from the results, and G spaces will 
decrease. The Femtocells-WiFi scenario is very likely to be at least one of the technology types to 
share this band. We expect significant advantages in this sharing since the G and B radii are 
relatively small. These assumptions will not affect the acceptance of the Hypotheses. 
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Spectrum sharing has gone from an idea to a serious policy focus in one decade. It has become one 
of the most expected approaches to expand mobile wireless capacity due to the predicted high 
growth rate of mobile broadband traffic over the coming years. Enabling spectrum sharing regimes 
on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented. To have 
meaning, those agreements must be enforceable, and the enforcement-cost supposed to be less than 
the benefits we are getting out of this sharing 
 As with many new and possibly disruptive technologies, spectrum sharing poses 
challenges for stakeholders, which include incumbents (i.e. PUs), regulators and entrants (i.e. 
SUs). Incumbents have made investments that are often sunk costs to utilize the spectrum for which 
they have a license. Over the course of nearly a century, regulators have developed regulations 
that have been tested in the field and in the courts and are based on the “command and control” 
licensing regime. Entrants are being pressed by the marketplace and enabled by new technologies 
to develop new approaches to exploiting the resource that is RF spectrum. Thus, it is no wonder 
that the specter of spectrum sharing has political, economic, technical, and legal implications.    
In this dissertation, we have sought to provide specific insight into some techno-economic 
aspects of non-opportunistic spectrum sharing. This analysis is valuable because it will help 
regulators prepare for possible future scenarios in solving the wireless capacity crunch. In addition, 
it can give government users more insight into the expected future of sharing. It is also of value to 
commercial users and operators in that they can use the results of this work to make more informed 
decisions about the economic benefits of different spectrum sharing market and opportunities.  
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The main goal of this dissertation is to examine and quantify the benefits of spectrum 
sharing. Given the inherent uncertainty of any quantifying model of future benefits, the goal of 
this analysis is not to reach definitive numeric findings of spectrum sharing value and economic 
benefits, but to shed light on the relationship between common enforcement strategies and their 
economic consequences in terms of lost value for bands that are actively being considered for 
government-commercial sharing.  
There are four hypotheses in this dissertation which had been tested throughout two 
spectrum bands cases. We believe that the first hypothesis hold in majority of expected spectrum 
sharing bands, where the opportunity cost of exclusive spectrum is high at low spectrum 
utilization. For other hypotheses, we believe that they hold in all spectrum bands. The complexity 
of “ex post” enforcement approach is higher than “ex ante” enforcement approach. In addition, 
there is more than one relationship-curve by moving from the “ex ante” towards the “ex post” 
enforcement approaches. Furthermore, spectrum utilization will increase by raising the 
dependency on the “ex post” enforcement approach. 
8.1 CONCLUSIONS 
One of the contributions of this dissertation is to demonstrate enforcement concepts in the 
spectrum sharing domain (chapter 4). Traditionally, in the spectrum field, the enforcement process 
is heavily based on preventing an “interference event” before it happens, such as having 
geographical or spectral (i.e. guard band) separation between licensees, and transmitters’ 
specifications. This dissertation propose the idea of an interactive rule of enforcement that changes 
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the spectrum utilization bar by moving from “ex ante” towards “ex post” enforcement. The 
enforcement regime is comprised of technical and non-technical elements, where the latter 
includes business processes, market norms, and policy institutions and frameworks that reinforce 
and interact with the technical enforcement solutions. Thus, developing effective approach to 
protect the rights of incumbents and entrants is important, and it is equally important that this 
approach be adaptive. 
As the main contribution of this dissertation, we propose a “sharing model” that is 
customized to examine and quantify the benefits of different sharing scenarios (chapter 5). It is a 
centerpiece of this dissertation in which main factors that affect the sharing scenarios can be 
examined and highlighted. The current approach to spectrum sharing using exclusion zones (as 
suggested by NTIA) is based primarily on ex ante enforcement by setting very large exclusion 
zones to protect the PUs. In this dissertation, however, the role of ex post enforcement is expected 
to increase. The proposed modeling of geographical exclusion zones moves from the ex ante 
approach (large exclusion zone) towards ex post enforcement. The evaluation criteria of sharing 
benefits spans three levels of sharing: Black, Gray, and White space sharing. 
The key component of this simulation is a methodology that has been used to determine 
the aggregated interference level at a PU location with many SUs sharing the band. In this work, 
we have created a reasonable representation of the aggregate interference in the spectrum sharing 
environment where multiple SUs cause interference to a single PU. Based on our model settings, 
the major findings can be summarized as follows: 
 The variance at the expected W area (by sharing the W space) is less when the 
density of SUs increases. This indicates that if we plan to share the spectrum in W 
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space only, the density of SUs will not have much effect over the W space area 
above a certain level of SUs per km2.  
 The incentive to share G space will decrease by increasing the density of SUs. 
Therefore, G area will be smaller if the density increase. 
 “Frequency sensitivity” of both B and G space area decrease as SUs density 
increases. For example, sharing at 1GHz or 5GHz will lead to the same B and G 
sharing areas at high SUs density. 
 The sensitivity analysis for the interference threshold boundary (in dBm) shows the 
following: 
o At a specific interference threshold of PU antenna, the exclusion zone radius 
(either B or G space) will increase in nonlinear relationship with SUs 
density.  
o The variance of the exclusion zone radius, by changing the interference 
threshold of the PU antenna, has a nonlinear relationship with SUs density. 
For example, by changing the interference threshold by (+10dBm), the gain 
at G space area will be higher at lower SUs density compared to higher ones.  
 
In the spectrum sharing case of the 1.7GHz band (chapter 6), sharing between MetSat (18 
fixed earth-stations) and LTE-UE has be studied. The results show high lost value if we keep the 
exclusive rights (i.e. no sharing) at this band. In addition, this analysis has ultimately led to a 
priority list of stations that are recommended to be relocated to better utilize the band. A level of 
“zip-code area” analysis was done to determine the population density affected by each exclusion 
zone (i.e. B, G, and W) to increase the accuracy of the benefits analysis. In addition, on the basis 
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of the FCC auction-database of comparable spectrum bands (AWS-1 bands), spectrum pricing 
analysis was performed. Based on the setting of our model and the analysis we did, we can 
conclude the following: 
 For each specific sharing environment, there is a unique sharing-benefits function. 
Frequency band, SUs density, transmit power of SUs, and other common factors 
are not enough to evaluate the sharing benefits in each specific environment or to 
give recommendations regarding the preference of each band to be shared by which 
SUs service. As a result, the enforcement strategy will vary and its cost will not be 
reasonable if it is above the expected benefits from each sharing case. 
 There is huge lost value in having exclusive usage rights MetSat stations only. Our 
analysis indicates high benefits by moving from pure ex ante enforcement (the 
current case by not allowing the sharing) towards ex post enforcement through 
different levels of sharing (i.e. B, G, W spaces). Based on our classical scenario: 
o W space is worth approximately $2.4 billion and covers an area of 98% of 
the area of the US land.   
o G+B space is worth approximately $245 million. However, not all the 18 
earth-stations are worth sharing in G and/or B space. It totally depends on 
the benefit function at each station and whether that benefit exceeds the 
expected enforcement cost. For example, the G+B space is worth $135 
million at one of the stations, whereas it is worth only $0.4 million at 
another.  
o These sharing benefits prove to be a valuable opportunity cost that is lost 
by having exclusive usage right at the 1.7GHz band. 
 168 
 
 One critical item in this simulation is the difference between the G and B 
boundaries. It is assumed to be (20dBm) in our classical scenario. We expect the 
PU will tolerate this additional level of interference provided that it will be paid 
back from the G space benefit.  
 We also deliver a relocation-table for the 18 earth-stations, where the station with 
the highest sharing benefits is recommended to be relocated to another area with 
less population. So, if spectrum sharing be limited to W space only, we reduce the 
opportunity cost by relocate the highest G+B benefits stations. 
 W space sharing gives the highest benefits with less expected enforcement-cost. G 
space sharing gives different levels of benefits which vary based on the sharing 
environment and it is expected to cost more to enforce sharing in this space. B space 
sharing also shows benefits, which may give a positive total gain at some scenarios.  
 Each earth-station has its own curve which represents the benefits of sharing by 
moving from the ex ante towards ex post enforcement scenario. 
 The percentage of impacted population due to G+B exclusion zone is 8.63%, 
6.63%, and 5.22% for addition loss equal to 0, 10, and 20dB; respectively. 
 
In the spectrum sharing case of the 3.5GHz band (chapter 7), the NTIA has determined 
that extremely large geographic exclusion zones are necessary; in addition, it was estimated to 
exclude approximately 60% of the United States population. In our analysis, we examine three 
different scenarios: LTE-UE, LTE, and Femtocells-WiFi. On one side, the most impactful scenario 
(LTE scenario, for Shipborne 1) is estimated to exclude approximately 38% of the United States 
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population. On the other side, for the least impactful scenario (Femtocells-WiFi scenario, for 
Shipborne 2) is estimated to exclude only 6.2%.  
This chapter discusses the benefits of spectrum sharing over different enforcement 
scenarios in the 3.5GHz band. The SU is modeled in three types, each of which has its own 
characteristics and findings. Although there are some other PU types using this band, the focus in 
this dissertation is on the main PU usages (i.e. shipborne radars) which cause the highest reduction 
in spectrum utilization. Based on our analysis: 
 In the LTE-UE scenario with 0.1% active factor: 
o Shipborne 1 radar gives the largest exclusion zone compared to the other 
four radars; the G+B space is worth $444 million. 
o Shipborne 2 and 3 radars give the smallest exclusion zone. The G+B space 
in each is worth approximately $160 million. 
 In the LTE scenario with 0.1% active factor: 
o The G+B space is worth $645 million in the Shipborne 1 case. 
 In the Femtocells-WiFi scenario with 0.1% active factor: 
o The G+B space is worth $330 million in the Shipborne 1 case. 
 The elevation angle of the PU antenna (i.e. shipborne radars) is unknown; we 
assumed it to be 10 degrees as the minimum elevation angle. The sensitivity 
analysis shows that this is a critically sensitive input to model results.  
 The NTIA analysis suggests 10km distance between the shipborne radars and the 
coast line, we consider zero distance in the analysis. If we add that to this model, 
many B spaces will be eliminated from the results, and there will be a significant 
decrease of G spaces.  
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Finally, we want to highlight that most of the settings of the simulation model are 
conservative. The intent of this approach was to that the PUs are protected by considering worst 
case settings in some of the inputs to the model. We ignore the effects of “indoor propagation 
losses” over the propagation model in all the analyses cases except at Femtocells-WiFi scenario. 
In addition, at 3.5GHz, we consider the shipborne radars to be at the coast line while we aggregate 
the interference. If we add all that to the model, it is expected that W benefits will dominate other 
benefits, especially in the 3.5GHz case. 
8.2 GENERALIZATIONS AND SPECULATIONS 
While the results reported here are specific to some particular sharing bands, the approach (and 
some of the lessons) may be generalizable to other bands and other sharing scenarios as well. One 
of the lessons from this study is that spectrum sharing benefits (as well as the enforcement 
applicability) are quite situation-specific. Sharing W space is expected to have higher incentives 
with high benefits and low enforcement-cost. Sharing G or B space, however, runs the risk of 
having enforcement-cost greater than the sharing benefits in some situations. Further, it is as yet 
not possible to determine a “best” approach to share a spectrum band as the enforcement-cost 
(including the costs of adjudication) are highly uncertain and dependent on the particulars of the 
sharing circumstances.  
In the 1.7GHz band, there are many reasons to expect that there will be one LTE operator 
sharing the band. First, reduction in enforcement-cost by having a centralized SU (i.e. single 
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interface managing all the secondaries; see section 4.1.2). Second, the adjudication process as part 
of ex post enforcement will be easier. Thus, demodulation of the LTE signal to uniquely identify 
the SU causing an interference event may not be necessary reducing ex post enforcement-cost. If 
multiple LTE operator exist to share the 15MHz band, the LTE signal would have to be 
demodulated to identify the source of the interference, which is more costly. 
This dissertation does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the benefits to society 
that may result from making spectrum sharing available, which some economists estimate as 
multiples of the private value. There may be a sharing scenarios where the SUs will use the band 
under pre-registration processes and spectrum-license-free (similar to unsilenced band), for 
example, WiFi sharing of the 3.5GHz band. Since there are no direct benefits from the spectrum 
auction, however, there probably huge benefits to society that will compensate any enforcement-
cost. 
Performing additional case studies, such as the ones presented here, will help build a 
“catalog” of enforcement approaches and expected benefits bounds. Such a collection may enable 
the development of recommended initial approaches for various spectrum sharing circumstances. 
These recommendations/lessons together will help analyzing and understating any future sharing 
scenario. 
The focus of this dissertation is to study the spectrum sharing between government (as 
PUs) and commercial users (as SUs). We believe there are many lessons that can be taken from 
this towards other sharing scenarios such as government-government sharing or commercial-
commercial sharing (see Figure 3-1). Frequency effects and SUs density analyses and findings are 
examples of lessons that can be taken from this dissertation and applied to other sharing scenarios.  
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In the case of government-government sharing, the trust between the PUs and SUs is high, 
and that will reduce the enforcement-cost substantially. For example, the SUs (i.e. government 
agencies) may gain access to more information about the PUs. The feedback level between the 
PUs and SUs will increase, especially if that contains information within government security 
domain. In the case of commercial-commercial sharing, it is expected that the opportunity cost of 
sharing will be less, since the PU has higher spectrum utilization compare to government users. 
Network topology and usages of commercial PU is different than governments PU, which led to 
the expectation that the sharing enforcement-cost will be higher in this case.  
8.3 FUTURE WORK 
There is a great potential for future research. This simulation model and the two case studies for 
examining spectrum sharing open the doors for future ideas and questions, including: 
 This dissertation quantifies the benefits of different levels of sharing. In other 
words, it sets the upper bound of the reasonable cost of enforcement for sharing the 
spectrum in specific scenarios. Although there is significant uncertainty in 
estimating enforcement costs at this early stage of spectrum sharing practice, it will 
be very interesting to see how benefits will intersect with cost to define the optimum 
point to do the enforcement and represent the ideal sharing utilization. Thus, finding 
the cost model for enforcement between “ex ante” and “ex post” enforcement 
approaches is another interesting area of research. 
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 Due to spectrum sharing, both PUs and SUs expect that interference may occur 
from one to the other. This dissertation concentrates on a “PUs as victim” approach 
and assumes that the SUs will consider the PUs interference as a fact of life that 
needs to be coexisted with it. However, how will that affect the benefits evaluation 
from the SUs perspective? Is there an advantage of small-cell over large-cell SUs’ 
service (since small-cell is most likely to be indoors and less affected by PU 
interference)? 
 Chapter 5 of this dissertation shows a very interesting relationship between “sharing 
benefits” and “some key model inputs”. By considering additional new SUs 
services that could share the spectrum with PUs, such as Machine to Machine 
technologies, how will that change the findings of sharing benefits in G and/or B 
spaces?  
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APPENDIX (A) 
 
 
 
SPECTRUM OPPORTUNITY COST 
Opportunity cost can be described as "the basic relationship between scarcity and choice"34. In 
microeconomic theory, opportunity cost is defined as the highest value alternative forgone; in a 
situation in which a choice needs to be made between several mutually exclusive alternatives given 
limited resources. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines it as "the loss of potential gain 
from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen". The efficient market clearing price is equal 
to the opportunity cost of the marginal unit of the good or service in that market35. 
Accordingly, spectrum opportunity cost is: 
 In the exclusive spectrum domain: 
o Allocating the spectrum to the highest value user should be considered in the 
band allocation process. That can be done in many forms, such as spectrum 
auctions. 
o In theory, the last remaining bidder, after all others have dropped out, will be 
the one best prepared to make the optimal use of that particular spectrum36. 
                                                 
 
34 James M. Buchanan; "Opportunity cost". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; 2008. 
35 American Case Management Association; “Opportunity Cost Pricing of Spectrum"; Public Consultation; April 
2009. 
36 ITU; “Exploring the Value and Economic Valuation of Spectrum”; ITU reports on broadband; April 2012. 
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  In the shared spectrum domain: 
o What we are trying to do in this research can be described as studying and 
discovering “alternatives” of utilizing the spectrum in specific bands under two 
level of usage rights: primary rights (i.e. PUs) and secondary rights (i.e. SUs).  
o  If the value of those “alternatives” is higher than the current case, this means 
that we have incentive to introduce spectrum sharing in that band. 
“Only if the sharing arrangement increases the value to all other sharing users by a greater 
amount than is lost to the highest valued user will the total value of the band of spectrum increase. 
If the total value of the spectrum for all shared uses is less than the value for a single user, then 
spectrum sharing diminishes the potential value of the spectrum”37. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
37 McHenry, Giulia and Bazelon, Coleman, “The Economics of Spectrum Sharing” The 41st Research Conference on 
Communication, Information and Internet Policy; 2013. 
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APPENDIX (B) 
 
 
 
MIMO EFFECTS AND TRANSMIT POWER 
In this appendix, we will illustrate in brief some research that supports the argument that 
characterizes MIMO over SISO systems in power efficiency (i.e. less interference to PU). As in 
the assumption in the simulation model, at long distance transmission, an SU using MIMO 
transmits less power than SISO. As a result, the amount of Gray and Black spaces will be less in 
the MIMO scenario. In other words, the sharing utilization will be better when SUs use the MIMO, 
where everything else is the same, including the data rate between SUs. 
From Figure A 1, we want to highlight two different distances. The distance between two 
SUs (transmitter and receiver) is “d”. The distance between SU transmitter and PU receiver is “R”. 
Distance “d” influences the transmit power between SUs. Distance “R” influences the spectrum 
utilization in our simulation model, and it is the key variable in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PU Antenna 
SU Transmitter 
SU Receiver 
d 
R 
Figure A 1 Differentiate between two types of distances affect SUs power 
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Most research relates the distance “d” to MIMO and the power efficiency level. However, 
this distance is not considered in our work; we rather consider “R” as directly affecting the 
exclusion zone size and the aggregated interference level.  
Based on Figure A 2 (from [71]), under the same throughput (data rate = 5 bit/s/Hz), 
transmit power will drop from 92 mW to 26mW by changing the antenna configuration from 1x1 
to 2x2. The transmit power will be around 7mW at 4x4 and 8x8. This figure is based on a simulated 
IEEE 802.11n network. In this case, SISO will cause more aggregated interference at the PU 
receiver, if they share the same spectrum band. Therefore, by adding MIMO factor to the SUs 
topology in our simulation model, the aggregate interference to the PU receiver is expected to be 
either less or at least the same as SISO, and we expect that utilization will increase and that Gray 
and Black spaces will be smaller. 
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Figure A 2 Mapping from transmit power to data rate 
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APPENDIX (C) 
 
 
 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS CHART 
In section 6.2.1, we illustrate the population characteristics chart for Miami, FL earth-station only. 
This appendix list the rest of them38. 
 
 
Figure A 3 Population characteristics chart: Wallops Island, VA 
 
                                                 
 
38 Note:”Anderson Air Force Base, GU” earth-station is not listed here, since it is located in non-populated area. 
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Figure A 4 Population characteristics chart: Fairbanks, AK 
 
 
Figure A 5 Population characteristics chart: Suitland, MD 
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Figure A 6 Population characteristics chart: Miami, FL 
 
Figure A 7 Population characteristics chart: Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI 
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Figure A 8 Population characteristics chart: Sioux Falls, SD 
 
Figure A 9 Population characteristics chart: Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK 
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Figure A 10 Population characteristics chart: Monterey, CA 
 
Figure A 11 Population characteristics chart: Stennis Space Center, MS 
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Figure A 12 Population characteristics chart: Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 
 
Figure A 13 Population characteristics chart: Yuma, AZ 
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Figure A 14 Population characteristics chart: Cincinnati, OH 
 
Figure A 15 Population characteristics chart: Rock Island, IL 
 
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
800.00
900.00
0 - 20 km 20 - 40
km
40 - 60
km
60 - 80
km
80 - 100
km
P
O
P/
km
2
Distance from PU location 
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
0 - 20 km 20 - 40
km
40 - 60
km
60 - 80
km
80 - 100
km
P
O
P/
km
2
Distance from PU location 
 186 
 
 
Figure A 16 Population characteristics chart: St. Louis, MO 
 
Figure A 17 Population characteristics chart: Vicksburg, MS 
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Figure A 18 Population characteristics chart: Omaha, NE 
 
Figure A 19 Population characteristics chart: Sacramento, CA 
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APPENDIX (D) 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE FCC AUCTION-DATABASE  
Table D1 Summary of AWS-1 band analysis 39 
Block Total ($) Bandwidth Licenses Type 
$US per 
MHz-POP 
Applied in 
MetSat Case 
A 2,246,977,800 
20 MHz 
(1710-1720 / 2110-2120) 
Cellular Market Area 
(CMA) 
0.40 yes 
B 2,437,092,750 
20 MHz 
(1720-1730 / 2120-2130) 
Economic Area 
(EA) 
0.43 yes 
C 1,461,386,350 
10 MHz 
(1730-1735 / 2130-2135) 
Economic Area 
(EA) 
0.51 yes 
D 1,669,642,750 
10 MHz 
(1735-1740 / 2135-2140) 
Regional Economic 
Area Grouping 
(REAG) 
0.59 no 
E 1,710,488,250 
10 MHz 
(1740-1745 / 2140-2145) 
Regional Economic 
Area Grouping 
(REAG) 
0.60 no 
F 4,174,486,000 
20 MHz 
(1745-1755 / 2145-2155) 
Regional Economic 
Area Grouping 
(REAG) 
0.73 no 
Gross Bids for all AWS-1 band = $13.7 billion 
0.54 
(average) 
 
Note:  
 These numbers are summary of this band analysis based on FCC auction-database. It is not the inputs to 
the simulation model.  
 For each station area, we perform separate analysis. 
                                                 
 
39 This is the auction number (66), which began on 8/9/2006 and closed on 9/18/2006. 
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Table D2 Earth-Stations basic information in the FCC auction-database 
No 
County Name 
 (State) 
Economic Area 
Number 
(EA) 
Cellular Market 
Area Number 
(CMA) 
1 Accomack (VA) 14 692 
2 Fairbanks North Star (AK) 171 315 
3 Prince Georges (MD) 13 8 
4 Miami-Dade (FL) 31 12 
5 Honolulu (HI) 172 50 
6 Minnehaha (SD) 116 267 
7 Anchorage (AK) 171 187 
9 Monterey (CA) 163 126 
10 Hancock (MI) 82 173 
11 San Bernardino (CA) 160 2 
12 Yuma (AZ) 160 321 
13 Hamilton (OH) 49 23 
14 Rock Island (IL) 102 98 
15 Saint Louis City (MO) 96 11 
16 Warren (MS) 77 497 
17 Douglas (NE) 118 65 
18 Yolo (CA) 164 35 
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APPENDIX (E) 
 
 
 
SHARING BENEFITS DETAILS  
Table E1 Benefits evaluation summary of G+B Space at Losses=0 (Classical Scenario) 
station 
# 
Black + Gray Space  
Radius  
(km) 
Land Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 92.20 8,653 435,253 0.14% 466,638 
2 12.75 487 57,152 0.02% 139,170 
3 97.62 25,415 8,440,867 2.73% 134,976,113 
4 90.51 13,534 4,762,026 1.54% 34,320,545 
5 39.48 1,549 953,207 0.31% 2,727,747 
6 62.44 12,368 278,007 0.09% 398,119 
7 60.37 8,192 345,952 0.11% 747,481 
9 91.21 14,689 2,382,815 0.77% 13,316,321 
10 95.10 18,415 1,613,317 0.52% 9,530,951 
11 99.70 21,282 2,673,463 0.87% 23,971,324 
12 36.44 1,570 194,179 0.06% 1,770,843 
13 46.20 6,899 1,912,574 0.62% 13,797,514 
14 32.30 3,199 336,954 0.11% 631,456 
15 13.44 497 569,906 0.18% 3,101,571 
16 70.57 15,269 479,346 0.16% 1,174,559 
17 10.19 290 124,618 0.04% 417,872 
18 21.39 1,386 1,084,759 0.35% 3,434,079 
Total Area Impacted (%) 1.56% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 8.63% 
Total Value ($) 244,922,303 
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Table E2 Sensitivity analysis in B space: additional losses = 10 dB 
station 
# 
Black Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land 
Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 7.85 161 4,759 0.00% 5,102 
2 1.70 3 3,263 0.00% 7,946 
3 46.17 6,049 4,921,052 1.59% 78,691,498 
4 32.85 1,604 2,895,056 0.94% 20,865,048 
5 13.13 352 469,010 0.15% 1,342,143 
6 3.80 34 1,023 0.00% 1,465 
7 15.43 370 244,784 0.08% 528,892 
9 25.49 777 265,882 0.09% 1,485,877 
10 58.18 7,699 455,459 0.15% 2,690,703 
11 96.55 24,891 621,028 0.20% 5,568,382 
12 3.01 31 1,415 0.00% 12,904 
13 2.55 28 72,582 0.02% 523,614 
14 1.47 8 14,867 0.00% 27,861 
15 0.59 0 0 0.00% 0 
16 3.84 28 2,533 0.00% 6,207 
17 0.27 0 0 0.00% 0 
18 0.39 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.43% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 3.23% 
Total Value ($) 111,757,643 
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Table E3 Sensitivity analysis in G space: additional losses = 10 dB 
station # 
Gray Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land 
Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 82.25 6,723 322,650 0.10% 345,916 
2 6.20 124 19,758 0.01% 48,112 
3 91.93 15,920 3,321,680 1.08% 53,116,280 
4 73.63 6,707 1,564,918 0.51% 11,278,569 
5 36.91 1,192 484,151 0.16% 1,385,472 
6 18.93 1,140 19,833 0.01% 28,402 
7 35.56 1,881 40,219 0.01% 86,899 
9 84.15 11,482 1,574,709 0.51% 8,800,235 
10 92.59 9,438 1,080,955 0.35% 6,385,929 
11 99.23 80 67,975 0.02% 609,491 
12 24.36 1,635 160,492 0.05% 1,463,629 
13 34.86 3,829 1,600,551 0.52% 11,546,547 
14 8.35 184 135,087 0.04% 253,155 
15 2.20 8 26,937 0.01% 146,598 
16 37.63 4,067 67,047 0.02% 164,288 
17 1.78 8 2,819 0.00% 9,453 
18 2.90 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.66% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 3.40% 
Total Value ($) 95,668,974 
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Table E4 Sensitivity analysis in G+B space: additional losses = 10 dB 
station # 
Black + Gray Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 82.25 6,883 327,409 0.11% 351,018 
2 6.20 127 23,021 0.01% 56,058 
3 91.93 21,969 8,242,732 2.67% 131,807,779 
4 73.63 8,311 4,459,974 1.44% 32,143,617 
5 36.91 1,544 953,161 0.31% 2,727,615 
6 18.93 1,174 20,856 0.01% 29,867 
7 35.56 2,251 285,003 0.09% 615,791 
9 84.15 12,259 1,840,591 0.60% 10,286,112 
10 92.59 17,137 1,536,414 0.50% 9,076,633 
11 99.23 24,972 689,003 0.22% 6,177,873 
12 24.36 1,666 161,907 0.05% 1,476,534 
13 34.86 3,858 1,673,133 0.54% 12,070,161 
14 8.35 192 149,954 0.05% 281,015 
15 2.20 8 26,937 0.01% 146,598 
16 37.63 4,096 69,580 0.02% 170,494 
17 1.78 8 2,819 0.00% 9,453 
18 2.90 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 1.08% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 6.63% 
Total Value ($) 207,426,617 
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Table E5 Sensitivity analysis in B space: additional losses = 20 dB 
station 
# 
Black Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land 
Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 3.44 31 1,536 0.00% 1,647 
2 0.12 0 0 0.00% 0 
3 34.80 3,707 3,507,253 1.14% 56,083,739 
4 22.18 1,088 2,171,110 0.70% 15,647,474 
5 3.03 26 44,200 0.01% 126,485 
6 0.00 0 1,579 0.00% 2,261 
7 3.16 34 45,873 0.01% 99,115 
9 1.99 5 6,623 0.00% 37,013 
10 6.52 127 4,914 0.00% 29,030 
11 90.99 22,917 441,774 0.14% 3,961,120 
12 1.55 8 578 0.00% 5,271 
13 0.84 8 20,763 0.01% 149,787 
14 0.00 0 0 0.00% 0 
15 0.00 0 0 0.00% 0 
16 0.13 0 0 0.00% 0 
17 0.11 0 0 0.00% 0 
18 0.00 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.28% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 2.02% 
Total Value ($) 76,142,942 
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Table E6 Sensitivity analysis in G space: additional losses = 20 dB 
station 
# 
Gray Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land 
Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted 
(%) 
Value 
($) 
1 56.86 3,751 172,143 0.06% 184,556 
2 4.14 78 16,621 0.01% 40,474 
3 77.83 11,495 4,121,944 1.34% 65,913,132 
4 40.36 990 1,139,028 0.37% 8,209,124 
5 29.10 1,212 870,665 0.28% 2,491,540 
6 4.42 73 0 0.00% 0 
7 25.91 1,080 226,117 0.07% 488,559 
9 65.15 6,487 791,956 0.26% 4,425,833 
10 83.57 14,513 1,076,051 0.35% 6,356,958 
11 98.36 2,021 205,050 0.07% 1,838,559 
12 14.76 580 118,128 0.04% 1,077,285 
13 22.10 1,549 1,106,421 0.36% 7,981,840 
14 1.76 8 14,867 0.00% 27,861 
15 0.72 0 0 0.00% 0 
16 3.89 28 2,533 0.00% 6,207 
17 1.56 8 2,819 0.00% 9,453 
18 1.08 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.45% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 3.20% 
Total Value ($) 99,111,533 
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Table E7 Sensitivity analysis in G+B space: additional losses = 20 dB 
station # 
Black + Gray Space Analysis 
Radius  
(km) 
Land 
Area  
(km^2) 
Population 
Affected 
Population  
Impacted (%) 
Value 
($) 
1 56.86 3,782 173679 0.06% 186,203 
2 4.14 78 16621 0.01% 40,474 
3 77.83 15,202 7629197 2.47% 121,996,871 
4 40.36 2,078 3310138 1.07% 23,856,598 
5 29.10 1,238 914865 0.30% 2,618,025 
6 4.42 73 1579 0.00% 2,261 
7 25.91 1,114 271990 0.09% 587,675 
9 65.15 6,492 798579 0.26% 4,462,845 
10 83.57 14,640 1080965 0.35% 6,385,989 
11 98.36 24,938 646824 0.21% 5,799,679 
12 14.76 588 118706 0.04% 1,082,556 
13 22.10 1,557 1127184 0.37% 8,131,626 
14 1.76 8 14867 0.00% 27,861 
15 0.72 0 0 0.00% 0 
16 3.89 28 2533 0.00% 6,207 
17 1.56 8 2819 0.00% 9,453 
18 1.08 0 0 0.00% 0 
Total Area Impacted (%) 0.73% 
Total Population Impacted (%) 5.22% 
Total Value ($) 175,254,475 
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APPENDIX (F) 
 
 
 
THE CUMULATIVE VALUE FOR EACH EARTH-STATIONS 
 
 
Figure A 20 Cumulative value of Wallops Island, VA 
 
020406080100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x 10
6
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 V
a
lu
e
 [
$
]
Distance from PU Antenna [km]
 198 
 
 
Figure A 21 Cumulative value of Fairbanks, AK 
 
Figure A 22 Cumulative value of Suitland, MD 
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Figure A 23 Cumulative value of Miami, FL 
 
Figure A 24 Cumulative value of Ford Island, Pearl Harbor HI 
020406080100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 10
7
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 V
a
lu
e
 [
$
]
Distance from PU Antenna [km]
020406080100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10
6
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 V
a
lu
e
 [
$
]
Distance from PU Antenna [km]
 200 
 
 
Figure A 25 Cumulative value of Sioux Falls, SD 
 
Figure A 26 Cumulative value of Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK 
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Figure A 27 Cumulative Value of Monterey, CA 
 
Figure A 28 Cumulative value of Stennis Space Center, MS 
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Figure A 29 Cumulative value of Twenty-Nine-Palms, CA 
 
Figure A 30 Cumulative value of Yuma, AZ 
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Figure A 31 Cumulative value of Cincinnati, OH 
 
Figure A 32 Cumulative value of Rock Island, IL 
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Figure A 33 Cumulative value of St. Louis, MO 
 
Figure A 34 Cumulative value of Vicksburg, MS 
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Figure A 35 Cumulative value of Omaha, NE 
 
Figure A 36 Cumulative value of Sacramento, CA 
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APPENDIX (G) 
 
 
 
TYPES OF THE PUS AT THE 3.5GHZ BAND 
 
All these information are from the NTIA Fast Track report [4]. 
Ground-Based Radar Systems 
DoD has two mobile ground based radar systems. The first is Ground Based Radar One 
(GB-1) which is specifically designed to locate the firing positions of both rocket and mortar 
launchers. The Army operates GB-1 radar at many locations within the U.S. However, the sites 
requiring exclusion zones provided in Table G1 was limited to the locations where the radar 
requires use of its full tuning range. The radar does not require use of the upper portion of its tuning 
range at the many other locations. Ground Based Radar Three (GB-3) is a multi-function system 
that provides surveillance, air traffic control and fire quality data. The Ground-Based Radar Two 
(GB-2) are interference limited systems (as opposed to noise limited systems) and are associated 
with Airborne Radars. 
Based on the NTIA analysis, it was concluded that there is a need for an exclusion zone to 
protect the ground-based radars. The exclusion zone creates separation distances on the order of 
several hundred kilometers. It should be noted that a number of “GB-1” and “GB-3” sites required 
limited exclusion zones protection. To accommodate this much-reduced number of exclusion 
zones, the radio frequency filter of the base stations would need to provide 30 to 40 dB of 
attenuation at 3500 MHz (approximately 50 MHz below the band of interest, 3550-3650 MHz) to 
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mitigate the potential of high-power interference effects. The radius of the exclusion zones around 
the ground-based radar systems are given in Table G2. 
Table G1 Ground-Based Radar 1 and 3 Installation Locations 
GB-1 Installation Name GB-3 Installation Name 
Fort Stewart, Georgia MCB Camp Pendleton, California 
Fort Carson, Colorado MCAS Miramar, California 
Fort Hood, Texas MAGTFTC 29 Palms, California 
Fort Riley, Kansas MCMWTC Bridgeport, California 
Fort Polk, Louisiana MCAS Yuma, Arizona 
Fort Knox, Kentucky MCB Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina 
Fort Drum, New York MCB Quantico, Virginia 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina MCAS Cherry Point, North 
Carolina 
Fort Wainwright, Alaska Bogue Field, North Carolina 
Fort Lewis, Washington MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina 
White Sands Missile Range Virginia Beach, Virginia 
Yuma Proving Ground Fort Worth, Texas 
Fort Irwin, California Cheyenne, Wyoming 
 Ft Sill, Oklahoma 
 Aurora, Colorado 
 Pensacola, Florida 
 Ft Bliss, Texas 
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Table G2 Summary of Exclusion Zones based on NTIA analysis 
Radar to Wireless 
System 
Interaction 
Ground-Based Radar – 1 Ground-Based Radar – 2 Ground-Based Radar – 3 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone (km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone (km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone (km) 
Radar to Base 
(Single Entry) 
50 40 40 < 1 50 63 
Radar to Mobile 
(Single Entry) 
50 < 1 40 < 1 50 3.5 
Base and Mobile to 
Radar (Aggregate) 
50 24 40 < 1 50 32 
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Airborne Radar Systems 
The NTIA concluded that, a frequency offset of 50 MHz was needed in order to minimize 
the required separation distances. As shown in the analysis, co-frequency operation with the 
airborne radar systems would require large exclusion zones (in excess of 300 km). Furthermore, 
establishing exclusions is generally not a practical approach to sharing with airborne systems. 
Therefore, NTIA concluded that a frequency offset of approximately 40 MHz was needed to 
eliminate the need for exclusion zones for airborne radar systems40 ; see Table G3. 
 
Table G3 Summary of Exclusion Zones based on NTIA analysis, Airborne Radar Systems 
Radar to Wireless 
System 
Interaction 
Airborne Radar – 1 Airborne Radar – 2 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion Zone 
(km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion Zone 
(km) 
Radar to Base 
(Single Entry) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
Radar to Mobile 
(Single Entry) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
Base and Mobile to 
Radar (Aggregate) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
40 This is one of the rationales for limiting the sharing band to 3550-3650MHz instead of the full 3500-3650MHz. For 
airborne radar systems, there is no need for exclusion zones.  
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Shipborne Radar Systems 
In shipborne radar case, the exclusion zone is defined by a distance from the coast line 
considering interference to and from the shipborne radar. In developing the exclusion zone 
distance (i.e. NTIA analysis), it was assumed that the shipborne radar was operating 10 km from 
the coastline.     
To share this band, the NTIA Fast Track Report recommends geographic separation to 
mitigate interference. NTIA recommends exclusion zones around ground-based and shipborne 
radar systems. With respect to shipborne radars, NTIA has determined that extremely large 
geographic exclusion zones are necessary, reaching a maximum of 310km. That is estimated to 
exclude approximately 60% of the United States population that falls within that exclusion zone. 
As a result, our focus in this dissertation is on shipborne radars only, as the main PU antenna type 
reducing sharing utilization. 
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APPENDIX (H) 
 
 
 
SHIPBORNE RADARS SPECIFICATIONS 
Table H1 Shipborne Radars Specifications 
 
Antenna 
Gain 
(dBi) 
Losses 
Transmitted Power 
Height FDR 
Transmitted 
(dBm) 
Duty 
Cycle 
Average 
(dBm) 
S1 32 2 90 0.1% 60 50 0 
S2 47 2 83 15% 75 30 0 
S3 41.8 3.4 98 1.6% 80 30 0 
S4 38.9 2 84 - 84 30 - 
S5 43.3 2 93.3 - 93.3 30 - 
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